Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Here I argue that in examining the outcomes of default how is contingent on when. A framework for assessing default costs is developed, unpacking slots of short time periods and associating them to a typology of costs. Through a process tracing analysis of the Argentine default and debt restructuring (2001-2005), it is showed how different types of default costs are combined, manifested, and eventually dissipated. Critical is not how exorbitant the costs are at several levels, but how their time-contingent nature leads to an ultimately amendable impact in terms of both economic recovery and political stability. This outcome is, however, based on complex dynamics and is consequently not easily predictable. Hence, uncertainty on the part of debtors as to the macroeconomic (liquidity) environment and to the microeconomic incentives of investors in bond markets keeps defaults as still relatively rare occurrences, even in the absence of a global enforcement authority in the arena of sovereign debt contracts. An implication is that international policy efforts that try to institutionalize a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism may damage this critical ad hoc link which seems to be working more often than not to induce compliance on the part of debtors.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: By constructing new measures, I empirically examine both ex ante and ex post control mechanisms that Congress has over the bureaucracy. Ex ante mechanisms are measured by the length of “important legislation” on average in a given year, and ex post mechanisms are measured by the number of congressional “oversight” hearings in a given year. The time-series analysis (1947-2001) is employed to analyze these two mechanisms both in the House and in the Senate.

The most notable finding is the importance of internal partisan politics in Congress. Homogeneous majority parties generally try to control the bureaucracy more often than not. And, distinct two parties cannot easily agree on exercising control powers over the bureaucracy. The subtle difference between the House and the Senate is also examined.

The second finding is the dynamics of the two mechanisms. The Senate experiences a substitution effect just as the conventional wisdom says. However, the House has a complementary effect of the two mechanisms, which is a new finding in this paper.

Publication Type: Proceeding
Abstract: By constructing new measures, I empirically examined both ex ante and ex post control mechanisms that Congress has over the bureaucracy. From the time-series analysis (1947-2001), I found that political parties matter: the homogeneous majority party exercises all control mechanisms more often, and especially, uses ex ante much more often. Furthermore, due to the long-time Demoratic rule, the Republic party becomes more active in the ex post control when they get the majority status. I also found that ex ante and ex post control mechanisms are complementary, not supplementary with each other: when Congress try to limit the discretion of bureaucrats, it exercises the statutory conrol (i.e. increases ex ante), checks later whether their agents are doing correctly (i.e. increase ex post later), and then allows some discretions (i.e. decrease ex ante).

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Previous research details the tools by which legislators
seek to influence bureaucratic policy-making. Recent research
highlights the importance of ex ante tactics by which legislators alter
an agency's structure or procedures in order to shape bureaucratic
discretion and decrease the likelihood of undesirable policy outcomes
(Bawn 1995, 1997; Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast 1989; Epstein and
O'Halloran 1994, 1995, 1996; 1999; Huber and Shipan 2000; McCubbins,
Noll, and Weingast 1987; 1989). Other work suggests that opportunities
to use ex-ante tactics are relatively rare and that ex-post tactics
(Arnold 1987; Robinson 1989; Spence 1997), including monitoring
accompanied with budgetary punishments, afford legislators ample
opportunity to influence bureaucratic decisions (Calvert and Weingast
1980; Calvert, Moran and Weingast 1981; Weingast and Moran 1983). The
legislative use of these tactics, however, has generally been presented
as a choice between competing alternatives, with legislators evaluating
the opportunity costs of engaging in one tactic at the expense of
another (Bawn 1997). Previous work has neglected the additional
possibilities that legislators may either simultaneously pursue both
tactics or may even prefer to engage in neither ex ante or ex post
tactics in their interactions with the bureaucracy. We argue that
legislators adopt different strategies of bureaucratic interaction.
Some members prefer to use all of the tools at their disposal to insure
bureaucratic responsiveness. These activist legislators favor both ex
ante and ex post tactics. Others are more pragmatic
preferring only ex post tactics to correct bureaucratic deviations
after they occur. Still others favor ex ante techniques to gain the
influence that they seek, preferring design over all other tactics.
Lastly, some legislators simply have no preferences for involvement in
bureaucratic affairs, favoring neither ex ante nor ex post mechanisms.
These legislators adopt a strategy of abdication choosing to allow
other actors (fellow legislators, the chief executive) to oversee
bureaucratic activity. We develop a theory that explains the strategies
that state legislators adopt toward state bureaucratic agencies. We
argue that legislators adopt one of four strategies of bureaucratic
interaction, and we expect that the strategies legislators' prefer
vary across both institutional and individual-level factors including
the technical complexity of the policy area, the resources available to
legislators, aspects of the political environment, and their policy
preferences. Using data from a survey of more than 2,500 state
legislators in 24 states, we locate legislators' preferences for both
ex ante and ex post tactics of bureaucratic influence. We then use
these two dimensions to characterize legislators by the strategy of
bureaucratic interaction they prefer: activists, designers,
pragmatists, and abdicators. We then model legislators' adoption of
these strategies as a function of both institutional factors and
individual legislator's characteristics. The results suggest that both
activists and abdicators are indeed present in state legislatures and,
more generally, that policy area characteristics, institutional
resources, and ideological preferences influence the nature of
legislators' interactions with state bureaucratic agencies.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Numerous agency relationships in
politics are characterized both by ex ante constraints on an agent’s
discretion and ex post review of their behavior. Congress constrains
bureaucracies ex ante while evaluating their behavior ex post. In 47
American states trial judges stand for periodic review while also
subject to legislative constraints on their sentencing discretion. What
methods insure greater affinity between agent behavior and the
preferences of its principal? How do these methods interact? In the
absence of ex post review, formal constraints carry the force of law
and allow a principal to commit to policies that are ex ante optimal.
By altering the range of feasible policies an agent can implement,
however, such constraints may also interfere with the principal’s own
ability to update on an agent’s type after observing her behavior and
therefore to discard agents with preferences that diverge from the
principal’s. A forward-looking principal must take this effect into
account when designing constraints on judicial discretion.
We develop a simple formal model that considers these tradeoffs in the
context of oversight of trial court judges. Judges are privy to private
information about offenders’ culpability when assigning sentences to
convicted offenders. Because judges’ preferences about which sentences
should correspond to a given degree of culpability may diverge from the
preferences of their overseers, however, citizens must be concerned
both with how much sentencing discretion lawmakers give judges ex ante
through the construction of mandatory minimum and maximum sentences and
whether they can identify and then replace too lenient liberal or too
punitive conservative judges ex post.
This simple model produces several interesting findings. First,
conservative and liberal judges are not equally amenable to control via
direct constraints on discretion. Rather, controlling liberals is
disproportionably more costly than controlling conservatives. Second,
because of this problem, mandatory minimum sentences are either
non-existent or completely binding for liberals. That is, there is no
middle ground. Third, under certain conditions, direct constraints on
discretion can facilitate, rather than interfere with, revelation of
information about an agent’s type.