Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: While France vehemently denounced the attacks of 9/11 on the United States, with French papers (such as Le Monde) taking the lead in expressing solidarity with the American people and government, relations between the two countries suffered due to French

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: War is a human game, and concern for the human rights violated by war led to an emphasis on various restrictions both as to the recourse to war ( jus ad bellum,) and to the ways it is conducted (jus in bello.) These circumscriptions are designed in certain aspects to moralize war or at least to alleviate its criminality. Israel's 2006 war on Lebanon transgressed those restrictions. The legitimate use of force is limited under international law to individual and collective self-defense, as specified by article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Even if it is accepted that article 51 grants Israel its right for self-defense, it must be remembered that self-defense needs to be limited-those principles are referred to as the 'Caroline Rules.'In the broader sense, I will argue that Israel did not violate the jus ad bellum but the jus in bello. Going beyond 'military necessity,' Israel, aggressively, transgressed 'standard restrictions,' leading to inflictions of harm that some even labeled war crimes. In summary: (1) the use of force against Lebanon would not be justified under international law unless: a) Lebanon mounted a direct attack on Israel or one of its allies and that requested Israel's assistance or b) an attack by Lebanon on Israel or one of its allies was imminent and could be averted in no way other than by the use of force or c) the United Nations Security Council authorized the use of force in clear terms. This paper shows that: (2) Lebanon has not attacked Israel, and no evidence is currently available to the public that any attack was imminent. Nonetheless, a Lebanese guerrilla group, Hezbollah, which mounted an attack on Israel from Lebanese territory, held Lebanon responsible. (3) Security Council Resolutions did not authorize the use of force against Lebanon. Such use of force would require further authorization from Security Council. (4)At present, Israel was therefore entitled, under international law, to use force against Lebanon by invoking article 51 on self-defense, which it did, yet its violation of the 'proportionality' dropped the legality of its self-defense and shifted the nature of the war, from a defensive one, into a 'war of aggression.'

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The paper analyses the military strategies used by Somali warlord Mohammad Farah Aideed in response to the US intervention (UNITAF and UNOSOM II) in Somalia between December 1992 and October 1993. It investigates how Aideed overcame his strategic inferiority by exploiting US casualty-aversion and sensitivities for Somali civilian protection. By systematically using human shields and crowd-swarming techniques, he exacerbated the US ability not only to discriminate between Somali combatants and non-combatants, but also to use force in ways that ensured high standards of US casualty-aversion and civilian protection. When the US hunt for Aideed turned increasingly indiscriminate (i.e. the US military adopting operating procedures that prioritized US casualty-aversion over civilian protection), the warlord portrayed himself as the leader in an anti-colonial struggle and successfully channelled Somali frustration against the invading power. The paper analyses how Aideed?s strategies (culminating in the 3 October 1993 ?Firefight in Mogadishu?) effectively brought an end to the US intervention in Somalia.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper will examine the opinions of Lebanese political elites towards the success and failure of Lebanon's Second Republic.

Publication Type: Paper (prepared oral presentation)
Abstract: Background & Aims: The study examined and compared use of coping strategies among groups of Israeli Jewish and Israeli Arab adolescents who faced missile attacks during the Second Lebanon War (July-August 2006). Relationships between the different coping styles and psychological outcomes of anxiety, anger and hope levels were also examined in the two groups.
Methods: Data were gathered from 303 Israeli adolescents (231 Jews and 72 Arabs) 12-19 years old that filled out self reported questionnaires among which demographics; Adolescent Coping Scale (ACS); State Anxiety; State Anger; Psychological Distress (SPD) and index of Hope.
Results: Both Jewish and Arab adolescents used mostly positive and active social coping strategies to deal with the war. Similarities were indicated on most of the coping styles as well as in some relationships between different coping styles and stress reactions. Coping styles of ‘mental and behavioral disengagement’ and ‘external locus of control’ were linked with more negative stress reactions while ‘positive growth’ was negatively linked to anger. Besides these significant similarities some differences were also emerged as Arab youths used more collectivist oriented strategies. The Hope index was linked only in the Arab sample to ‘positive growth’ and ‘social active’ coping styles while ‘venting emotion’ was linked to anxiety, anger and SPD among Jewish adolescents.
Conclusions: The results indicate that the two groups, belonging to two different cultures but facing the same stress situation, used mostly similar coping styles. These styles however found to be some differently linked to the psychological outcomes. The results will be discussed on the background of the interactional approach to stress and coping. Cultural, social and situational factors will be considered as well.