Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Regulators are moving away from command and control regulation towards a variety of flexible forms of regulation, and greater reliance on individual firms and industries’ capacity for self-regulation. Among such flexible forms of regulation, Principles-Based-Regulation (PBR) has recently reached a prominent status, especially in the context of financial services. While the use of broad principles (in lieu of detailed rules) is not new, current PBR differs from its earlier manifestations in its further integration of performance-based and enforced self-regulatory features. Moreover, although the debates regarding the (dis-)advantages of using detailed rules vs. principles are familiar, empirical analyses of implementation of PBR are scarce.

This paper focuses on the UK Financial Services Authority’s shift towards greater reliance on principles in the regulation of retail finance, and in particular on principle 6 to the Financial Services and Market Act (2000) according to which ‘a firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and treat them fairly’. Since 2004, the interpretation, measurement and embedding of ‘Treating Customers Fairly’ (commonly referred to as ‘TCF’) have been the key focuses of the FSA’s regulation of the retail finance sector.

Informed by the assumptions of extant theoretical literature, the paper explores how TCF is interpreted by firms and the FSA, and the extent to which it results in flexibility and innovation. It further highlights the vulnerability of PBR in times of crisis. Methodology includes analysis of public and confidential documents and a convenience sample of interviews with industry participants.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Politicians from developed countries have recently increased demands for "fair trade" policies. The main claim is that inferior regulatory standards in other countries---e.g. lower labor standards---are unfair and constitute legitimate basis for imposing trade restrictions. Given that such rhetoric may be disingenuous, why do states pursue fair trade policies? The policies might be based on genuine societal values (i.e. belief in the morality of strong labor standards). Alternatively, the policies might simply be disguised protectionism. Although the insincere type has incentives to appear as the sincere type, I argue that the two types have different costs for foregoing fair trade policies and are distinguishable. For the central decision maker maximizing his tenure in power, the size of the relevant constituency for potential fair trade issues differs between the two types of states. The constituency and the cost of foregoing fair trade policies are larger in the sincere type, because demands for fair trade are based on broader societal concerns. I examine this argument in two empirical contexts---negotiations over international regulatory harmonization and settlement of trade disputes in international institutions. Sincere fair trade states are 1) less likely to pursue harmonization and more likely to 2) have a harder bargaining position in harmonization and 3) escalate to higher levels in dispute settlement. The finding rebuts the prevalent presumption that all fair trade policies are disguised protectionism. In addition to political science and economics, the research integrates sociology and philosophy (fairness and norms) and law (conflict of laws).

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper explores questions of identity as they emerge within the contested terrain of the Fair Labor Standards Act. The authors follow the emergence the “worker” within the new economy and workforce. In the end, the authors look at labor practice and participatory management for suggestions on how we can reinterpret the field and practice of human resources and labor organizing.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Despite evidence that playing “fair” alters outcomes in laboratory settings or even in everyday life, political scientists have given little attention to the possibility that fairness matters in negotiations. For example, when confronted with “divide the dollar” games, participants routinely propose splits closer to 50/50 than any rational theory anticipates and individuals nearly always reject “unfair” offers closer to 99/1 even if both sides would benefit from the division. If fairness plays a role, our understanding of bargaining situations needs revision. For example, the payoffs to standard games like prisoner’s dilemma or chicken, are altered. Communication (even of a non-binding type) acts as a signaling device to indicate the probable treatment of players. This paper moves the discussion of fairness out of the laboratory and examines the role of fairness in bargaining over trade. Individual negotiators in international settings actively consider the potential for “fairness” in trade partners. They respond differently to actors viewed as “unfair” than to those who will likely play “fair” in bargaining.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The embedded liberalism thesis argues that governments can build support for free trade by compensating economically those hurt by trade, usually with welfare or education policies. This strategy depends, though, on opposition to trade being driven by economic factors, such as job or income loss because of increased competition. The current fair trade movement raises many non-economic criticisms of trade such as concerns about the environment and labor standards. Many scholars dismiss these concerns as traditional protectionism in disguise. This article argues, instead, that for many these concerns are sincere and that this presents a growing challenge to the compromise of embedded liberalism. The article demonstrates this by examining survey data in the European Union and showing that those who support fair trade tend to have characteristics that are opposite those who support economic protection.