Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The paper purports to offer a
formal model that unifies deterrence and the security dilemma (or the
spiral model) in a way different from the current literature's. The
two models, deterrence and the security dilemma, have been regarded as
an alternative to each other. There are some formal works to unify the
two, but even in such models, deterrence and the security dilemma are
still treated as different worlds in the sense that actors do not know
which world they are in and therefore act based on the probability for
each. In my model, the world actors are in can change from one to the
other as a crisis proceeds. More precisely, in one's efforts to deter
its adversary by building arms or mobilizing its force, one may well
succeed in dissuading the other until some point. However, once its
deterrent act exceeds that point (without recognizing it), the world is
transformed to that of the security dilemma in which its deterrence
backfires by (unnecessarily) provoking its opponent. This is the
security dilemma in the sense that even if one's opponent is greedy,
its deterrence failure is not due to the adversary's greed but rather
because of the latter's fear, aroused by one's excessive deterrence,
that the latter may be attacked in any event by the former. The logic
behind it pertains to two types of credibility in deterrence, namely,
the credibility of one's threats and that of one's assurances. As
Schelling and others argue, a deterrent threat needs to be accompanied
by the assurance that as long as the opponent stays there, one will
not, the opponent believes, intend to hurt the other. This point has
been argued by non-formal works. The existing formal models, however,
are mainly concerned with how to make sure of the credibility of one's
threat without modeling to what extent it undermines the other type of
credibility of an assurance. My model, by showing the inherent
interconnectedness of deterrence and the security dilemma, illuminates
the delicateness of deterrence. With the United States being at present
the only superpower in the international system, policy implications of
the model would be of vital significance. Jervis argues that state
leaders tend to think that their benign intention is known to others
even though it is not the case in actuality. If neorealists are right,
the unmatched power of this country is ineluctably a threat to the
others. Hence, unawareness of the security-dilemma side of deterrence
could engender unintended consequences, ultimately undermining the US
power.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper explores the deterrence-vs.-restraint dilemma in extended deterrence. We do so within the context of the Tripartite Crisis Game under incomplete information. This model was developed specifically to capture the mixed motives and contradictory impulses that oftentimes frame extended deterrence encounters. To focus the analysis and to gain tractability, we make specific assumptions about the utilities of the players: Challenger, Defender and Protégé. Our most significant simplification concerns Defender’s type. In particular, we assume that Defender, although not heavily invested in the issues in dispute, is known to prefer conflict to the breakup of its strategic relationship with Protégé.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Intuition and international relations theory both affirm that commitments should be firm and transparent in order to be credible. Because ambiguity is believed to cut against the credibility of the commitment, it is commonly assumed that ambiguous commitments are inimical to cooperation and invite conflict. Why then do states often choose to make commitments that are deliberately ambiguous? The tension between the current state of international relations theory and empirical international politics presents a puzzle: anomalous ambiguous commitments occur despite prevailing theoretical predictions that they should undermine the credibility of the commitment by signaling weakness, creating incentives for opportunism, and, increasing the chances for misperception. This paper develops a three-party dual deterrence model to demonstrate that the form of commitment is often a strategic choice, and, under certain conditions, ambiguous commitments can actually outperform firmer and more transparent alternatives. We demonstrate that dual deterrence dilemmas require alternative solutions strategies and then introduce and analyze conditional threat and ambiguity strategies. We then show that under certain conditions these strategies can work to deter challengers from destabilizing the status quo when traditional alternatives would have the unintended consequence of bringing about the very outcome they are designed to prevent. The paper makes three important contributions to the study of international politics. First, it shifts our focus from credibility to variation in the type of commitment. Second, it identifies and distinguishes between various deterrence strategies for addressing dual deterrence dilemmas. Third, it challenges our intuition and scholarly presumption that information and transparency are strictly better by identifying some conditions under which actors are better off being ambiguous.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper examines the South Asian nuclear deterrence in light of the context and conditions of the second nuclear age. South Asia is an important case for examining the viability of nuclear deterrence in the second nuclear age.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: We explore the effect that the school environment has on students’ commitment and determination to participate in their own education, with particular attention to the experiences of first generation immigrants and African American students. In contrast to current theories, we distinguish between belief in education and commitment to school. In an environment in which ineffective control and non-engaging classes predominantly characterize the relationship of schools to their students, it is not clear that students would be socialized into the schools’ values and goals. Students need to develop strategies that allow them to remain committed to education while surviving their day to day in a unsafe, academically limited school environment. These processes are sometimes seen as minority “resistance” to educational norms. Instead, our data suggests that the nature of the schools in which minority students find themselves has a greater influence on sustaining or dissuading students’ commitment to education than does their immigration status or cultural backgrounds.