Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper reports results from a quantitative network analysis of international commodity trade flows designed to pilot measures of structural change and continuity over the period 1965 to 2000. This period is important because of the theoretical claims of global restructuring associated with the "new international division of labor" and the end of the north-south divide. The dimensions on which this study measures both continuity and change are 1) the form of the world trade structure, 2) upward and downward mobility on a continuous, hierarchical measure of trade structure, and 3) the global division of labor characterized by exchanges of commodities along a continuum of capital intensive to labor intensive/raw materials. The findings support the view that the "new international division of labor" has not reversed historical relationships between center and periphery.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Conventional analysis of social disparities in health concentrates heavily on gradational measures of socioeconomic status. By focusing on the “vertical” differences, this approaching could have overlooked other forms of social inequality in health, and in turn lead to underestimation of the extent of health inequalities. Using 2004-2005 data from National Health Interview Survey, this study examines social class effects on a variety of individual health outcomes. The results indicate that gradational measures of socioeconomic status leave a significant amount of health disparities unexplained. The actual extent of social inequality in health far exceeds our existing estimation. In addition, most of the unexplained health disparities are based primarily on detailed social class categories (i.e. occupations) rather than aggregate classes. This occupation-health association cannot be explained by characteristics of the work environment or social scale of occupations. This study also reviews potential mechanisms underlying the association between social class and health that are independent of the vertical inequalities.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: ISA 2003 Proposal Is War Rational? The Extent of Miscalculation and Misperception as Causes of War A central but often implicit debate in the causes of war literature centers on the question: is war mostly the rational and Clausewitzian pursuit of states and groups, or is it primarily the result of miscalculation and misperception? Explanations for war relying on offensive realism, expected utility theories, elite manipulation, or pre-emption all tend to be rational. On the other hand, hypernationalism, optimistic miscalculation, and the Cult of the Offensive are miscalculation and misperception explanations. Most theories about the causes of war, and most arguments about particular wars, can be parsed into either the rational camp or the miscalculation and misperception camp. Little work clashes the two sets of arguments, or spans multiple methodologies. I do this in three ways: First, miscalculation and misperception has to be defined so that they can be distinguished from a rational Clauwitzianism. Likewise, observable implications have to distinguish between the two camps. Those making miscalculation arguments must also show that the natural equilibrium of the states in question is peace. While there are many miscalculation and misperception arguments about war (Blainey, Van Evera), most proponents fail to take these steps. Second, I perform statistical analyses to get a sense of the extent of the miscalculation problem. I ask: how many war initiators lost wars, how many states started wars against more powerful states (and won or lost), how many states initially won their wars, but got balanced against and ended up losing, and so forth. When Bueno de Mesquita wrote War Trap, initiators won 42 of 58 interstate wars, leading him to argue that states generally make rational calculations when going to war. Third, case studies can answer questions including: did states and leaders accomplish their goals with war? If not, was war at least a reasonable bet; was there a reasonable theory of victory? Were these goals those that could reasonably be defined as Clausewitzian? (I use multiple criteria for rationality) If not the goals were not Clausewitzian, and/or the means seemed inefficient, what drove or colored the move toward war? My ISA paper will cover the first two issues. I will present the framework of the project and the statistical findings. So far we have found that war initiators only win 44% of the time, and lose 36% of the time (uncertain results account for the remainder). Assuming that most initiators plan on winning, they miscalculate with high frequency. Our analysis also shows when war initiators win, the average length of the war is 308 days. When they lose, duration is 660 days. This supports the arguments of Van Evera and Blainey that states start wars thinking they will be quick and cheap. When states calculate well and win, wars are indeed shorter than when they lose. To identify conditions which imply variations in miscalculation and misperception, I am analyzing such factors as: duration, presence of joiners, and relative fatality, force, and power levels.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: ISA 2006 ProposalIs War Rational? The Extent of Miscalculation and Misperception as Causes of WarA central but often implicit debate in the causes of war literature centers on the question: is war mostly the rational and Clausewitzian pursuit of states and groups, or is it primarily the result of miscalculation and misperception? Explanations for war relying on offensive realism, expected utility theories, elite manipulation, or pre-emption all tend to be rational. On the other hand, hypernationalism, optimistic miscalculation, and the ?Cult of the Offensive? are miscalculation and misperception explanations. Most theories about the causes of war, and most arguments about particular wars, can be parsed into either the rational camp or the miscalculation and misperception camp. Little work clashes the two sets of arguments, or spans multiple methodologies. I do this in three ways:First, miscalculation and misperception has to be defined so that they can be distinguished from a rational Clauwitzianism. Likewise, observable implications have to distinguish between the two camps. Those making miscalculation arguments must also show that the natural equilibrium of the states in question is peace. While there are many miscalculation and misperception arguments about war (Blainey, Van Evera), most proponents fail to take these steps.Second, I perform statistical analyses to get a sense of the extent of the miscalculation problem. I ask: how many war initiators lost wars, how many states started wars against more powerful states (and won or lost), how many states initially won their wars, but got balanced against and ended up losing, and so forth. When Bueno de Mesquita wrote War Trap, initiators won 42 of 58 interstate wars, leading him to argue that states generally make rational calculations when going to war.My ISA paper will present the framework of the project and the statistical findings. We find that war initiators only win 33% of the time since 1945, compared to 77% during the 1800s. Assuming that most initiators plan on winning, states miscalculate with increasing frequency. Our analysis also shows when war initiators win, the average length of the war is 308 days. When they lose, duration is 660 days. This supports the arguments of Van Evera and Blainey that states start wars thinking they will be quick and cheap. When states calculate well and win, wars are indeed shorter than when they lose. To identify conditions which imply variations in miscalculation and misperception, I am analyzing such factors as: duration, presence of joiners, and relative fatality, force, and power levels. I will be well into Phase II of this project by Spring 2006, and will have conducted a number of analyses to help explain why the win rate has declined so dramatically.

