Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: War diffusion is a neglected topic in the trade-conflict debate. I draw on the insights from the economic liberalism literature and show that trading partners of the participants in an ongoing war, are more likely to intervene to settle the conflict.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: It is widely argued that European leaders wishing to improve the competitiveness of their economies must emulate the harsh and regressive neo-liberal policies associated with the Ronald Reagan, George W. Bush, and Margaret Thatcher. The choice is between neo-liberal reform and no reform. My paper challenges this gloomy understanding. Between neo-liberal reform and no reform, a number of European countries have pursued a course of what I call "progressive liberal" reform. By "progressive liberalism," I mean policies that appropriate the goals of neo-liberalism, but pursue these goals in a manner that preserves or even enhances equality and protections for the disadvantaged. After reviewing the challenges that economic liberalization poses to progressive parties, my paper examines progressive liberal reforms in three areas: reductions in social spending, tax cuts, and labor market flexibilization. For each case, I proceed in four steps: 1) I first define the traditional leftist position that opposes liberalizing reform; 2) I next present the neo-liberal position, which favors liberalizing reform with regressive distributional implications; 3) I then show that the liberalizing reform in question harbors a progressive potential; 4) Finally, I describe how the reform has been implemented in practice, in a particular European context, so as to capture many of the benefits associated with neo-liberalism, while safeguarding progressive values and the needs of low-income and disadvantaged groups.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: In �The Politics of Faith and The Politics of Scepticism�, Michael Oakeshott sketches a conceptual distinction between two styles concerning the activity of governing. The first comprehends the State as a civil association (societas), where the individuals are connected through the formal recognition of the same legitimate authority. The authority emanates from the non-instrumental rules that compose the public interest (respublica). Thus, to govern is to maintain the order, to guarantee the execution of the lex. In the other pole, the Politics of Faith appears as the style of an enterprise association (universitas), where the citizens are identified through the same comprehensive purpose; for that modality, to govern means to promote this purpose. From the distinction between societas and universitas, Oakeshott concludes that social and economic rights are perfectionist interests that violate the neutrality of the respublica. Therefore, starting from the Chantal Mouffe�s critic, that Oakeshott removes the political dimension of the respublica, this paper aims to establish a dialogue between the �radical democracy� and the �liberal conservatism�. It defends that the Politics of Scepticism not necessarily rebut state intervention, that could be included as a form of improvement to the maintenance of order. Firstly, because the consensus about the authority, in a liberal perspective, do not necessarily imply a connection with economic liberalism. Second, the distinction between �perfection� (in the Politics of Faith) and �improvement� (in the Politics of Scepticism) is too ambiguous to affirm, as Oakeshott presumes, the absolute incompatibility of the state intervention with the scepticism.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Political Theology has increasingly become Carl Schmitt’s most fiercely debated book, perhaps superseding even The Concept of the Political for the attention it has come to receive. This small yet potent text has captured so much scholarly attention for the way in which it hoists liberalism by its own petard, demonstrating that liberalism ultimately rests on the illiberal – the exception, the decision, the true nature of sovereignty – as much as does the most anti-liberal regime. I offer a reading of Political Theology that points our attention to what is arguably the most interesting yet neglected feature of this text, viz., the way in which it constitutes liberalism’s anti-liberal “Doppelgänger.” I contend that in his 1922 text Schmitt offers a critique that negates liberalism without replacing it with a substantive anti-liberal creed. Political Theology thoroughly undermines liberalism, yet in its formalism it moves theoretically closer to it than any other anti-liberalism. This important text thereby develops an anti-liberalism that does not demand specific content or substance, an anti-liberalism that can be characterized as “anti-liberal formalism” and which competes with the formalism of liberalism.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Descending from Kant and other early political philosophers, economic liberalism maintained that economic interdependence decreases international conflict. However, liberal theorists have long ignored the possibility that economic factors that lead states to peaceful relations can also affect other foreign policy decisions. In this project, we change the outcome of interest in the liberal debate from war to war intervention and generalize the liberal idea to allow us to theorize about the link between economic interdependence and state behavior. The economic theory of war expansion that we propose waves insights from the liberal peace research program to help inform our thinking about how states make choices as external actors to ongoing interstate wars. We argue that wars do not adversely affect only the economic relations between the war adversaries: external actors who have economically valuable trade relations with the states in war also suffer some costs. These costs are mainly related to the adjustment of their economy to the new situation where the efficient level of trade is severed. Therefore, states that are not directly involved in the conflict may view war as a possible threat to the integrity of goods that are being transported or traded (Mansfield 1994). If states refrain from aggression to maintain their economic ties, they would also have an incentive to stop the wars that harm the same interests. Put differently, states would seek to influence the course of events in the wars that encumber their valuable economic relationships. To test our theory, we use the cases of overt military interventions in interstate wars from Gleditsch and Strand's Armed Conflict 1946-1999 dataset and expand it by adding the cases of potential intervention by foreign states treating every member of the international system as a potential intervener. We also use the bilateral trade data from Correlates of War 2 Project. Our empirical analysis offers clear evidence that states which have an economically valuable trade relationship with one of the war belligerents are more likely to militarily intervene in ongoing interstate wars.