Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: We identify incongruities between stated party preference and stated vote choice and show that they are significantly induced by expectations. We apply so-called exploded logit models for the explanation of (in)complete preference rankings.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The purpose of our paper is to explore
the extent to which Americans? explanations for gender and race
differences ? or, in another vocabulary, their ?theories? of gender and
race ? have consequences for their views about the problems that gender
and race pose to society and what, if anything, government should do
about such problems. Our analysis takes off from a simple intuition:
that the political significance of any social condition depends in part
on how the condition is explained. We take up race and gender, and we
take them up together. Most of the empirical literature on explanation
has focused on race alone; very little work has been done on gender;
and there is almost no research at all that considers race and gender
at the same time. Our investigation is designed to provide multiple
opportunities to draw comparisons: between what blacks and whites and
men and women make of gender, and what they make of race, and what
implications these beliefs hold for their views on politics. We rely on
data from two parallel surveys carried out in the fall of 2000 in
Atlanta and Detroit, among equal samples of women, men, blacks, and
whites. We augment these data with content analysis of narratives about
race and gender in the mainstream and Black press in the two cities and
with analysis of data from the National Election Studies.
In the end we find that explanation and opinion are in fact connected.
We find furthermore that such connections are much stronger and farther
reaching in the domain of race than they are in the domain of gender.
To put it in a highly stylized way, when it comes to politics ? in the
United States, at the present time ? race is a theory and gender is
not.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: State delegation to third parties to monitor and enforce war crimes violations poses a serious analytical puzzle. Why would states expend resources to prosecute others, and why would they expose their own officials to prosecution? Over the past five decades-stretching from the Nuremberg Tribunal to the International Criminal Court-states have gradually created, strengthened and broadened enforcement mechanisms for war crimes. Existing explanations focus exclusively on state motives, as captured in the debate between the logic of consequences and the logic of appropriateness. I move beyond this debate by arguing that two other factors, preexisting institutions and historical opportunities, can produce international enforcement mechanisms. I illustrate these points by reference to various enforcement mechanisms and then assess the plausibility of arguments focusing on state motives. Ultimately, the best explanation of war crimes enforcement rests on a combination of democratic states, preexisting international institutions, and historical opportunity.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper examines the institutionalization of the presidency by analyzing the stability and persistence of the organizational units in the Executive Office of the President (EOP). I provide a theory of organizational stability based in the micro-level incentives of presidents. I test my theory with data collected on all units in the Executive Office of the President from 1939-2002. I find substantial volatility in the institutional presidency and I find a higher hazard rate for agencies with preferences that diverge from the president and agencies that are hard to monitor. Older agencies, agencies with demonstrated expertise and institutional memory, have a lower hazard rate.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: What explains variations in state compliance with the 1997 OECD "Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions."? In an initial phase of follow-up monitoring to evaluate each country's implementing legislation, this Convention's peer-review monitoring group found a surprising variation in the compliance records of the OECD's four largest members. While Germany and the United States 'satisfactorily' complied with the Convention, France only 'sufficiently' complied and the United Kingdom did not comply. Why did some states comply and others not? Given the Convention's optimal design, function, and normative basis from the point of view of compliance theory, this outcome is particularly surprising. Employing evidence from research in the fours countries, and focusing on the U.K. case in particular, the paper assesses three alternative explanations for the observed variations in compliance: unintentional non-compliance; strategic trade; and norms related to transnational bribery. The analysis finds that none of the explanations initially suggested by the evidence is complete, but that a combination of strategic trade interests and normative factors is at play. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of this study for compliance theory in IR, and theories of international politics in general.