Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: While there exists some body of scholarly work on intelligence failures (Wirtz, Levite, Kam, DeFalco and others), much less scholarship was dedicated to the second order issue of investigating these failures. As they are an iterative occurrence for many national intelligence systems (from Pearl Harbor, through the Tet Offensive and all the way to 9/11 and Iraq in the American case), a thorough investigation is designed to help prevent the next failure. However, a closer look at the investigations reveals that they serve a broader set of goals, and rarely assist national intelligence organizations in preventing the next debacle. The paper analyzes recurring patterns in several investigative bodies that scrutinized intelligence failures, such as the various Pearl Harbor investigations, the Israeli Agranat Commission, and the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. It then offers a cross section explanation of the limitations of these investigations, and points to the political contexts, institutional limitations, and epistemic constraints as major stumbling blocks in interpreting intelligence failures. In conclusion, the paper offers some remedies to the limitations it identified in investigating intelligence failures.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: While there exists some body of scholarly work on intelligence failures (Wirtz, Levite, Kam, DeFalco and others), much less scholarship was dedicated to the second order issue of investigating these failures. As they are an iterative occurrence for many national intelligence systems (from Pearl Harbor, through the Tet Offensive and all the way to 9/11 and Iraq in the American case), a thorough investigation is designed to help prevent the next failure. However, a closer look at the investigations reveals that they serve a broader set of goals, and rarely assist national intelligence organizations in preventing the next debacle. The paper analyzes three tensions in several investigative bodies that scrutinized intelligence failures, such as the various Pearl Harbor investigations, the Israeli Agranat Commission, and the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: While there exists some body of scholarly work on intelligence failures (Wirtz, Levite, Kam, DeFalco and others), much less scholarship was dedicated to the second order issue of investigating these failures. As they are an iterative occurrence for many national intelligence systems (from Pearl Harbor, through the Tet Offensive and all the way to 9/11 and Iraq in the American case), a thorough investigation is designed to help prevent the next failure. However, a closer look at the investigations reveals that they serve a broader set of goals, and rarely assist national intelligence organizations in preventing the next debacle. The paper analyzes recurring patterns in several investigative bodies that scrutinized intelligence failures, such as the various Pearl Harbor investigations, the Israeli Agranat Commission, and the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. It then offers a cross section explanation of the limitations of these investigations, and points to the political contexts, institutional limitations, and epistemic constraints as major stumbling blocks in interpreting intelligence failures. In conclusion, the paper offers some remedies to the limitations it identified in investigating intelligence failures.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: While the broad purpose of this research is to provide an improved understanding of general state policy innovation, we develop and test a model of policy innovation which examined the factors that influence the probability of a state restructuring its electric utility policies. The results of our model of electric restructuring generally support our hypotheses and more broadly the literature regarding policy innovation. Economic interests continue to represent a key factor in understanding the policy choices of state legislatures. States which faced high energy costs were most likely to look for opportunities to reduce those costs. Furthermore, states legislatures with the greatest resources and expertise were quickest to explore and adopt policy innovations in response to their high energy costs. States where the general policy preferences of those in power favored deregulation were also more likely to restructure. Finally, we note it is interesting that a policy innovation which has failed so miserably was most likely to be adopted by the most professional (sophisticated) legislatures.

Publication Type: Proceeding
Abstract: In an ideal word, doctors would choose what medical procedures to use on the basis of rigorous evidence. In reality, medical procedures may diffuse into clinical practice before they are scientifically evaluated. Once a procedure becomes popular, physicians may keep performing it, even after evidence emerges suggesting that it does not work. A leading example is arthroscopy for knee arthritis, which a landmark study has shown works no better than a placebo operation. We use the arthroscopy case as a window into the capacity of American government to serve citizens' shared interest in effective medicine. We identify severe problems at every stage of the policy process, from evaluation to decision making and implementation. Surgeons have attacked the study on questionable methodological grounds yet they have not insisted on the follow-up trials that would address the problems they claim undercut the study's unwelcome conclusions. In deference to expert opinion, the government has maintained broad coverage of the procedure under the Medicare program. These outcomes are unsurprising. Medical procedures are not subject to rigorous scientific evaluation in general. While drugs and devices are routinely tested for efficacy, there is no FDA for surgery. We argue that the systematic underevaluation of medical procedures reflects the simultaneous presence of market failures and government failures, and that this problem is not self-correcting.