Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The present body of literature on the causes for intelligence failures has not shown so far the impact of cultural factors neither on traits in data collection, nor on the quality of information processing. Consequently, the literature lacks convincing explanations why certain organizations are more likely to fall victim to specific obstacles while others less so. In order to bridge this gap in the theory of intelligence failures, the suggested paper will: (a) Introduce the concept of ‘intelligence culture’ to explain the variance in the predisposition to analytical pathologies across various intelligence organizations, and (b) Illuminate the main cultural traits of the CIA, the Soviet/Russian Intelligence Services and Israel's Military Intelligence (AMAN), in order to present their impact on the way specific obstacles hamper high quality information acquisition and processing and lead to intelligence failures.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Intelligence regarding pre-war Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction has become central to the debate over the US war in Iraq because of the importance that the Bush Administration gave to it in the run-up to the war, and the subsequent failure to find WMD. As a result, much attention has focused on the quality of the intelligence and the possible causes of intelligence failure. However, any assessment of intelligence failure should also address the relationship between intelligence and policymaking because it can affect the incorporation of intelligence into decisionmaking, and as a result can affect the success or failure of various policies. Yet very little attention has been focused on the various means of intelligence delivery and its effect on that relationship. For example, CIA's Directorate of Intelligence produces reports and transmits the information to policymakers differently than either the US National Intelligence Council or the British Joint Intelligence Commitee, and the differences between them could potentially shape the content of the information and its incorporation into decisionmaking in different ways. The purpose of this paper will be to evaluate the impact of intelligence agency means of delivery on the incorporation of Iraqi WMD into the decision to go to war. In the end, this study will tackle one of the fundamental questions of intelligence agency organization: how should intelligence agencies be organized to interact with policymakers for purposes of optimal national security decisionmaking?

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: While there exists some body of scholarly work on intelligence failures (Wirtz, Levite, Kam, DeFalco and others), much less scholarship was dedicated to the second order issue of investigating these failures. As they are an iterative occurrence for many national intelligence systems (from Pearl Harbor, through the Tet Offensive and all the way to 9/11 and Iraq in the American case), a thorough investigation is designed to help prevent the next failure. However, a closer look at the investigations reveals that they serve a broader set of goals, and rarely assist national intelligence organizations in preventing the next debacle. The paper analyzes recurring patterns in several investigative bodies that scrutinized intelligence failures, such as the various Pearl Harbor investigations, the Israeli Agranat Commission, and the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States. It then offers a cross section explanation of the limitations of these investigations, and points to the political contexts, institutional limitations, and epistemic constraints as major stumbling blocks in interpreting intelligence failures. In conclusion, the paper offers some remedies to the limitations it identified in investigating intelligence failures.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Scholars? heightened interest in the activities and the control of intelligence services reflects the agencies? increased importance over the last few years. Despite this, intelligence studies has made relatively few scientific advances: On the one hand, it relies extensively on research on decicive moments in the history of specific national intelligence services. Albeit interesting, such accounts rarely produce core propositions, let alone lead to empirical validity testing. On the other hand, the main alternative research stream which relies on both democratic and organizational theory to provide comparative insights into aspects of democratic intelligence governance faces the problem that its ?scientific? approach borders educated advocacy. What is more, while it certainly helps to elucidate the breadth of necessary reform, it has few answers for the persistent re-occurrence of intelligence scandals.With this paper, we discuss a possible means to overcome this impasse. Drawing on Frost?s constitutive theory and the notion of ?embedded? human rights we apply normative theory to the hard case of balancing between the norms of confidentiality and accountability in intelligence affairs. Based on empirical data on emerging practices to adopt codes of intelligence ethics, we test normative theory?s ability to resolve seemingly intractable conflicts between the respect for individual civil liberties and the protection of national security. We conclude that the rights of intelligence agencies can be constituted by the rights of the democratic society, if and only if, agencies fully incorporate the standards of the democratic society through their own training.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The primary focus of intelligence studies is to find ways of improving the quality of information gathering and analysis. But excellence in obtaining and assessing the information is not sufficient. If the intelligence product has no impact on the decision maker, then resources spent on the intelligence system have been wasted. This paper explores the issue of how, when and why intelligence impacts ? or fails to impact ? decision making at the highest levels. The paper uses the typology method to identify four types of potential effect and failure of effect of intelligence on the decision maker. Each type is characterized by the unique traits of the decision maker and the intelligence maker, the relationship between them and the general context. The second part of the paper uses this theoretical typology to examine the impact of the Israeli intelligence (AMAN) on key decision makers in five critical episodes between 1955 and 1990.