Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This essay refines power transition theories by developing a model of hegemonic disruption. Al-Qaeda does not command large armies from Indonesia to Morocco, nor does it or its ideological brethren have control of even a regionally powerful state; however, it does provide inspiration, operational support, and, most importantly, an ideological blueprint for many groups who seek to overthrow the status quo in their nations and region. For this reason, al-Qaeda as the centerpiece of a revolutionary and violently militant ideology can be seen as a global insurgency which presents an asymmetric challenge to US hegemony throughout Asia and Africa. While not an existential threat, nor capable of producing a peer competitor for the US, the al-Qaeda network’s ability to propagate its revolutionary ideology could plunge at-risk nations into instability or civil war or even come to power through short-lived alliances of convenience with non-violent Islamists or non-Islamist opponents of the ruling regime. Each scenario can undermine the hegemonic legitimacy and/or dominance of the US on a region by region basis. Al-Qaeda’s network and ideology is less likely to produce a national champion, such as communism had in the form of the USSR, than to instigate or take advantage of a series of flashpoints where its ideology squares off with local or regional opponents in insurgency or civil war. The conflicts in Iraq, Somalia, and Afghanistan could be seen as visions of the future for many states. Such disruption can be an initial indication of hegemonic decline, leading second-tier powers to sense vulnerability in the US, a vulnerability which may change their calculus of the costs and benefits of balancing against the US or posing a direct challenge. It could also lead the US into overextension, miscalculations in foreign policy priorities, and provocative policies which could alienate allies, threaten fence sitters, and play into the hands of critics or enemies of US hegemony, again changing the cost and benefit estimates for second-tier powers of balancing or challenging the US. A third possibility emerges if the American public loses its commitment to the duties of hegemony and begins to ask its leaders to minimize US involvement in troublesome regions. This too would lead to a reassessment of US hegemony by second-tier powers. The situation in Iraq today provides evidence for all three of these scenarios.

In addition, the unique features of US unipolar dominance complicate the strategic calculus of US hegemony. Following the demise of the USSR, the US has taken upon itself, on an inconsistent basis, the task of reconstructing the world in its own image. Both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations have committed the US to a revisionist goal of spreading of liberal-democratic norms around the globe as a first order foreign policy priority. As a revisionist hegemon, US power and policy directly challenges non-liberal-democratic nations and ideological movements – an ideological contest that raises the stakes for the US. The survival of al-Qaeda and its revolutionary ideology undermines the foundation of US hegemonic policies as it seeks to spread democracy and free trade. The US cannot ignore al-Qaeda and al-Qaeda is not likely to ignore the US. In this sense, unless the US moves away from it revisionism, accepting a more status quo realist hegemony, its hegemonic future depends, in part, on how well it can compete with al-Qaeda’s revolutionary ideology in nations with substantial Muslim populations.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Some democratization studies
suggest that former hegemonic/authoritarian parties should decline
and/or whither away once a nation makes the transition toward
democracy. Both Mexico and Taiwan made the transition to democracy and,
in 2000, former hegemonic political parties in Mexico (PRI) and Taiwan
(KMT) lost national power after ruling for several decades. Despite
these historic losses, both remain strong political parties in their
respective nations. In this paper, we look at hegemonic party reform in
Mexico and Taiwan. We begin to examine how these former hegemonic
parties have adapted to the new circumstances facing them and explore
the variables/mechanisms that have allowed them to remain strong. Both
the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) and the Kuomintang (KMT)
have always displayed a degree of flexibility, even in the heyday of
their hegemony. During the democratic transition period (1980s/1990s),
the pace of internal party reform increased in both parties. The reform
process became more intensive after 2000. Reforms and/or changes we
examine include: how these parties have adapted to losing the national
president as the defacto party leader; reforms that change the
mechanism for selection of party leaders and candidates for public
office; the changing status of sub-national party units; reforms that
attempt to bring new members into the party or change the status and/or
rules relating to party members; and reforms that result in changes in
party ideology. Electoral loss appears to be a key factor that has
driven party reform. It does not appear, however, that simply losing
elections is the only variable that has led to change. In some
circumstances it also seems as if these parties enact reform in order
to prevent losing before it occurs, akin to taking “preventive
medicine.” Initial indicators are that reform generally helps these
former hegemonic parties in the electoral arena.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The theory of hegemonic stability (HST) has been criticized on both, theoretical and empirical grounds. In this paper we develop a model that is in line with HST but provides a more sophisticated causal mechanism for the lack of public good provision though hegemonic leadership and we test this model empirically. In our model states differ in terms of both, ideal points on the relevant issue dimension and power; hegemons and other leaders can make side-payments to veto actors that oppose a change away from the status quo in a setter type model. We show that if there is leadership competition the hegemon does usually only get its way if it has an ideal point that is no more progressive than other leaders’ ideal points, even if the hegemon is significantly better endowed. We test our hypotheses empirically using CINC scores as a measure of our key independent variable by developing a measure of regime effectiveness based on the new International Regimes Database as our dependent variable.

Publication Type: Proceeding

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This essay argues that search engines are the hegemonic apparatus of the World Wide Web (WWW). Literature is critically reviewed from a variety of disciplines and angles, including social science theories and network theories, to support this argument. It is concluded that the WWW has a robust structure of skewed distribution of accessibility which is strengthened by search engines. The latter define the already highly accessible websites as more important and relevant on their search results lists. Moreover, search engines consider links coming from central websites as important to their sites’ ranking, giving them the power to determine which websites would be accessible via search engines. It is suggested to deal with the inequality of WWW accessibility by reconsidering either the corpus of indexed websites or the searching rationale.