Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The impact of the extractive industries on human rights and corruption has become a salient policy area in recent years. This has led to the emergence of global governance initiatives such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. The politics and design of these initiatives remain poorly understood. One reason is that the literature’s emphasis on ‘networks’ and ‘flows’ is ill-suited to the analysis of global governance mechanisms in high-stake policy areas. Arguably, an analytical focus on interest-based bargaining can add to the study of global governance by looking at EITI and the Voluntary Principles as transnational regimes. The paper compares the political processes surrounding the establishment of EITI and the Voluntary Principles in terms of strategic bargaining between four dominant sets of actors: multinational oil and minerals companies, international NGOs, resource investment ‘host states’ and company ‘home states’. Secondly, the structural design and potential effectiveness of EITI and the Voluntary Principles are compared. Differences in the bargaining processes are found to have had a determining impact on the design and potential effectiveness of each initiative. The paper lastly discusses the implications for other new mechanisms in the policy area.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The paper compares non-state, market driven governance mechanisms associated with transnational fair trade certification schemes to more state-centered certification schemes aimed at improving environmental and working conditions around mining and oil extraction. First, critical structural similarities and differences are identified and assessed, in relation to their expected/intended outcomes. Second, the paper explores ideas about how ? or on what basis ? the effectiveness of NSMD and state-driven certification schemes might be comparatively analyzed.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper engages the debate on the regulation of transnational corporations (TNCs) in the global economy. To that end, it draws on ongoing research on resource extraction and infrastructure mega-projects in Latin America. Undertaken by TNCs in cooperation with domestic governments, the projects under study have given rise to massive human rights violations, including the violent displacement of affected communities by state and para-state armed forces. Cases range from oil drilling in indigenous peoples' territories to big-dam construction projects in Afro-descendant and peasant communities. The paper discusses the mobilization of corporate social responsibility discourses and practices both by TNCs and social movements opposing such mega-projects.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: In practical criminological research, we often criticize our two major measurements for broad crime trends: the UCR and the NCVS. Both series, however, can be though of as measurements for the same underlying signal, or the true crime rate. In this paper, I use state-space modeling to extract the underlying true crime signal from the UCR and the NCVS. Using the Kalman filter and Kalman smoother, maximum likelihood estimation yields estimates of the underlying crime signal. Given these results, traditional predictors of the UCR and NCVS rates can then be used to contrast and compare their effects on the true crime rate.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: When is it rational for voters to ignore economic outcomes in making a vote decisions? Clearly, as we will demonstrate in this essay, voters frequently either ignore or give little weight to economic outcomes when they decide for whom they will vote. This essay will summarize a competency theory of the economic vote – developed more extensively in Duch and Stevenson (2005a) – that identifies the circumstances in which this is a rational decision. We begin by analyzing a large sample of election surveys and demonstrate that, while the economic vote is a pervasive phenomenon in developed democracies, its magnitude varies quite significantly and, with some frequency, voters give economic evaluations little weight in their vote decision. The competency theory that we summarize clearly identifies political and economic contexts in which we would not expect rational voters to hold incumbents responsible for shocks to the macro-economy. Moreover, we assert that most other theoretical approaches – in particular the classic sanctioning model of economic voting – have not developed good explanations for why and when the economy should not matter for vote choice. We then demonstrate that by working with a competency model of economic voting we are able to explain nicely the cross-national and dynamic variations in the magnitude of the vote that has puzzled students of comparative voting behavior.