Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: As international economic interdependence rises, so questions of international distributive justice press upon us. The terms of the contemporary debate on this topic have been set by the Rawlsian approach. Hence the debate has focused on whether globalisation has advanced so far that justice must be framed by a "global original position", a binary approach which ignores the variation and complexity of the ties forged by the international economy.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: While the debate over the
determinants of federal grant allocations has been argued from the
socioeconomic and the political perspectives, this study demonstrates
that federal funding is a function of both, depending on the category
of funding and the type of formula. It is generally understood that
socioeconomic variables, alone, will explain the distributive patterns
of formula grant dollars based on the particular measure of need used
in the legislative formula. However, grant allocation research has not
provided a convincing explanation for the disbursement of
non-formulated or discretionary funds. With discretionary grant
distributions, socioeconomic factors will be instrumental. Yet, certain
political factors will exert more influence over their allocations
depending on the definition of need used in the companion legislative
formula. Congressional influence via committee representation, for
instance, will be slightly more determinative of discretionary grant
allocations when these allocations are supplemental to specific
need-based formula grants. Thus, with need-based formulas that employ
crime, state representation on the House Appropriating Committees and
the House Authorizing Committee will yield disproportionate advantages
to those represented states because the definition of crime is more
manipulable. These formulas may be facilitated more readily through
periods of unified government rather than divided government.
Alternatively, when discretionary funds are a companion to population
(universalistic) formulas, there will be less opportunity for political
maneuvering at the committee level. Universalistic tendencies yielding
a more equitable distribution of funds and more credit claiming
prospects may be pursued by Congress unless otherwise encouraged by the
President. The current study compares two types of discretionary grant
distributions, one that was supplemental to a universalistic formula
grant employing population figures. The second discretionary program
was a companion to a specific need-based formula employing the annual
numbers of Part I violent crimes for grant disbursements. With a
unified government and a targeted presidential agenda, will politics
supersede universalism in our fight against terrorism? Are specific
need-based formulas more reasonable than universalistic endeavors? To
understand how future anti-terrorism federal grant monies, especially
non-formulated funds might be distributed, this paper explores the
influential mechanisms affecting the grant allocation patterns under
the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act and the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act. This analysis properly accounts for the explanatory
variables within the socioeconomic and the political frameworks to
assess discretionary grant allocations implemented by two separate
public laws, the first, during a period of divided government and the
second, during a time of unified government. The dependent variable is
represented by DOJ formula and discretionary grant allocations from
fiscal years 1996 through fiscal year 2001. The explanatory variables
include congressional ideology (i.e., Nominate scores) as well as state
representation on the Appropriating (House and Senate Appropriating
Committees and Subcommittees on Commerce, Justice, State, and the
Judiciary) and the Authorizing (House and Senate Authorizing Committees
and the House Subcommittee on Crime) committees for the 104th through
the 107th Congresses. The control variables encompass presidential
influence (i.e., statewide electoral votes) statewide political
characteristics (i.e., voting turnout percentages and inter-party
competition) and socioeconomic variables (i.e., population attributes
and violent crime data). In order to estimate the effects of each of
the plausible determinants, I employ a multivariate regression
analysis.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper explores the roles different brokers play in the delivery of pork in Presidential systems. In a typical setting, at least three actors seek to distribute resources: executives, legislators, and mayors. They face competing demands to build prospective electoral coalitions, address urgent needs, and forge alliances with each other.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: A number of recent studies have focused their attention on the relationship between welfare states and inequality, considering the determinants of income distribution and the distributive consequences of particular welfare state regimes. In this paper we examine more directly the relationship between welfare state generosity and poverty levels in advanced industrial democracies in the last quarter of the twentieth century. We employ data from the Comparative Welfare State Entitlements Data Set, a new cross-national and time series data set containing programmatic data from a number of welfare state programs, as well as poverty data from the Luxembourg Income Study. Our results strongly suggest that more generous entitlements to social insurance programs are associated not only with lower relative poverty, but also lower absolute poverty. While our results do not refute the idea that more spending or left-leaning governments matter, they do offer a more explicit policy mechanism by which to affect poverty rates.