Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: One of the most important factors that have been asserted to have an influence on political elections in the United States is Presidential approval. The success of a candidate at every level of government has frequently been considered by scholars to be tied to the fortune of the President, specifically if the President is of the same party. Presidential coattails have actually been demonstrated to be second only to incumbency in most models of elections for Congress as well as those for the Governors of the various states. But are there factors that scholars have not considered when evaluating the role of Presidential approval? Mostly, scholars have controlled for economic conditions and incumbency. But in looking at the other offices in which the President’s evaluations are considered to carry so much weight, how does the approval of the other actors themselves weight in?
The purpose of this paper is to reconsider the effects of Presidential coattails by putting approval to the test: do voters make evaluations of the party, reflecting Presidential approval as a criterion for party success? Or do voters instead vote by making evaluations of candidates, separate from their party evaluations? Can a Governor with high personal popularity overcome a failing President with the same party label?
To investigate these important questions, I rely on time-series data from 1980-2004, using Pooled Cross-Sectional Time-Series analysis. The sample will include election data for over a twenty-five year span and across fifty states. The focus of this essay will specifically be on the approval of the Governor vs. the approval of the President, with a focus being on the candidate for Governor of the President’s party. I will control for the usual suspects, including economic variables from each of the states, incumbency, and national policy mood. The data for this study are readily available, and the model will go further through time and space than any other of its kind. It also provides a fresh look at Presidential approval by testing its effects against what could be one of the most important factors omitted from previous models; approval at other levels.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This study focuses on the gubernatorial success of women. We exam the both campaign success and job performance once elected. We find the women face significant hurdles in the electoral process. There is an apparent bias among voters against female candidates that can not be overcome by campaign spending. Women have lower success rates than men when running as incumbents, challengers, or in open seats. Once elected governor women also have lower approval ratings than men even though there is no empirical evidence that there is a significant difference in the leadership of states between men and women. Overall, we find that although women are successful in raising money (when running as a Democrat) and states economies perform well under female governors there still appears to be a bias against female candidates in the electorate.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Skinner and Klinkner (2004) argue that attitudes reflecting racial prejudice were present in the 2003 Louisiana governor’s race, and were even stronger in north Louisiana. Utilizing an approach that better fits theory and available data, this study shows that they overstate the significance and importance of presumed racial prejudice in the election, especially statewide. Across the state, attitudes reflecting racial prejudice had no impact on the vote decision, and where they did in north Louisiana, the effects were small enough that they did not change the outcome of the contest. As argued previously (Sadow, 1996), prejudice concerning race has ceased to be a factor of importance to electoral outcomes when it comes to Louisianans’ voting calculus in statewide contests.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper explores the gubernatorial role in formulating state economic development policies. I develop a theory predicting how political and economic factors constrain gubernatorial choices about traditional and entrepreneurial economic development proposals.

Traditional policies attempt to attract mobile business firms to a state by maintaining a favorable business climate based on light tax and regulatory burdens. Entrepreneurial policies, rather than attracting mobile firms, are intended to stimulate the creation and expansion of local firms by providing venture capital, increasing productivity, and supporting the research and development of commercial technology.

I have analyzed the economic development policies proposed by governors of all fifty states in their major legislative addresses during the period from 1997 through 2006. My preliminary findings indicate that governors of states experiencing lagging economic performance include a greater number of economic development proposals in their legislative addresses than governors of states experiencing leading performance.

I also find that Democratic governors don’t accommodate a Republican legislative majority by proposing a greater number of traditional policies. Instead, Democratic governors propose significantly fewer traditional policies under conditions of divided government than when their own party controls the legislature. Similarly, I find that Republican governors don’t accommodate a Democratic legislative majority by proposing a greater number of entrepreneurial policies, but instead propose significantly fewer than when Republicans control the legislature. I plan to expand my model to include factors that may affect a governor’s decision to accommodate the opposition party, such as his public approval and institutional powers.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Campaign contribution limits have been a common feature of campaign finance reform efforts in most states. The use of contribution limits was seen as an important mechanism to lessen the influence of so-called “special interests” and to encourage citizen participation. Contribution limits could “democratize” the system of contributions by forcing candidates to rely on a larger number of smaller contributions thereby reducing the “value” of any single contribution. In this paper we focus on the alleged “democratization” effects of campaign contribution limits. We examine 58 gubernatorial elections in 42 states during the period of 1990 to 2000. Analyses of the number of contributors, the dollar amount of contributions, and the average amount of each contribution suggest that contribution limits do have a democratization effect. The nature of the effect, however, does depend upon whether one examines all contributors, just particularistic contributors, or just individualistic contributors.

Kihong Eom (keom0@uky.edu)
Donald A. Gross (pol146@uky.edu)