Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Because governments impose numerous trade barriers on thousands of imports from dozens of trading partners, litigation-minded governments will look for shortcuts to help them determine which foreign trade policies might be illegal, and thus worth challenging before the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Previous disputes taken before the WTO provide one such shortcut. The argument advanced here is that governments will be more likely to initiate WTO dispute proceedings against governments who have lost previous, similar disputes before the WTO. Put differently, governments who have a developed a reputation for “cheating” under WTO rules are more likely to end up as future defendants before the WTO. A set of reputation-based hypotheses are tested by examining decisions of more than 120 WTO members to challenge the antidumping duties and countervailing duties of other members before the WTO between 1979 and 2006. Governments who have lost past disputes are indeed more likely to be challenged in future disputes, particularly when past and future dispute settings are similar. Therefore, a poor reputation for compliance with international trade rules–as generated by the WTO dispute mechanism–entails significant reputational costs.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Despite being directly affected by decisions made in panels of the Dispute Settlement Body, the private sectors of society do not have standing to litigate before the WTO. In order to submit private-sector cases to WTO, there is a deep concern of private parties to strengthen their relations with government officials of the states. The influence of private sectors in the conduct of foreign policy of a state depends on mechanisms do not always institutionalized, that allow private interests become a matter of national interest. The purpose of this paper is to examine the means by which private parties affect State trade policies through the comparison between the political context of the USA and EC, in which there are rules that stipulates conditions in front of which governments must defend the interests of private parties, and the Brazilian political context, in which the choice of the case that will presented to the WTO is essentially political. We approach these questions by examining evidence from the EC and USA dataset on norms and WTO disputes, as well as interviews with Brazilian Commission officials and leading members of business associations.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Dispute resolution within the WTO is decentralised. As a consequence, a key to understanding the precise implications of the creation of the WTO for both improved compliance and domestic policy autonomy is why do governments take particular disputes to the WTO?
This paper focuses on the European Union because it is the world's largest exporter and second most prolific user of the WTO's dispute settlement mechanism and because its engagement with dispute settlement has been neglected by political scientists. In particular, I argue that the EU�s initiation of WTO complaints reflects the European Commission�s preferences and its role as both an active �gatekeeper� and as an entrepreneur. Crucially, how the Commission decides to pursue its preferences is influenced by the international political and legal framework in which it is operating and is marginally constrained by the preferences of the EU�s member state governments. The imposition of sanctions by the EU, however, reflects a dual gatekeeper, with the support of both the Commission and a qualified majority of the member governments required.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper addresses the timing of MIDs in territorial disputes. I hypothesize that a challenger state is more likely to initiate a MID when it can achieve bargaining leverage in other disputes.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: In 1995 the dispute resolution system of the WTO was transformed to make it more effective in enforcing WTO rules. Ironically, the improvements in the dispute resolution system have contributed directly to greater conflict in the WTO. How can improving a system to resolve disputes actually exacerbate conflict? Alter identifies a number of conflict enhancing consequences of the change in the dispute resolution mechanism. Conflict is not per se bad. Indeed if the outcome of this conflict is that governments must better justify participation in the WTO, then conflict is good. But there is a danger that international courts are more likely than most courts to generate conflict, while the international legal and political system is less adept at weathering controversy and addressing valid public concerns. Left unaddressed, conflicts generated by international legal bodies can erode support for the international legal system and multilateral strategies in general. Alter puts forth solutions designed to build into internationally legalised processes political safety valves, greater political sensitivity, and improved accountability, as well as legitimacy enhancing devices. Demonstrated here in the case of the WTO, Alter�s analysis applies to international legal systems generally.