Publication Type: Individual Poster
Abstract: Background and Aims: Although it was previously thought that children do not acquire the ability to discriminate amounts (Piaget, 1960), recent research has shown otherwise. The present study seeks to reinforce these findings by discovering exactly how infants encode extent and whether a salient standard is necessary for them to do so.

Methods: Two cylindrical wooden dowels were presented on a stage with a camera behind it to forty 6.5 month olds in three separate tasks. In the first task, the infants were habituated to a wooden dowel 6cm high and 3.3 cm in diameter and then shown a second dowel 12cm high and 3.3 cm in diameter and looking times were recorded for the first and second stimuli. In the second task, infants were habituated to the same wooden dowel as in task l but the dowel was now inside a clear container that was 18cm high and 3.5cm in diameter. They were then shown the second wooden dowel from task 1 which was also inside a salient container 18cm high and 3.5 cm in diameter. Looking times were recorded for both the habituated and novel stimuli. The third task involved habituating the infants to one wooden dowel that was 12cm high and 3.3 cm in diameter alongside another wooden dowel that was 6cm high and 3.3 cm in diameter without the salient standard in task 2. After the infants were habituated to this stimuli, the dowels were switched and looking times were recorded for the novel stimulus.

Key Results: An ANOVA found that there was a significant difference between looking times on all three tasks with factors such as sex, size of the habituated dowel and condition. A significant main effect was found, F(2,113) = 26.335, p<.001.
Paired t tests show that infants looked longer at the novel dowel than the familiar dowel. In the dowel standard condition, infants looked longer at the novel dowel than at the familiar dowel. In the no standard condition there was no significant difference in looking times between the novel and familiar.

Conclusions: Infants were habituated to three conditions that differed in height (extent). Infants were found to look longer at the novel stimulus in the conditions that offered a standard, salient or otherwise, but not in the condition that did not offer a standard. These results support previous research that infants have the ability to encode extent but with a standard present.