Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: An understanding of how insurgencies arise, the nature, goals and strategies of insurgent groups, and the relative effectiveness of a state’s response to insurgencies are of critical importance. This paper addresses the latter issue—how states can best end insurgencies. Specifically, it asks: Why do some insurgencies end in negotiated settlements while others persist as protracted conflicts?
The essay argues that insurgencies are more likely to end in negotiated settlement if civil-military relations within a state are harmonious. Discordant relations between the government and the armed forces are likely to result in a continuation of hostilities between the government and the insurgent groups. To illustrate the argument, the paper examines two insurgencies in Southeast Asia—the ongoing Muslim struggle for independence in Southern Thailand, and the successful peace deal between the government of the Philippines and the Moro-National-Liberation-Front in the southern province of Mindanao in 1996. The paper suggests that the southern Thailand insurgency persists because of the continuing tensions in civil-military relations while the insurgency in Mindanao ended with a peace agreement in 1996 because of the harmonious civil-military relations in the Philippines during the administration of President Fidel Ramos.

Publication Type: Proceeding

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: There exists a widespread perception that the recurrent and cascading episodes of ethnic cleansing witnessed in the Balkans in the 1990s represented something new and novel. However, the uncomfortable fact is that both states and non-state actors have long utilized population displacement as a tactical weapon against their adversaries. In the context of counter-insurgency operations, states have been particularly prone to use “regroupment camps” or “strategic hamlets” in order to—in Mao’s terms—“drain the sea” of water (civilians) to expose and kill the fish (guerrillas). Nevertheless, despite the frequency of its employment, the historical evidence on the efficacy of regroupment as a tactical weapon in counterinsurgency operations is mixed at best. In fact, evidence suggests that—except under a very circumscribed set of conditions—the long-term political and military costs of using population regroupment as a tool of counter-insurgency tend to outweigh the short-term military benefits. In fact, while there have been some noteworthy relocation successes—e.g., the British in Malaya in the q950s—more often than not, population relocation schemes actually backfire, galvanizing support for insurgents rather than their opponents.

Drawing upon existing literatures on social revolutions, foreign policy decision-making, and behavioral psychology—as well as evidence from myriad counterinsurgency operations since the start of the 20th century—this paper offers two sets of hypotheses. One set seeks to explain why population relocation remains a common feature of counter-insurgency operations, despite its problematic track record. A second set proposes an explanation as to why—and under what conditions—population relocation schemes will succeed or fail in their objectives. Historical cases examined include the Boer War, the Malaya Emergency, the Mau Mau Revolt, the Huk Rebellion, the French-Algerian War, the Vietnam War, and the wars for Angola and Mozambique. More contemporary cases are also examined, including recent or ongoing civil conflicts in Guatemala, Burundi, and Kurdistan.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: How do actors choose strategies when engaging in intra-state conflicts? Studies of international wars (Stam 1996) find that strategy choice has a significant effect on both the duration and outcome such conflicts. Unfortunately, despite great variation in rebel groups and state responses, such research has not been conducted with regard to civil wars. Furthermore, even less thought has been directed toward the question of how the warring parties come to choose these strategies in the first place. Of particular interest is the adoption of insurgent and counter-insurgent strategies by actors in intra-state wars.One important factor that may influence strategic decision-making for both rebels and governments is the experiences of other actors in the system. The diffusion of insurgency and counter-insurgency strategies across space and time may play an important role in determining the perceived scope of available strategic options and the actual strategies chosen in the end. Research on diffusion in fields like anthropology and sociology (Rogers 2003) shows the importance of a variety of factors, such as interpersonal networks, the ability to implement new innovations with limited experiments, and the cost of an innovation, in determining the rate and scope of diffusion throughout a system. This paper will use previous research on diffusion in other fields, along with the limited available literature in political science (Goldman and Eliason 2003), to develop a theory of strategic diffusion as it relates to insurgency and counter-insurgency, generate hypotheses from the theory, and conduct initial empirical tests. These tests will take two forms. First, in-depth historical research will be used to trace the actual decisions of several key actors over time. Second, by coding the insurgent and counter-insurgent strategies of rebel groups and governments, quantitative statistical methods will also be utilized in order to establish if consistent patterns of diffusion occur across time and/or space. By theorizing about insurgency and counter-insurgency, this paper will fill an important gap in the existing political science literature and potentially act as a predictive tool for understanding the decisions made by insurgent groups in future conflict situations.