Publication Type: Proceeding

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The study compares two plausible message strategies (outgroup contrast and ingroup counter-stereotyping) for debiasing pluralistic ignorance by activating group members’ collective identity in the context of alcohol use by college students. Undergraduate students (N = 278) at a large public university were randomly assigned to one of three experimental conditions (outgroup contrast, ingroup counter-stereotyping, and control). Only the outgroup contrast message strategy was effective in activating collective identity and reducing perceived social distance from ingroup members. Results suggest that, as hypothesized, activating subjects’ collective identity resulted in decreased misperceptions about group members’ normative behavior. In addition, this debiasing strategy resulted in more favorable evaluations of the accuracy of social information about the true distribution of members’ behavior. On the other hand, there was no evidence of effect on behavioral intentions. Implications for future research and intervention strategies are discussed.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: ISA 2003 Proposal Is War Rational? The Extent of Miscalculation and Misperception as Causes of War A central but often implicit debate in the causes of war literature centers on the question: is war mostly the rational and Clausewitzian pursuit of states and groups, or is it primarily the result of miscalculation and misperception? Explanations for war relying on offensive realism, expected utility theories, elite manipulation, or pre-emption all tend to be rational. On the other hand, hypernationalism, optimistic miscalculation, and the Cult of the Offensive are miscalculation and misperception explanations. Most theories about the causes of war, and most arguments about particular wars, can be parsed into either the rational camp or the miscalculation and misperception camp. Little work clashes the two sets of arguments, or spans multiple methodologies. I do this in three ways: First, miscalculation and misperception has to be defined so that they can be distinguished from a rational Clauwitzianism. Likewise, observable implications have to distinguish between the two camps. Those making miscalculation arguments must also show that the natural equilibrium of the states in question is peace. While there are many miscalculation and misperception arguments about war (Blainey, Van Evera), most proponents fail to take these steps. Second, I perform statistical analyses to get a sense of the extent of the miscalculation problem. I ask: how many war initiators lost wars, how many states started wars against more powerful states (and won or lost), how many states initially won their wars, but got balanced against and ended up losing, and so forth. When Bueno de Mesquita wrote War Trap, initiators won 42 of 58 interstate wars, leading him to argue that states generally make rational calculations when going to war. Third, case studies can answer questions including: did states and leaders accomplish their goals with war? If not, was war at least a reasonable bet; was there a reasonable theory of victory? Were these goals those that could reasonably be defined as Clausewitzian? (I use multiple criteria for rationality) If not the goals were not Clausewitzian, and/or the means seemed inefficient, what drove or colored the move toward war? My ISA paper will cover the first two issues. I will present the framework of the project and the statistical findings. So far we have found that war initiators only win 44% of the time, and lose 36% of the time (uncertain results account for the remainder). Assuming that most initiators plan on winning, they miscalculate with high frequency. Our analysis also shows when war initiators win, the average length of the war is 308 days. When they lose, duration is 660 days. This supports the arguments of Van Evera and Blainey that states start wars thinking they will be quick and cheap. When states calculate well and win, wars are indeed shorter than when they lose. To identify conditions which imply variations in miscalculation and misperception, I am analyzing such factors as: duration, presence of joiners, and relative fatality, force, and power levels.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: ISA 2006 ProposalIs War Rational? The Extent of Miscalculation and Misperception as Causes of WarA central but often implicit debate in the causes of war literature centers on the question: is war mostly the rational and Clausewitzian pursuit of states and groups, or is it primarily the result of miscalculation and misperception? Explanations for war relying on offensive realism, expected utility theories, elite manipulation, or pre-emption all tend to be rational. On the other hand, hypernationalism, optimistic miscalculation, and the ?Cult of the Offensive? are miscalculation and misperception explanations. Most theories about the causes of war, and most arguments about particular wars, can be parsed into either the rational camp or the miscalculation and misperception camp. Little work clashes the two sets of arguments, or spans multiple methodologies. I do this in three ways:First, miscalculation and misperception has to be defined so that they can be distinguished from a rational Clauwitzianism. Likewise, observable implications have to distinguish between the two camps. Those making miscalculation arguments must also show that the natural equilibrium of the states in question is peace. While there are many miscalculation and misperception arguments about war (Blainey, Van Evera), most proponents fail to take these steps.Second, I perform statistical analyses to get a sense of the extent of the miscalculation problem. I ask: how many war initiators lost wars, how many states started wars against more powerful states (and won or lost), how many states initially won their wars, but got balanced against and ended up losing, and so forth. When Bueno de Mesquita wrote War Trap, initiators won 42 of 58 interstate wars, leading him to argue that states generally make rational calculations when going to war.My ISA paper will present the framework of the project and the statistical findings. We find that war initiators only win 33% of the time since 1945, compared to 77% during the 1800s. Assuming that most initiators plan on winning, states miscalculate with increasing frequency. Our analysis also shows when war initiators win, the average length of the war is 308 days. When they lose, duration is 660 days. This supports the arguments of Van Evera and Blainey that states start wars thinking they will be quick and cheap. When states calculate well and win, wars are indeed shorter than when they lose. To identify conditions which imply variations in miscalculation and misperception, I am analyzing such factors as: duration, presence of joiners, and relative fatality, force, and power levels. I will be well into Phase II of this project by Spring 2006, and will have conducted a number of analyses to help explain why the win rate has declined so dramatically.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Among few examples for those who argue that Islam and democracy can go together is the Turkish experience under the Justice and Development Party (JDP) government since November 2002. Yet, the Party itself disassociates the movement with a religious political background, and rather defines its political stand as a ?conservative democrat.? Notwithstanding repeated commitments to secularism and democracy, it is being defined as pro-Islamist, Islamic-oriented, moderate-Muslim party in the media outside of Turkey. This study aims to discuss the ambiguity in the media coverage of this rather recent political movement in Turkey, and find out if such discrepancies between the party's own description and its perception in the media occur with respect to certain issues, or if this occurs regardless of the subject matter. Using the LexisNexis database, a dataset is being created for the media's coverage (from the fall of 2002 through June 2006), to code for the labels used to describe JDP every time a news about the JDP appeared in the newswires. To find out if certain labels are more likely to be used in a given subject area, I will code the news for different issue areas (such as, domestic politics, the European Union accession, economic policy and crises, religion and social life, relations with the US). Findings will be compared with the Party?s official documentation (i.e. its political manifesto and government program). How similar are these with the party's own definitions of its political agenda? To what extent, or relating to what issues, is the party still perceived as a continuation of past political movement? When is it represented as a ?moderate? Islamic political movement? The conclusions will provide results regarding the wide array of descriptions of the media coverage on political Islam, and include policy implications for similar movements to address their ?image problem.?