Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: What’s “Nationalist” about Nationalist Violence?

In this paper, I address two sets of questions about “nationalist” violence. First, what does it mean to say that a “nation” is committing violence against another nation? Does it imply that large numbers of individuals are participating in the killing? Do these individuals have to be representative members of their national communities? In other words, does nationalist violence imply mass participation? And second, what motivates those individuals who are instrumental in producing nationalist violence (both the combatants who kill and the civilians who collaborate with them)? Is nationalist ideology necessary and sufficient; or do individuals have other (more personal) reasons for participating? For example, are individuals coerced? Do they profit materially from violence? How important is revenge as a motivation? Or peer pressure? Or enjoyment? In general, how are individuals recruited into violence- producing organizations? All of these questions get at whether nationalist ideology is necessary and sufficient to motivate violence.
I work through both sets of questions by way of a literature review on civil wars, riots, and mass killings, where the questions of mass participation and motivation are vigorously debated. The goal here is to, first, get a feel for who exactly is doing (and facilitating) the killing and whether it is indeed the case that nationalist violence implies nations fighting nations; and, second, to explore exactly how powerful nationalist ideology is as a motivator and mobilizer.
Overall, my literature review suggests, first, that mass participation in violence is more limited than suggested by the “nationalist” label and, second, that for those who do participate, the motivations at play often have as much to do with enjoyment, profit, group pressures, and local grievances as with nationalist ideology. In other words, nationalist ideology is often neither necessary nor sufficient to explain the motivations of both those doing the killing and those civilians who collaborate with them to make the killing possible. More important are the nationalist networks that recruit fighters and collaborators, provide them with selective incentives, and coordinate violence once the shooting starts.
Together, these conclusions have important theoretical implications. The primary implication is that, at least as far as the production of violence is concerned, mass nationalism per se is not the problem. Thus, we need to pay less attention to how elites “whip up” the masses with emotional appeals and more attention to the concrete processes that elites use to recruit individuals into violence-producing organizations and the various mechanisms they use to secure compliance from co-nationals. Also, when we observe individuals engaging in what, on the surface, look like “nationalist” behaviors we should hesitate before assuming that nationalist ideology per se is the primary motivator.
In the rest of the paper, I make my case in four sections. First, I deal with the question of mass participation in violence and ask to what extent do “nations” participate in episodes of nationalist violence. Second, I deal with the question of motivations and ask, given participation, is nationalist ideology a necessary and sufficient motivator. Third, I discuss the work that ideology does do in nationalist civil wars, particularly in relation to external audiences. Finally, I briefly conclude with the theoretical and policy implications of my arguments.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Nationalist movements, with few exceptions, are rarely framed or understood as transnational actors. However, they can be understood and analyzed as such -- social actors that engage in meaningful patterns of cooperation across state boundaries (and who see themselves as part of a transnational community), but who simultaenously maintain strong connections with specific, local or regional polities. In Europe, moreover, these transnational nationalist
networks create complex webs linking together nationalist actors, states, and the European Union. In this paper, I argue that
globalization and the European Union have significantly expanded the political opportunities for regional nationalists to establish and make
use of transnational nationalist networks. However, not all nationalist networks are able to capitalize equally on this expansion. I examine
the impact of the EU on two different kinds of nationalist networks: first, licit networks that link together officially sanctioned, institutionalized groups, and second, illicit networks of primarily
underground and violent nationalist organizations.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed

Publication Type: Proceeding

Publication Type: Proceeding
Abstract: This paper asks why mobilization in favor of reform within the French Empire was supplanted by demands for independence from the empire. I contend that mobilization in favor of liberal reforms constituted an alternative to nationalist demands for separation and argue against assuming a static preference for independent nation-states among political organizers in Morocco and Algeria. I propose a more dynamic understanding of resistance to French rule, one in which the preferences of Moroccan and Algerian political actors are not given, but are shaped by political opportunities and by their interactions with French administrators and politicians. The paper demonstrates the shift in collective action goals over time, and investigates the historical conditions that led people and organizations living under colonial rule to begin framing political requests in the language of nationalism