Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: In recent years a debate has arisen over which justice most influences the content of a majority opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court. One possible answer is that the author of the majority opinion most influences its content, at least insofar as he can attract majority support for his opinion. An alternative answer, symbolized by references to “the swing justice” on the Court, is that the median justice most influences the content of the majority opinion: if she declines to support the draft majority opinion, no matter who is writing it, the opinion cannot become a majority opinion. Both of these arguments have received substantial attention in the recent literature on Supreme Court decision-making. But a third possible answer that has also been advanced is that the median justice in the majority coalition most influences the content of the majority opinion. That is, for those justices who were on the majority side on the “conference vote” held soon after oral arguments on a case, the resulting opinion will be written so as to appeal to the median member of this group. Here we subject this “median of the majority coalition” hypothesis to systematic analysis. The conclusion is that the hypothesis, and the existing efforts to test it empirically, suffer from several logical deficiencies, including a contradiction between two of its major premises. It is thus unlikely that the hypothesis offers an adequate explanation of the process by which Supreme Court opinions are written and adopted.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The main purpose of this paper is to examine the Steps-To-War model across varying power status conditions. Although the Steps-To-War model and the following research explain and show quite firmly that territorial issues and certain realist policy options are dangerous conditions in the escalation to war, they do not pay sufficient attention to the potentially important role of major power status. I try to replenish the theory by explaining the different behavior of major powers with the Most and Starr’s ‘willingness’ and ‘opportunity’ framework and by conducting empirical tests. I hypothesize that the risk factors from the steps-to-war theory such as territorial issues, making alliances, and mutual military buildups are more dangerous for major powers relations than non-major powers, since they make major powers’ willingness and opportunity much higher. Using the dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes data for the period of 1816-1992, the data analyses provide partial empirical support for the hypotheses. In regard to methodology, this paper has two features: 1) I construct interaction models in order to capture the multiplying effects between power status and the other risk factors by following Braumoeller’s suggestions; 2) I develop and conceptualize a new indicator of ‘politically relevant alliance’ using the home region information of disputants and their alliances.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: In recent years a debate has arisen over which justice most influences the content of a majority opinion on the U.S. Supreme Court. One possible answer is that the author of the majority opinion most influences its content, at least insofar as he can attract majority support for his opinion. An alternative answer, symbolized by references to “the swing justice” on the Court, is that the median justice most influences the content of the majority opinion: if she declines to support the draft majority opinion, no matter who is writing it, the opinion cannot become a majority opinion. Both of these arguments have received substantial attention in the recent literature on Supreme Court decision-making. But a third possible answer that has also been advanced is that the median justice in the majority coalition most influences the content of the majority opinion. That is, for those justices who were on the majority side on the “conference vote” held soon after oral arguments on a case, the resulting opinion will be written so as to appeal to the median member of this group. Here we subject this “median of the majority coalition” hypothesis to systematic analysis. The conclusion is that the hypothesis, and the existing efforts to test it empirically, suffer from several logical deficiencies, including a contradiction between two of its major premises. It is thus unlikely that the hypothesis offers an adequate explanation of the process by which Supreme Court opinions are written and adopted.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This research examines how and why student pick public relations as their major and what expectations they have of their first job. All division and department chairs of colleges and universities, which had public relations majors and that were listed in the AEJMC Directory were asked to take part in this survey. One hundred and forty-three institutions were contacted. A total of 180 surveys were returned.
Some major findings were that most respondents stated that they had picked public relations as a major because they liked to plan events and because they liked people. Most respondents reported that they had taken or were required to take the courses recommended by the Commission on Public Relations Education. In addition, most of the respondents who had interned did so at non-profit organizations and were not paid for their internship. Participants seemed to have realistic expectations for starting salaries, and stated that they wanted to obtain employment at agencies, corporations, and non-profits.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed