Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: With India slated to become a major economic power in the Asian region and according to RAND Corporation, could position itself in a strategic political actor in the affairs of the region, if its economy continues to sustain growth levels of 6-7 %. The economy is at around 8.5% at the moment. In this context it is imperative for India's policy makers to have a credible energy security strategy.
India has been active in negotiations to build natural gas pipeline from Iran thru Pakistan to India to boost its growing energy hungry economy. Iran's geopolitics is a major concern and it is crucial for Indian policy makers to understand and analyze the political risks while dealing with Iran, which has been termed as a rogue state by the United States.
This paper makes an attempt to achieve two goals:
1. A study of the hardliner and reformist elements in the making of Iranian foreign policy and the central difficulty in its analysis.
2. An attempt to understand the political risk analysis of Iran in the context India’s vigorous pursuit of building a pipeline from that nation.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This work examines the history of the Iranian nuclear program from the 1970s till the present. It also studies the economic, political, and potential strategic impact of a developing country acquiring nuclear capabilities, both civilian and military. In addition the paper examines the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the ramifications a potential Iranian nuclear program would have on the treaty. Finally the paper examines the ramifications an Iranian nuclear program has on Tehran's foreign policy regarding the United States, the Russian Federation, and the European Union, as well as with its neighbors in the region. This work also takes into account the implications of the upcoming Iranian election on this issue.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: According to Alexander George, "the general idea of coercive diplomacy is to back one's demand on an adversary with a threat of punishment for non-compliance that he will consider credible and potent enough to persuade him to comply with the demand" (Forceful persuasion, 1997). The Western policy (US and EU) vis-à-vis Iran since the beginning of 2003 is an example of coercive diplomacy.The EU, and more in particular the EU-3 (France, the UK and Germany), regarded the Iranian conflict as a first test-case for the implementation of the EU Security Strategy (December 2003). Also because the US refused to talk to the regime in Teheran, the EU manoeuvred itself in the spotlights of international politics. For nearly two and a half years, the EU tried to convince Iran to give up its extensive civilian nuclear programme in exchange for economic benefits (= coercive diplomacy). The EU effort failed. The Iranian file then moved to the UN Security Council where the US took up the role of coercer.The aim of the paper is to describe and to analyse EU and US policy with respect to Iran since 2003. First of all, what did the EU-3 and US demarches accomplish ? How effective were the EU-3 and the US ? While it is clear that the EU-3 could not convince Iran in the end, the EU-3 action may not have been without accomplishments (gathering information; winning time; forming a consensus in the rest of the world). Secondly, what are the reasons that the EU (and maybe the US too) could not convince Iran in the end ?
On the basis of the theoretical literature - more in particular Alexander George, ibid.; Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, 1960; Thomas Schelling, Arms and influence, 1966; Peter Jakobson, Western use of coercive diplomacy after the Cold War, 1998; Bruce Jentleson and Christopher Whytock, Why "won" Libya ? in: International Security, Winter 2005/2006 - I have distilled eight factors that are regarded as crucial for successful coercive diplomacy. One of the major objectives of the paper is to match these factors with the Iranian case. This may clarify why (at least) the EU failed. Last but not least, as most of the literature dates back from the sixties and seventies, the more ambitious objective is also to further refine the theory of coercive diplomacy, e.g. which factors are (not) crucial.Methodologically speaking, it will be a qualitative analysis (case-study) based on literature. Thanks to the course I am teaching since last year (Diplomacy) and thanks to my current research project funded by the Flemish Fund for Scientific Research, I am already to a large extent familiar with the literature on coercive diplomacy. Throughout the years, I have also followed the Iranian crisis on a daily basis. The task now consists in matching both. In addition, I am planning to do interviews at the EU in Brussels (as I did before).

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Shi?a jurisprudence in Iran stands on the cusp of major doctrinal change. Up until recent years, three primary reasons have underlied the obstruction of reformation in Shi?a jurisprudence (fiqh) in modern Iran, particularly since the late 1800s. The first has to do with the role of the state, which initially suppressed and sought to marginalize Shi?a doctrine and then, after the 1978-79 revolution, used it as its own basis of legitimacy and institutional framework. This, in turn, led to a second impediment to the reformation of Shi?a jurisprudence, namely the emergence of a clerical class many of whose members positioned themselves as the primary protector of Iranian culture and society against an oppressive and intrusive state. Largely as a result of this, Shi?a jurisprudence became increasingly politicized and revolutionized throughout the twentieth century, its revolutionary posture undermining its attention to inner reform. A third impediment, and directly related to the latter two, has been the traditional role of Shi?a clerics as social mediators and as protectors of culturally salient rituals. This pervasive social influence marginalized the voices of those calling for reforming the fiqh. Partly as a result their own actual or threatened marginalization and partly due to their conviction, those calling for the doctrinal reform of Shi?ism never quite went so far as to call for its jurisprudential ?reformation?, often tempering their call for reforms and balancing it with resort to some of Shi?ism?s orthodox, and at time archaic, notions and value systems. Today, however, more than a quarter century after the success of the Islamic Revolution, only the first impediment to the reformation of the Shi?a doctrine remains?i.e. the nature and role of the state in relation to Shi ?ism?while the other two impediments are undergoing fundamental changes. Whether these changes are by themselves sufficient to foster a process of religious reformation, or will also propel changes to the remaining impediment as well, remains to be seen. What is certain, however, is that today Iranian Shi?ism stands at the gates of historic doctrinal changes.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper analyzes the role of public opinion in particular crises between Iran and the U.S. The main objective is to evaluate whether the public is really influential in presidential decision-making on foreign issues.