Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper focuses on the interaction of ethnic and gender hegemonies in contexts of protracted ethno-national conflict. In situations of ethnic hegemony, competing groups seek to secure control over the polity and judicial institutions, the economy, and/or key social organizations. In such contexts, identities tend to become polarized, as ethnic entrepreneurs strive to encapsulate all interests and identities, including gender, under the banner of the national interest. As such, ethnicity and gender interact in ways that produce and reproduce complex patterns of power relations. One obvious pattern of relations entails male domination and female subordination. The feminist literature on ethno-national conflicts has powerfully documented the myriad ways that men control the polity, the military, and the economy as well as the ways in which women are victimized by rape, domestic violence, and political and economic marginalization (e.g., Eisenstein 2000; Enloe 2000; Nagel 2003; Stiglmayer 1994; Yuval-Davis 1997). At the same time, the scholarship also demonstrates that men and women are both complicitous in and opposed to projects of ethno-national domination, suggesting that patterns of gender hegemony in situations of conflict are not universal, totalizing, or necessarily permanent. Ethnic hegemonies and gender hegemonies may be contested and can be subverted. In principal, successful subversion of one hegemony might lead to subversion of the other. In this paper, we examine the close interlocking of gender hegemonies and ethno-nationalism, particularly under conditions of ethnic conflict and potential regime change. We deploy Ortner's notion of competing logics to explore the dynamics of gender and ethnic relations under conditions of conflict. How do hegemonic, counter-hegemonic and alternative ethno-gender logics operate in situations of ethno-national conflict? How do gender hegemonies function within specific practices and institutions? To answer these questions, we examine a variety of literature: on ethno-national conflict, on transitions and regime change, on gender hegemonies and gender regimes, and on specific case studies such as Bosnia, Northern Ireland and Sri Lanka. We then turn to the logics of different ethno-national and gender regimes in conflict situations, and we conclude with some suggestions/observations for overturning gender hegemonies in post-conflict contexts.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The paper deals with the phenomenon of hegemony in International Relations theory and practice. First, it develops a cartography of the existing approaches to hegemony in IR. Second, it discusses and evaluates two significant attempts to create a comprehensive framework for studying hegemony in world politics; that is, ‘agential approaches’ and ‘critical realist approaches’. The third section discusses the limitations of these two approaches, and proposes a new comprehensive framework for analysing the phenomenon of hegemony in IR. Rather than using agents and/or structures as its starting point, the proposed framework suggests approaching hegemony as a phenomenon of movement of power.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper examines both the practice and theory of IR, in the African context, in terms of the relationship vis-a-vis the great powers/(neo)colonialists and the capacity for intra-African counter-hegemonic policies. In the process, the author seeks to shed light on the hegemonic identity and policies of Nigeria itself in Africa and the balance between this identity and the identity of Nigeria as a state resisting great power hegemony and international institutional dictates.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The end of the Cold War ushered in an unexpected period of multilateralism. Organizations in particular benefited because they became repositories of legitimacy, both symbolizing the newfound emphasis on cooperation and providing sanction for international action. But was the growth of multilateralism merely a luxury indulged because the great powers faced minimal threat? America's behavior over the last two years suggests that multilateral action may have been an act of convenience rather than commitment. Or does it? Multilateralism is more entrenched in the international system than is often thought. Even nations that possess dominant power now find themselves operating under significant restrictions, and institutions are surprisingly relevent even though they are often dismissed. This paper will analyze US behavior in the MIddle East and Nigerian behavior in West Africa to test the hypothesis that the norm of multilateralism now restricts and shapes hegemonic behavior, even in cases where the hegemon appears to pursue independent interests.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Globalization makes a policy adopted by one state influence the welfare of other states. Since such an influence is often non-exclusive and non-rivalrous, a state produces a global public good from the perspective of other states. Global public goods ranging from liberal trade to controlling nuclear weapons tend to be provided suboptimally, since each state has an incentive to free-ride. Hegemonic stability theory and critics examined the relationship between the hegemon and provision of global public goods. In this paper, I analyze the role of the hegemon in providing global public goods and provide a more consistent explanation regarding the relationship. I call into question the argument that hegemony is sufficient or necessary for global public goods and argue that resolving a distribution problem is a key to provide a global public good efficiently. The hegemon might show efficient leadership in resolving a distribution problem, but asymmetric information is so costly to the hegemon in decentralized negotiation that the hegemon's incentive to lead other states for a global public good is questionable. By agreeing to delegate an international organization to negotiate with a state that produces a global public good, the hegemon and other states can achieve a Pareto-improving outcome.