Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The question posed in this paper is whether economic interdependence is effective in reducing conflict in periods in which there is the greatest potential for conflict? Is economic interdependence effective in reducing conflict as states increase in relative power? Using data from the Correlates of War Project from 1870 to 1992 we test the combined effect of economic interdependence and an increase in capabilities of states against the probability of conflict. We conclude that increased economic interdependence and an increase in state power results in the increased likelihood of conflict. We also argue that relative power and economic interdependence capture similar effects and are collinear measures to a degree.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: What determines the level of a country's military expenditures?
Numerous empirical investigations have addressed this question, but
most of them have failed to provide unbiased results due to problems
of simultaneity or omitted variables. This paper solves these
problems by estimating a spatial interdependence model of the
military expenditures of neighboring countries that also incorporates
variables such as attitude toward risk, participation in a
militarized interstate dispute, potential costs of war, and the role
of democracy. The evidence not only shows that spatial
interdependence is a major determinant of military expenditures, but
also that there is positive feedback between countries. In other
words, the military allocations of countries are positively related
to the military expenditures of their neighbors. In addition, the
democratic nature of countries plays a significant role in the
reduction of military arsenals.

Publication Type: Proceeding
Abstract: The reform of the welfare state is one of the most widely studied topics in political science, but the literature is deficient in at least two respects. Firstly, scholars have tended to focus on income-replacement programs and to neglect the health care field, despite the importance of health care expenditures for public budgets and the significant reforms occurred in recent years. Secondly, with a few recent exceptions the literature has not seriously taken into account the possibility that the reforms carried out in the various countries have been interdependent. In other words, the literature has not sufficiently examined if, and how, welfare state reforms have diffused across countries. This is a major problem because political diffusion processes are very common, as pointed out in particular by the recent diffusion literature in comparative and international political economy. This paper addresses both points by studying the spread of hospital financing reforms. During the past 20 years, most OECD countries have progressively shifted from retrospective reimbursement of hospitals to prospective financing based on diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) or similar methods, which are considered to be more effective tools in containing hospital expenditures. While changes in hospital financing methods are certainly linked to country-specific factors as well as to common pressures, our main argument is that they are in part due to a diffusion process. We develop a theoretical model of diffusion that distinguishes among several diffusion mechanisms, and in the empirical analysis we focus on learning. We rely on an original dataset on hospital financing reforms in OECD countries and use event-history methods to investigate the presence and nature of diffusion patterns. Findings show that hospital financing reforms have spread in part as the result of a learning process.

Publication Type: Proceeding
Abstract: This paper maps out a neoclassical realist framework for understanding the relationship between domestic politics, economic interdependence, and cooperation. Much of the literature on economic interdependence assumes that there is a causal relationship between interdependence and cooperation. Systemic realist analyses have begged to differ; so too have neoclassical realist analyses, but for very different reasons. The framework presented here starts with the observation that intra-group resource allocation processes always involve internal competition (electoral competition in democracies; bureaucratic struggles in non-democracies). It argues that such competition is also always connected to the politics of group identity, as a process of self-other differentiation in the modern Wesphalian system that links groups identity to notion s of autonomy and territorial self-determination. It argues that this link between intra-group competition and identity politics, in both its implicit or explicit forms, drives interdependent cooperation, and hence there is little reason to be sanguine about the phenomenon. It utilizes cases from the US (implicit forms of ID politics) and China-Taiwan (explicit forms of ID politics) to illustrate this framework. Although it concurs with most systemic realist analysis that cooperation, peace, and interdependence do not necessarily correlate, it also raises questions about the compatibility of insights drawn from neorealist and neoclassical realist analysis.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Through an analysis of in-depth interviews with participants in networks of care, this paper explores the tensions between ideology of individualism and the practice of interdependence. It pays particular attention to the ways that men and women weigh the advantages of household and network interdependence, especially in relationships with children, against the costs of social entanglements.