Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: As incumbency may lose its explanatory power in districts where incumbents are pitted against other incumbents, we explore the effects of campaign expenditures on political competition in highly competitive settings.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The creation of the Scottish Parliament and Welsh assembly in 1999 brought a new electoral system to mainland Britain, mixed-member proportional (MMP). This paper examines the electoral effect of having two types of Members of the Scottish Parliament (MSPs). Lundberg (2006), using an elite survey in 2000 and 2003, has shown that MSPs elected through the constituency part of MMP spend more time doing constituency service than MSPs elected thought the list. This paper looks at the effect of these different types of incumbency on constituency vote totals in the 2003 and 2007 Scottish Parliament elections. While it finds that both types of incumbents have an incumbency advantage, this effect is small for list MSPs and is also affected by the party affiliation of the MSPs.

Publication Type: Proceeding

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Uncertainty reduction theory (Berger & Calabrese, 1975) has been well applied to newcomers’ information seeking behavior in their socialization processes. Yet little is known about information seeking behavior of incumbent employees, although they are the majority in many organizations. The field study was conducted to examine how incumbent employees in a contemporary organization seek information during organizational change from a relational perspective. The data from 124 employees of a public library that was about to face budget cuts indicated that incumbents use three different types of communication networks (i.e., organization-wide, workgroup, personal) depending on the level of perceived social costs. In addition, this study explored if perceived social costs differentiate the use of communication channels available in the contemporary workplace.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: In estimating incumbency advantage and campaign spending effect, simultaneity bias is present. In order to solve it, my model explicitly takes into account ``analyst's error'' which analysts do not know but players know. Estimation by Markov Chain Monte Carlo, especially data augmentation, enables us to integrate analyst's error out and employ a non closed-form likelihood function, which is the joint distribution of the five endogenous variables: vote margin, both parties' campaign spending and candidate quality. I derive equilibrium of my game-theoretical model and plug it into my statistical model. I show superiority of my model compared to a conventional estimator by Monte Carlo simulation. Empirical application of this model to the recent U.S. House election data demonstrates that, as suspected, incumbency advantage is smaller, defender's campaign spending effect is larger and positive, and challenger's campaign spending effect is smaller than previously shown.