Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper analyzes the impact of merger and antitrust laws on different types of acquisitions across countries. The data covers completed mergers and acquisitions in 36 countries between 1985 and 2000. I find that, antitrust laws are successful in decreasing average transaction size in cross border M&As compared to the average size of the listed company in the country. Antitrust laws decrease relative volume of cross border M&As in aggregate and that of horizontal cross border M&As in particular. After the implementation of antitrust laws, net USD inflow to the home country through cross border mergers decreases, making domestic companies net acquirers. On the other hand, in aggregate, merger laws do not change relative volume or frequency of M&As significantly. However, after the imposition of merger laws, domestic firms become net targets in horizontal cross border M&As, increasing net USD inflow into the home country. This result is expected since merger laws decrease legal uncertainty in merger-acquisition process. These findings have two important policy implications. First, both antitrust and merger laws have significant influence on M&A activity in the intended directions. Second, antitrust and merger laws have significant impact on the flow of funds across countries and therefore they can be used to attract foreign direct investment.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Since it's institutionalization in 1990, the European Union's policy governing the mergers and acquisitions of businesses has undergone significant changes. This paper examines the effects of private litigation on this dynamic policy area. Two case studies (Tetra Laval/Sidel and GE/Honeywell) are used to highlight factors that affected the ability of private actors to use litigation as a tool in policy battles. The cases find that litigation produced important pressure to expand the scope of merger reforms.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The quest in political science toward a unifying theory of institutional change forges on. This paper seeks to aid in this endeavor, firstly by explicating a new theory: rational choice historical institutionalism (RCHI). This theoretical hybrid of two of new institutionalism’s three variants seeks to compensate for the individual weaknesses of RCI (rational choice institutionalism) and HI (historical institutionalism) while accentuating their strengths. In essence, RCHI theory is based on rationalist assumptions but takes account of the increasing returns of political phenomena.

Secondly, the paper seeks to map a nascent area of research by subjecting RCHI’s hypotheses to the ongoing cross-Atlantic dispute between U.S. and EU antitrust authorities, which reached a boiling point when the EU anti-trust body vetoed a proposed merger of GE and Honeywell in 2001. As a result, it and the U.S. Department of Justice brokered an international informal agreement (as opposed to a formal treaty) for regulating mergers. As such, the paper explores the recursive relationship between informal and formal institutions, which must incorporated in a unified theory of change that seeks to end this long and important quest.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper analyses the incentives of banks to merge. We investigate using a spatial model
of competition under which circumstances banks want to increase their geographical scope of
operation expanding their market share via mergers. Two different configurations of mergers are
analysed. First, mergers among banks contiguously located and secondly, mergers among banks
non-contiguously located. An interesting application of both configurations can be used for the
analysis of domestic and cross-border mergers. The main conclusions are as follows. A higher
probability of moving around a certain area and needing to make a banking transaction increases
the importance of the network effect derived from a larger market share, forcing banks to merge.
Finally, depending on the level of such probability banks decide between local or cross-border
deals.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: European legislation exercises an important influence on national policy even in areas where there is no pressure or need to incorporate in national legislation directives or regulations agreed upon in Brussels. In this article, I apply insights from the literature on sociological institutionalism and policy framing to explore statistically the impact of the 1989 European Merger Control Regulation on British merger policy during the period 1984-2001. The findings address two issues in the broader literature of European integration. First, the study undermines the point, which is so widely accepted in the Europeanization literature, that goodness-of-fit - that is, pressure emanating from the incompatibility between European and national institutions, norms, or policies - is a necessary condition for national adaptation. Second, euroskeptics and other proponents of British “exceptionalism” have much to fear from European integration. Even in the absence of directives emanating from Brussels, European ideas and norms seep into national practice by way of norm diffusion and lesson drawing.