Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper asks why IGOs take action in international dyadic disputes. Three key determinants of action�organizational attributes, conflict attributes, and disputant attributes may each affect the likelihood of IGOs acting in international conflicts. In short, if the preferences of IGO members are primary in determining IGO action, then one would expect to see a relationship between the IGO member types and the target disputants of IGO action. However, if IGOs are driven by norms above and beyond the interests of the member states, then one would expect to see certain attributes of the conflict�such as duration, hostility level, and fatality level�as important motivators of IGO actions. Using PANDA data from 1984 to 1994, I code the level of IGO action for all dyadic disputes lasting longer than 24 hours. The cross tabulation, multinomial logits, and predicted probabilities suggest that intergovernmental organizations function as both norm generators and as venues to help states collaborate in action which supports their status quo preferences.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: While motives and behavior of political elites in stirring up ethnic conflicts attract a great number of researches much less attention has been given to the question: why do large numbers of people follow these leaders? Horowitz (1985) who was the first to pose this question suggested explaining mass behavior in terms of social psychological theories such as theory of social identity and theory of self-categorization. According him ethnic conflict can be considered as inter group conflict whereas mass behavior can be treated as a form of group behavior regulated by such processes as group comparisons, differentiations, categorizations and etc. What is however often slipped down from such social psychological approach is historical context as a background for the conflict mass behavior. From the other side political scientists readily recognize that the existence of antagonistic group histories is an important (along side with some others) factor in mass mobilization and conflict behavior. Group histories which are often referred to as collective memory may fan, quench violence, or even prevent such violent mass behavior but it rarely becomes a subject of political studies. Strange as it may seem collective memory and its role in driving mass behavior attract even less attention. It seems that the concept is too vague to serve as an analytical category. Collective memory frequently includes such notions as �??bad histories�?� of the groups involved, historical myths, �??ancient hatreds,�?� or identified as the aggregate of individual memories. The absence of clear-cut differentiations is probably responsible for the researchers�?? excessively cautious treatment of collective memory issues. In my paper I am persecuting two aims: first, to formulate a collective memory conception that might be applied to an analysis of mass behavior; second, to demonstrate the possibilities of such a conception using the Armenian-Azeri conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh as an example.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Hegemons seek to ensure that the less powerful states?the followers?follow, whether through coercion or benevolence. Strategies and incentives include, but are not limited to, trade, direct aid, diplomacy, and formal military alliances. Possible responses to the hegemon?s leadership are available to followers in the international system, including balancing, bandwagoning or neutrality. While this paper reviews the literature on hegemonic leadership, specifically the strategies available to a hegemon in order to garner support from followers, the primary focus of the paper is to examine the strategies and motivations of the followers. Do followers follow (or not) because of external security threats (realism), coercion by the hegemon, or shared values about how the international system should be ordered? Using contemporary and historical examples, the paper elucidates the domestic (e.g., political institutions, public opinion, etc.) and international (global and regional distribution of power) factors that determine the followers? motivations to follow or not to follow the hegemon. For example, what factors account for France?s decision to withdraw from NATO in the 1960s and yet not follow the Soviets? What factors account for both Indonesia and Malaysia, countries with close ties to the US through ASEAN, to criticize US policy towards Iraq in 2002-3 (Capie, 2004)? Why does Ireland pursue its ?Singular Stance? of unarmed neutrality, maintaining a lack of cooperation with US and UK security policies when other small European countries have followed the hegemon?s lead and abandoned neutrality (Jesse, 2006)?

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Using a sample of conflicts with security IGO participation, I ask if IGOs are likely to intervene in int?l disputes to maintain global peace or to support the SQ. Overall, IGOs tend to aid in conflicts with SQ states but use force to maintain peace.

Publication Type: Abstract
Abstract: The Food and Drug Administration is examining whether biologics can and should be treated like pharmaceuticals with regard to generics. Follow-on biologics differ from generic pharmaceuticals in that equivalence of safety and efficacy is more challenging to demonstrate. Because of these differences, generic biologics are often referred to as �follow-on biologics.� The focus of the debate on follow-on biologics has been on legal and health concerns, but there are important economic questions. How will differences in development and manufacturing costs and associated regulations affect the market for follow-on biologics? Will follow-on biologics be as competitive and provide the substantial financial savings provided by generic pharmaceuticals?

Generic pharmaceuticals provide a substantial price discount over branded products. Nevertheless, it is not the mere presence of a generic product in the market but competition between multiple firms that results in aggressive price competition and discounting. To assess the potential economic advantages to consumers from follow-on biologic products we must assess the potential for firm entry into this new market and whether competition among manufacturers of follow-on biologics is likely to be as vigorous as that of manufacturers of generic pharmaceuticals.

We analyze market entry and prices for follow-on biologics in the United States using four analogs. First, we analyze the U.S. market for generic pharmaceuticals. We report estimates of the number of generic competitors as a function of expected returns. We then report estimates of relative generic prices as a function of the number of generic competitors. We use IMS Health�s Generic Spectra data. Second, we analyze the U.S. market for human growth hormone (HGH). In this market some patents have expired and there are multiple competitors, but none of the products entered through an abbreviated process bypassing clinical trials. We will use price data on the HGH market from Drug Topics Redbook. Third, while there are no generic biologics yet sold in the U.S., Australia became the first regulated market to approve a generic biologic. We will analyze price data for Omnitrope, a generic biologic human growth hormone approved by the Australian Therapeutic Goods Administration in October 2004. Fourth, we will report prices of biologics in emerging markets such as Brazil, China, India, and Mexico to provide insight on manufacturing costs and generic competition.

Given uncertainty about the market for follow-on biologics, it is challenging to accurately predict how the market will evolve. Nevertheless, these four analogs can provide a better understanding of the likely market for follow-on biologics. Policy makers should be cautious in projecting large financial benefits for follow-on biologics for consumers and payers based on the experiences of generic pharmaceuticals. They need to consider how follow-on biologics will differ in terms of economics as well as scientific and regulatory factors.