Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: A theory of political time is developed to explain the leadership challenges that faced two big-city mayors: Dennis Kucinich of Cleveland (1977-1979) and David Dinkins of New York City (1990-1993). Both encountered significant political problems while in office, and both lost their bids for reelection. Kucinich practiced preemptive politics, challenging a robust political order that derailed his attempts to bring about his vision of urban populism. Dinkins practiced disjunctive politics, defending urban liberalism at a time when the premises of the ideology were under assault.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Since the early 1990s, an increasing number of the nation’s large, urban school districts have made significant changes to their school governance framework by shifting from elected to mayoral-appointed school boards. We refer to this policy reform as “mayoral takeover” of urban school districts. In light of its emerging significance for the politics of urban education, we asked (Wong & Shen 2001) in an APSA presentation two years ago: “Does school district takeover work?”
We ask a similar question now because the policy reform has continued to gain momentum. In the two years since our initial inquiry, mayoral takeover has gained even more prominence as a policy option to turn around urban school districts. In 2002, the largest school district in the nation became a mayoral takeover district when New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg was given control over the NYC public schools. With the addition of New York to a list of cities that includes Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C., nearly 2,000,000 students now receive their education in a mayoral takeover school district. Mayoral takeover further strengthened its foundation in 2002 when voters in Cleveland strongly supported the continuation of the mayoral appointed board.
Although a growing number of mayors believe that “doing nothing” about their city’s schools is not an option, it is not yet clear that the answer is “doing something” in the form of taking over the school district by appointing a majority of the school board. Thus, in this study we address the question: What are the consequences when mayors lead urban districts?
To answer this question, we attempt to develop a broad assessment framework for empirical evaluation. Drawing on data from the Annual Survey of Government Finances and the National Center for Education’s Common Core of Data, we examine the relationship between mayoral takeover and fiscal and staffing indicators. We also look at recent achievement trends in districts that have implemented mayoral takeover.
We find that mayoral takeover seems to be increasingly related to federal revenue sources, and is associated with greater levels of per-pupil expenditures in important categories such as instruction and student support. We do not find that mayoral takeover is strongly related to fiscal health or district debt levels. While we find some mixed evidence on recent student achievement, we find no evidence to suggest that mayoral takeover will leave the worst schools behind in the wake of reform.

Publication Type: Proceeding

Publication Type: Proceeding
Abstract: How does one explain the diverging voter preferences of Latinos and Asian American voters in the 2005 Mayoral election in Los Angeles? Some posit that Latino support for Villaraigosa was driven by a desire of Latino voters to elect a co-ethnic candidate. Hahn’s support among Asian Americans was most often attributed to active mobilization of the Asian American community by the Hahn campaign. We show that these explanations are incomplete. Moreover, popular explanations of Latino vote choice present an oversimplified portrait of the group’s voting behavior because they tend to be preoccupied with the role of racial cues at the expense of considering other factors, such as rational candidate evaluation. Co-ethnic voting among Latinos certainly provides some explanation for the patterns observed in 2005. But there were other factors influencing Latino vote choice left largely unexamined by observers. We also contend that mobilization mattered for the Asian Americans’ support for Hahn, but not in the manner assumed by most pundits and reporters.