Showing 1 through 2 of 2 records.
| | Pages: 22 pages | || | Words: 6428 words | || | |
| 1. Hill, Tony. "Non-Results and a Few Results from Exit Polling in Canada, January 2006" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Palmer House Hotel, Chicago, IL, Apr 12, 2007 <Not Available>. 2009-12-02 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p198901_index.html>Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: The author attempted exit polling during advance poll voting and the general election in January 2006 to understand how and if party and candidate mobilization occurs. The polling was generally scuttled by Elections Canada and by other problems involved in trying to conduct exit polling remotely. The paper shares the problems that occurred and a few results reached by a very small N and offers suggestions to scholars who desire to exit poll in Canada in the future. |
|
| 2. Perry, James. "Kennedy’s Early Crises: Berlin, Cuba, and Southeast Asia, January – April 1961" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association 67th Annual National Conference, The Palmer House Hilton, Chicago, IL, <Not Available>. 2009-12-02 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p361668_index.html>Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript Abstract: The crises in Europe, Southeast Asia, and the Caribbean in early 1961 have often been studied in isolation from one another, but rarely has the interaction of their competing demands been examined. For example, studies of the Bay of Pigs give only cursory attention to the impact on Operation Zapata of contingency planning for a Berlin crisis and for military intervention in Laos and South Vietnam. This creates a misleading view of the Kennedy administration's approach. Policymakers did not compartmentalize their thinking, as they knew that decisions taken with respect to one region necessarily affected all the others. The tension between the competing demands of each crisis was exacerbated by the enormous distances between the crisis zones. Moreover, Kennedy had very little leeway in resolving these crises, because he took office with the crises already in progress and with planning for paramilitary operations in Laos and Cuba well advanced. My paper will show that by the first week of February, Kennedy had evolved a global strategy to resolve the crises he faced. The paper will then show how the Soviets reacted to this strategy, and how Soviet countermoves forced Kennedy to alter his original plans. |
|