Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The effect of ethnicity on party politics in (1999-present) Nigeria has been paradoxical. Despite ethno-religious violence over Islamic law and an insurgency among minorities in the oil-producing regions, the ruling Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) formed a super-majority multiethnic coalition that has survived despite the scale of ethnic conflict. Chandra (2004) notes competitive intraparty advancement is a prerequisite for the success of ethnic parties. In unequal multiethnic coalitions, it is difficult to guarantee minority ethnic members a chance to advance within the party, when candidates depend on ethnic appeals for support at home that may escalate ethnic tensions. The PDP’s rotational system guarantees intraparty advancement of ethnic minorities without sacrificing members’ ability to campaign ethnically at home. Examining the 2008, 2007, and 2003 elections, I show how local PDP campaign strategies rally ethno-religious support but provide cues to minorities that ethnic “talk” by their rivals within the party does not violate the multi-ethnic deal. This redirects the literature on ethnic parties, which has focused on how parties are built on “nested” ethnic identities, but has ignored the dynamics of multi-ethnic parties.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Since 1989, there has been a continuing increase in the levels of economic liberalization and an explosion of interethnic, intra-state conflict. For many scholars this increased level of economic liberalization leads to an externally-derived, unavoidable redistribution of resources, thus increasing not only inter- but also intra-state inequality. Such a rise in intra-state inequality drastically increases the propensity for ethnic conflict. Using large-N quantitative methods economics-based scholars, who stress the causal links between factoral models of trade integration and occurrences of state disintegration in multiethnic states, have argued that economic liberalization leads to ethnic conflict because it induces the mobilization of the ethnic groups that can be better off by seceding. Alternatively scholars, who stress domestic-level explanations, have argued that economic liberalization leads to state shrinking, especially of social safety net policies, thus inducing mobilization along ethnic lines and ultimately conflict. Yet, both approaches stipulate that economic liberalization, with its increases in inter- and intra-state inequalities, is positively and linearly linked to ethnic conflict. However, the empirical record for this conventional wisdom is often spotty and subject to methodological biases, especially in their measurement of economic liberalization. We disagree on conceptual, methodological and analytical terms. We argue that the relationship between economic liberalization and ethnic conflict is a non-linear, inverted-U shape: hence, economic liberalization leads to ethnic conflict in the countries that have undergone medium levels of economic liberalization. We reconceptualize economic liberalization by measuring it in a composite index manner, thus avoiding the pitfalls of relying on one or two indicators. We test our hypothesis both in a quantitative and a qualitative manner. Quantitatively, we use OLS multivariate regressions to test competing hypotheses and we show that our hypothesis holds across time and space in a robust fashion. Qualitatively, we use four in-depth case studies (Sri Lanka, Bulgaria, Malaysia, and Ethiopia) to compare across space and time again and to illustrate aspects of the causal relationship that cannot be condensed in numerical data. Analytically, we conceptualize ethnic mobilization as a collective action problem and we synthesize collective action and resource mobilization theories. Thus, we investigate both the demand and the supply aspects of ethnic mobilization. Both in conditions of low and high economic liberalization, political entrepreneurs cannot induce effective mobilization drives. At low levels of economic liberalization, the state dominates the mechanisms of resource allocation and at high levels of economic liberalization, the market dominates the mechanisms of resource allocation. In the former case the political entrepreneur cannot credibly promise his members a greater share of allocated resources and in the latter case, the political entrepreneur cannot deliver to his members a sufficient enough share of the available resources. It is in conditions of medium-level economic liberalization, that political entrepreneurs can provide their potential members with significant and credible material benefits because it is at these levels of economic liberalization that potential members rationally perceive that ethnically-based political mobilization can alter profitably their payoff structure, i.e. there is a greater chance that by joining this type of ethnically-based political mobilization organization that they can positively acquire a larger share of allocated resources since there exists a significant amount of resources under state control. Overall, this paper illustrates how changes in the level of intra-state inequality interact with existing mobilizational resources to render ethnic conflict more or less probable.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Studies on the US have shown that minority-majority districts increase the turnout of minority voters and the electoral success of minority candidates. However, few studies have explored how various forms of ethnic geography affect minority electoral politics. We address this issue by examining the effects of Russia’s multiple layers of ethnic geography on minority electoral behavior. Russia’s ethnic federalism makes it a particularly interesting case since this type of federal structure arguably has direct and indirect effects of its own. Historically, ethnic federalism has advanced minority elites in leadership positions and promoted minorities’ geographic concentration and resistance to assimilation. We use census and electoral data disaggregated to the raion-level (roughly equal to a US county) to analyze the voting behavior of specific ethnic groups. We also use a multilevel framework, which allows us to capture the extent of the variation in our dependent variables--voter turnout and minority vote share--that is explained by the various levels of analysis, including raions, electoral districts, and federal regions. Our initial findings suggest that each level of ethnic concentration has a mobilizing effect on minorities.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Competition over scarce resources is frequently argued to lie at the heart of ethnic mobilization. Often embedded in this assertion is the belief that increased competition alters the instrumentality of group membership and can strengthen identification within an ethnic group when individuals perceive the group as an effective means for accessing valued resources. This, in turn, is believed to strengthen group solidarity and thereby provide the organization means necessary to mobilize ethnic groups. Despite the prevalence of instrumentalist approaches in the literature on ethnic mobilization, little analytic attention has focused on examining the linkages between ethnic-based instrumentalism, identification, and mobilization. Using survey data from the multiethnic country of Mauritius, we address this issue by examining the direct and indirect relationship among political and economic instrumentalism, ethnic identification, and participation in ethnic movements across two ethnic groups. We find limited support for an instrumentalist approach to ethnic mobilization as significant differences emerge in forms and extent to which instrumentalism affects ethnic identification and ethnic mobilization across ethnic groups. These results suggest a number of deficiencies in instrumentalist approaches to ethnic mobilization that build on an instrumentalist premise. Possible amendments that address these deficiencies and advance understanding of ethnic mobilization are discussed.

Supporting Publications:
Supporting Document
Supporting Document

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This research aims to investigate the factors behind users� ethnic preference, comparing the strength of ethnic identity and the ethnic relevance of e-health information. The first task of an experimental study had Asian American users read four pieces of disease-related information presented by two Asian and two White male agents. Both strong and weak ethnic identifiers perceived the Asian agents more expert and trustworthy than the White agents for presenting primarily Asian-related information and the White agents more expert and trustworthy than the Asian agents for presenting primarily White-related information. In the second task, both strong and weak ethnic identifiers were more likely to endorse an Asian agent than a White agent for Asian-related health foods Web sites and endorse a White agent than an Asian agent for White-related health foods Web sites. The results suggest a matching effect between agent ethnicity and the ethnic relevance of information.