Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: In many respects deterrence and extended deterrence in ethnic conflicts seem very unlikely to succeed. There is a fundamental difficulty in deterring low-level violence since effectively delivering the threat to the opponent is hard; most of the time, the actors on the opposing side are not fully aware of what the consequences will be should deterrence fail. This problem stems not only from the multiple actors and interested parties that may be involved in such a conflict – a situation that complicates the ability to make a credible threat – but also from the fact that part of the violence in such conflicts is a result of spontaneous acts of local mobs and independent actions of extreme factions. There are, however, cases in which an ethnic group did not cross what could be defined as one of the red lines of an opposing group. One such case occurred in 1992 and then again in 1993, in Nakhichevan, a landlocked exclave of Azerbaijan bordering with Armenian territory. Although there was some violence between the sides, the Armenians did not act to conquer Nakhichevan. While this conflict can also be presented as a conflict between the states of Armenia and Azerbaijan, it was directly linked to the ethnic struggle in Nagorno-Karabakh, and neither the Azerbaijani nor the Armenian government had complete control over events in Nakhichevan and Nagorno-Karabakh.Our claim in the paper will be that it is exactly this blurriness between the state and the ethnic group as actors in the conflict, and the great dependence of a warring ethnic group on outside assistance from a state, that could be taken as an advantage in conducting a successful practice of (extended) deterrence, as was exercised by Turkey with regard to Nakhichevan. In addition we claim that it is important to address identity-linked issues when discussing the Turkish deterrence since the Turkish threats embodied also references to a possible partial repetition of what the Turks inflicted on the Armenians in World War I. By highlighting these two factors that strengthened the Turkish deterrence, i.e. threatening the state actor linked to the ethnic conflict, and raising identity-related fears in the threats themselves, we show the advantages of using a broader deterrence theory for understanding developments in ethnic conflicts.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: One of the major problems that war torn multiethnic-societies face in the peacebuilding processes is the status of the displaced people and their properties. In a modern liberal-state system, the territory as a whole belongs to the state, and on this territory individuals are given individual property rights. However, in war torn multi-ethnic societies, the formal rules of territorial sovereignty are dysfunctional and individual properties are unprotected. In such situations, liberal theorists support the rights of the individuals, and they therefore offer solutions based on the protection of the right to return of each individual displaced person to his or her property, and on restitution. In contrast, statist approaches emphasize the importance of the sovereignty of the society as a whole, and argue that unless there is a global solution that prioritizes the exchange of the territories en bloc, the property issue would become one of the biggest obstacles before the peacebuilding. On the one hand, applicability of the liberal solution is questionable, as properties are scattered through the territories controlled or claimed by the warring parties, and thus, returning former properties is problematic for individuals in war torn multiethnic societies. On the other hand, application of the statist solution may harm the sustainability of the peace in the future, as the sovereignty itself is often the contention point that led the war, and de facto and de jure sovereignties of the two ethnic groups are oddly overlap, which leads to a chaotic situation for any legitimate distribution of the property rights. Besides, the global solution of the statists can lead unfair consequences, for it just ignores the loss of individual properties. As its role has been ever increasing for offering and implementing solutions in war torn societies, in this paper I examine how the international community (states, NGOs, IGOs) assumes its third party peacebuilding role on the subject of displaced people in light of three case studies, namely Bosnia, Cyprus, and Karabakh. What are the formulations and suggestions made by the international community in the peace processes for the future of displaced people and their properties in these war torn societies? Does their approach support the co-existence of different groups of people as liberals sympathize, or encourage separation and division among people in the line of statist approaches? Is each individual case taken as a unique challenge, or are there similarities and trends in the international approach to property rights in peacebuilding? My analysis specially focuses on whether international intermediaries encourage the right to return of the forcefully evacuated owners to their properties, a solution that seeks to improve the heterogeneous structure of the societies, or formulations supported by the international community create ethnically divided, but internally homogenous entities in their proposed settlements. In my conclusion I discuss the effects of the approaches chosen by the international community on individual rights and how liberal and statist theories are reflected in practice where multiethnic groups co-exist.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Diaspora Involvement in Ethno-National Violence: Causal Mechanisms and the Cases of Kosovo, Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh. Diaspora studies in international relations have recently started exploring security aspects of diaspora politics in addition to the more traditional tracing of ethnic lobbying in foreign policy decisions, and the impacts of refugee flows on internal and international developments. While these approaches have been seeking to enhance our theoretical understanding, the field still remains largely dominated by empirical case studies. Previous research has often highlighted the importance of diaspora sponsorship of ethnic violence in the home country, yet largely omitted to look at the causal mechanisms linking ethno-national violence in the kin-states with the organization of diasporas in the host states. Using the process-tracing method, my paper aims to find out several of these mechanisms. I plan to use evidence from the cases of the conflicts in Kosovo, Chechnya and Nagorno-Karabakh, all part of the post-communist world. My general hypothesis is that radical ethnic elements in host countries could not become influential power-brokers in diaspora circles unless the human rights abuse in the home country has grown to an extent of affecting the entire community and not individuals only. When this condition is met, radical elements abroad gain public support from their ethnic brethren at home, as well as from international circles, especially those in the kin-state. Whether diaspora radicalism continues to be largely self-sustained or supported internationally, depends both on the perception and actual conduct of the organization?s goals and strategies, but also on the international environment at large. Thus, diasporas engaging in conflicts which finished by the end of the 1990s ? a period of more permissiveness towards the proliferation of non-state actors ? had better chances to succeed in their endeavors than such operating after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The paper explores the potential of the current ‘no-war-no-peace’ situation in Nagono-Karabakh conflict by discerning the factors influencing the progress of conflict potential. Eight factors reflect on the roots and developments in the discourse of conflict as well as the resourses for conflict resolution. The analysis of conflict potential outlines the possible scenarios for further development of ‘no-war-no-peace’ situation. It also gives a chance to accumulate and focus peace efforts constituencies across the conflict line by shifting conflict potential towards the peaceful resolution of this conflict and establishing long-lasting peace.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper studies the politics of nationalism in Armenia since 1988. It argues that although politics in Armenia has become “ordinary” and “normal”, meaning that elites have become preoccupied with issues of power and economic gain and that the socioeconomic policies are predominantly about every day issues, the political events and policies are still formulated in a nationalist language – thus the umbrella issue is of nationalist nature, primarily about Karabakh. The dominance of the nationalist issues over the realpolitik based ones does not mean a negative turn on nationalism – as the dichotomy civic/ethnic nationalism wants to suggest. It merely reflects the Soviet legacy of the territorialization of nations and national identity, and Armenia’s constant feeling of threat from its neighboring states: Turkey and Azerbaijan.