Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: I argue that persuasive rhetoric broadly defined occupies a vital place in the development of individual authenticity and autonomy, and that the coercive potential of such talk is and may be more mitigated than commonly supposed. I explore these claims in relation to the dominant account of how autonomy is related to intersubjective deliberation, the discourse ethics of Habermas. I propose a supplemented understanding to his own of the nature of a properly authentic and autonomous individual. In the case of authenticity, a greater role for intersubjective “ethos” claims should be seen; in the case of autonomy, the need for the development of rhetoric-related virtues/skills is argued. I close by describing how these supplemental definitions help to assuage concerns about the manipulative role of rhetoric.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: In this paper I examine how a country’s exchange rate and international economic ties affect the government’s desire and ability to manipulate fiscal policy. Building upon Clark and Hallerberg (2000), who argue that governments only manipulate fiscal policy prior to an election when the exchange rate is fixed, I qualify their findings in two ways. First, I argue that governments will only manipulate fiscal policy under a fixed exchange rate when the economy is relatively closed. Because fiscal expansion reduces domestic producers’ competitiveness, as trade openness increases, governments become less likely to manipulate fiscal policy. Second, in a world where capital is partially rather than fully mobile, increased exchange rate flexibility renders fiscal manipulation less effective rather than ineffective. As a result, governments can manipulate fiscal policy when the exchange rate is flexible and I argue that they will do so as trade openness increases, leaving the economy highly exposed to international shocks. I test this argument through a quantitative analysis of changes in government debt in 21 OECD countries from 1974 to 2001.

Publication Type: Proceeding

Publication Type: Proceeding
Abstract: Between 2002 and 2003, a European constitutional convention drafted a constitution for Europe. Two actors in particular influenced the negotiations in the Convention: the President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and the Praesidium.
We first examine how the Praesidium was able to structure the agenda inside the Convention due to the absence of voting on amendments. The Praesidium was able to conclude every particular proposal-amendment round by accepting, rejecting or amending proposed amendments. We then analyze cases which show how the Presidency was able to control the agenda of the Convention. By investigating institutions, we demonstrate that the Presidency used several tricks to manipulate the result. We find evidence that (1) the Presidency filtered proposed amendments, considering only some of them, (2) it determined consensus in the Convention without saying how many members approve of a particular measure, and (3) it juxtaposed proposed amendments and concluded that the Praesidium proposal constitutes the best compromise.
The second part of our agenda-setting analysis complements these cases by examining the timing of the Praesidium proposals. Analyzing the entire set of amendments in the Convention, we show that the Praesidium structured the agenda by presenting its draft proposals in multiple sequences. While the Praesidium could have proposed the entire constitution at once, such an iterated procedure resulted in fewer amendments over time. This suggests that timing was used for strategic reasons by the Praesidium. We support our hypothesis by showing that (1) some of the most important issues were presented at the end of the Convention, and that (2) the actual timing of proposals does not correlate highly with either the initial timetable or with the final constitution. We conclude that in the absence of majority or unanimity voting, agenda control mattered and thus the possibility of political manipulation.