Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The proposed paper presents the findings of a comparative research project on changing collective norms regarding security and defence policy in Britain, France, Germany and Poland. Are lessons learnt from history nationally distinct or do we find evidence of a common discourse revolving around the European experience of the wars of the first half of the 20th Century? The paper considers evidence from a media content analysis surrounding the interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo and Iraq, quantitative empirical evidence from questionnaire responses from elite actors and public opinion polls to measure differences between as well as within countries. One key finding is that there has been a convergence across Europe towards accepting that military instruments are sometimes necessary to protect foreign civilians from organised violence. On the other hand, the paper finds substantial differences in national attitudes rooted in collective identities regarding the use of force to promote values, material or political interests, or pre-empt threats. The paper argues that national strategic cultures thus limit the European Union to the role of a cautious humanitarian power (as epitomised in previous ESDP missions) unless it develops more flexible forms of intergovernmental cooperation on security and defence matters. A European Union that attempts to do more and live up to some of the aspirations set out in official documents will risk failure.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The threat emanating from political violence movements engaged in terrorist activities at the dawn of the 21st century poses serious questions relative to the benchmarks for operational counter-terrorism forces. Many cannot meet the demands set by a mode

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: NATO's military response to international terrorism includes the creation of a new Response Force (NRF) that is supposed to be able to react very quickly - within five days - to crises in far-away regions and simultaneously to modernize, indeed revolutionize, European forces. While the blueprint has the appearance of coherence it might also be structurally flawed: the eagerness of NRF advocates to implement the concept could cause allies who must bear the burden of change to resist transformation in favour of incremental change. An essential question - for NATO as well as experts on political and organizational change - is therefore whether NATO is rushing to failure or has found a means to overcome traditional sources of resistance to change. Change is promoted not only by NATO member states such as the United States, but by large parts of NATO's international staff, civilian as well as military, which for most of the 1990s laboured to promote the type of military changes inherent in the NRF. Most allies support the NRF in principle but policy-makers need to cope with diverging foreign policy, budgetary, and industrial interests that can - as in the past - inhibit the fulfilment of political promises. Military organizations may in addition be reluctant to revise fundamentally their ways of war if they lack trust in the process of change. The NRF is only a couple of years old but the crucial first stages of reform will tell us how these interests are coming together and whether force structure transformation is likely. The paper will also contrast the NRF with the force planning regime of the Europea Union and assess the implications for the political and organizational study of military change.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: “[E]arly warning research poses major challenges for peace and conflict researchers. Few dynamic models are in use, and we know of none being used to forecast civil conflicts or humanitarian emergencies in a policy setting” (Harff and Gurr, 1998). This statement illustrates a frustrating phenomenon that is present in the study of preventative policy measures of crisis around the world. At present there are two major dislocations that have been identified by the international community as relevant episodes that require policy and aid responses: environmental and political crises. While there exist comprehensive early warning systems in place to address these environmental crises (Duffy et al. 1995), the same can not be said for political disasters. The use of forecasting models to predict humanitarian emergencies is a relatively recent occurrence though there are some instances where it has been done successfully (Schmeidl, 1995; Gurr, 1993; Fein 1993; Harff 1993; Clark 1983, 1989). Despite the success of these works, the use of forecasting models by social scientists is extremely rare due to the tendency of these models to lack a causal structure that can be used in future time frames. This study addresses the need to model the complex processes of state failure and the humanitarian emergency, forced migration, by deviating from the traditionally used forecasting model and instead developing a causal model of state failure that establishes a relationship between state failure and forced migration. This relationship has yet to be established in the literature, but there is evidence to suggest that this relationship provides a more practical framework for understanding state failure and the causes of forced migration than previous statistical analyses of these factors alone. A greater understanding of what causes state failure and the relationship between the nature of the state and forced migration will allow policy makers to better predict, anticipate and prevent failure and subsequent forced migration.