Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Do legislators’ cognitive limitations affect which lobbyists they listen to and which advocacy arguments they accept or reject? In this paper I report my findings from an original experiment that simulates how lobbyists communicate with members of Congress. I recruited 139 Washington-based staff in House and Senate personal and committee offices to participate in an “in-box” simulation that asked them to learn about several policy issues and recommend a hypothetical health care policy agenda for the 110th Congress. The experiment is a 2 x 2 repeated-measures design with four experimental conditions. The experiment includes two within-subjects factors: (1) Advocacy Argument Quality and (2) Interest Group Credibility. The first factor is the qualitative nature of the advocacy argument—normative or instrumental—conveyed by a hypothetical interest group coalition. The second factor is the homogeneity of organizations that comprise the coalitions, with homogeneous coalitions being credible and heterogeneous coalitions non-credible. The point of the repeated-measures design was to nullify the alternative hypothesis that policy decisions are based entirely on pre-existing issue preferences. I am able to reject the null hypotheses and support my theory that legislative policymakers use argument quality and interest group credibility as cognitive heuristics when making decisions about policy priorities. I discuss the implications of my findings for the lobbying as legislative subsidy model and the deliberative theory of interest representation.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper seeks to improve upon lobby theory by learning from a failed lobby campaign in which the lobbyist managed to annoy and anger key constituencies. A qualitative case study was conducted on attempts made by the Norwegian oil industry in 2002–2004 to achieve a tax amendment. Qualitative interviews were carried out with oil industry representatives, two former ministers, political advisors, and members of parliament, and with journalists who had followed the campaign. The main argument being put forward in this paper is that lobbyists should use insights from stakeholder theory. Combining lobby theory with an approach suggested by stakeholder theory might temper single-minded advocacy that is too preoccupied with getting immediate political results, and help organizations to remember that it is important to develop good long-term relations with stakeholders.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: We study how variation in patterns of legislative delegation to the bureaucracy across issue areas influence the relative amount of interest group activity devoted to legislative versus administrative lobbying.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper examines the interplay between public opinion, pro-Arab, and pro-Israel lobbying groups in the United States. It looks at how lobbying organizations shaped public opinion favoring the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It also investigates how public opinion in turn provided the parameters for US policymakers to pursue the two-state solution as the formula for peace.