Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Most people assume that terrorist organizations, since they operate outside of the norms of society, are immune to the vicissitudes of public opinion. In fact, most terrorist organizations, like political parties, are ultimately power seeking and see themselves as future leaders of their community, especially when the conflict involves ethno-religious and territorial disputes. Similar to Mao’s theory of the fishes and the Sea, the terrorists live and operate from within the parameters of the public and thus for many reasons which we will explore in this paper, are both cognizant and susceptible to how they are perceived by members of rival groups, the larger society in which they live, and international public opinion.This need to address public support occasionally means that if the terrorists engage in policies or strategies that are far more radical and violent than the sentiments of their publics, they risk losing their base. The terrorists may be circumscribed in the kinds of strategies they can initiate. If they engage in operations that their publics reject, there is a good chance that they will switch tactics and limit operations in the future.A case in point in the IRA’s failed “suicide” bomber campaign in 1990; during this period the IRA kidnapped and forced at gunpoint several Catholic “volunteers” for suicide car bombs. While their families were held hostage, the men were forced to ram the explosive laden vehicles into British military checkpoints. Republican Public responses to the incident were so negative that the IRA was forced to rethink this tactic and shift gears. Thus this paper argues that the terrorist organizations do not shape public opinion, rather at times, public opinion can limit (and shape) the actions of terrorists.The paper draws from theoretical assumptions of terrorism as a coercive and offensive strategy; arguments made in the civil war literature about the multiple and intimate connections between insurgent groups and the population, and primary source interviews with the IRA leadership and one of the “suicide” proxy bombers who survived his “mission.”

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: A plausible assumption for most observers of terrorist movements is that such groupings, given their tendency to frequently operate outside of societal norms, are relatively immune to the vicissitudes and pressures of public opinion. In fact, most terrorist movements, like political parties, are ultimately power seeking, perceiving themselves as the future leaders of their respective community. This is particularly the case when the conflict in question relates to ethno-religious and territorial disputes. Following from Mao�s theory of the
�Fishes and the Sea,� terrorists live within and operate according to certain parameters of the public and, for reasons explored in this paper, are both cognizant of and susceptible to how they are perceived by members of their ethnic/religious community, rival groups, as well as international public opinion. This sensitivity to public support occasionally means that when the terrorists engage in tactics or strategies that are perceived to be more radical or violent than that which their publics have become used to tolerating, the movement risks the consequences of backlash.

It thus would seem to follow that terrorists may be circumscribed in the kinds of strategies they can pursue and the immediate tactical methods they can deploy. One such example is the IRA�s failed �human bomb� campaign of 1990, often referred to as the �proxy bomb� campaign, and sometimes misleadingly referred to as the IRA�s �suicide bomb� campaign. The particular operations that came to typify this activity during the IRA�s campaign of terrorism throughout the Troubles involved the kidnapping at gunpoint of several Catholics (not members of the IRA), with victims being subsequently coerced to drive vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs) into military targets. In some cases, the victim�s family would be held at gunpoint until completion of the operation. A little explored feature of the proxy bomb attacks is that public opinion against the IRA, even from within the broader Republican community, was so negative that the IRA quickly discontinued the use of the tactic. While the reasons behind both the execution and discontinuation of the proxy bomb campaign are still poorly understood, the IRA is one of the few historical cases we have in which the use of human bombs (albeit of one particular type here) failed in a strategic sense due to the limits of public sensibilities and a lack of tolerance for targeting civilians in this particular way.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The IRA's disarmament has been variously explained. This paper, based onarguments published before the IRA's comprehensive disarmament, argues forthe centrality of constitutional objectives in explaining the IRA's origins,maintenance and dissolution. Both the IRA's constitutional mission and itsinternal constitutional organization are addressed. Constitutionalengagement was a necessary part of bringing the IRA's war to an end.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper is an analysis of changes in the Blair government?s stance towards the IRA which impacted Jerry Adam?s support for decommisioning. British and American broadcast and print media are analyzed. Attention is paid to framing and context.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Since 9/11, Britain has experienced a rise in ‘home-grown’ political violence, a renewed concern with counter-terrorist legislation, intelligence and diplomacy, and the profiling of a British-resident (and often born) ethnic/religious community as an alie