Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Despite the growing attention on the possible inadvertent consequences of economic statecraft in
countries under economic sanctions, the studies have largely overlooked the gender-specific
effects of economic sanctions. Because sanctions can have a devastating impact on the target
country’s economy and political stability and that women often disproportionately suffer the
effects of such economic and political shocks, we argue that economic sanctions will likely exact
a very high toll on the status of women. To quantitatively analyze the research question, we use
four different indicators to tap the economic and political aspects of women’s status across
countries. Using time-series cross-national data for the period 1981-2000, our overall findings
suggest that sanctions inadvertently deteriorate women’s status in the countries under economic
sanctions.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The history of the regulation of women’s lives tells a plethora of
stories, including of women’s economic subordination. But while there
are familiar legal rubrics and landmarks in this discourse, such as
coverture, Bradwell v. State and Title VII, there are many other legal
events in a multitude of economic contexts that shaped the
transformation of women from economic dependents to independent economic
actors. This Article analyzes the legal history of this transformation
and argues that understanding this history provides an essential
foundation for comprehensively evaluating both the present state of
women as economic actors and the full panoply of laws that construct her
economic life. Beyond addressing workplace equality, conceptualizing
women as economic actors compels an integrated assessment of areas of
women’s financial lives that may be subject to discrimination or
disadvantage, including in lending, purchasing and bankruptcy, as well
as in access to an array of economic-related opportunities.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Our paper examines how veto players preferences and powers, domestic and international economic constraints, and policy diffusion affect various dimensions of economic liberalization in the developed and the developing world.

Publication Type: Hands-on Sessions
Abstract: This session will provide content knowledge, teaching strategies, & resources that link economic, environmental, and social systems. Presentation and hands-on activities will offer an introduction to basic ‘eco-eco’ concepts and ways to integrate them into formal or informal educational settings.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper explores the gubernatorial role in formulating state economic development policies. I develop a theory predicting how political and economic factors constrain gubernatorial choices about traditional and entrepreneurial economic development proposals.

Traditional policies attempt to attract mobile business firms to a state by maintaining a favorable business climate based on light tax and regulatory burdens. Entrepreneurial policies, rather than attracting mobile firms, are intended to stimulate the creation and expansion of local firms by providing venture capital, increasing productivity, and supporting the research and development of commercial technology.

I have analyzed the economic development policies proposed by governors of all fifty states in their major legislative addresses during the period from 1997 through 2006. My preliminary findings indicate that governors of states experiencing lagging economic performance include a greater number of economic development proposals in their legislative addresses than governors of states experiencing leading performance.

I also find that Democratic governors don’t accommodate a Republican legislative majority by proposing a greater number of traditional policies. Instead, Democratic governors propose significantly fewer traditional policies under conditions of divided government than when their own party controls the legislature. Similarly, I find that Republican governors don’t accommodate a Democratic legislative majority by proposing a greater number of entrepreneurial policies, but instead propose significantly fewer than when Republicans control the legislature. I plan to expand my model to include factors that may affect a governor’s decision to accommodate the opposition party, such as his public approval and institutional powers.