Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The U.S. military is awash in visions of transformation. An array of glossy joint and service visions of what has become known as the "military after next" have been produced. Service transformation "roadmaps" have been developed. War games and experiments have been employed by the Department of Defense, the Joint Staff and joint commands, and the services in an effort to "validate" their visions. Analysts inside and outside of the military have opined about the emergent Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). The rhetoric of "revolution" and, somewhat less radically, of "transformation" is ubiquitous. It remains to be seen, however, whether any of the multitude of "visions" will be translated into reality.
In this paper we examine one specific vision of transformation, the Navy's concept of Network-Centric Warfare. We provide the context for our exploration of the Navy transformation case by first reviewing the Bush administration's approach to transformation. In the second section of the paper, we turn to Network-Centric Warfare. A preliminary assessment of Network-Centric Warfare is provided in the final two sections. Our intent is twofold: (1) to evaluate the prospects for naval transformation and, by implication, the more general phenomena of U.S. military transformation; and (2) to begin to sketch out the implications of contemporary transformation for analytical debates on the nature of military innovation.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper looks at naval procurement, and especially aircraft carriers as an example of Veblen effects in international relations. Veblen effects study the extent to which actors use their consumption as a signal for status and a means to gain prestige. Once the quest for prestige is taken into account actors may be less sensitive to costs, and under certain conditions may opt for a less efficient, more expensive, and more conspicuous consumption. The paper presents a qualitative and quantitative analysis of carriers and warships as prestige symbols.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: In previous work I argue for a connection between different military doctrinal cultures and the failure of coercive diplomacy. Different military cultures in the United States and China affected signaling, communication, perception, and assessments of the balance of power. This led to failures of deterrence and coercion during the Korean War. In this paper, I extend this idea into two additional naval cases: the deterrence of conflict in the Taiwan Strait in 1950 and today. I argue that Chinese naval doctrine today is, for cultural and organizational reasons, distinct from that of the United States. I assess the potential dangers this poses to the conduct of military diplomacy in the Taiwan Strait, and offer proposals to overcome or limit these challenges.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The hallmark of German foreign policy under Bismarck was an intricate system of continental alliances, whose principle objective was the preservation of peace and maintenance of the status quo. Bismarck understood the futility of territorial expansion as a means to enhance German security, for Germany could never defend a colonial empire because it could never redirect resource from its army to build a navy. In 1890 Bismarck was dismissed as chancellor, and German foreign policy underwent a radical reorientation toward Weltpolitik, which was an aggressive challenge to Britain’s world power status. By 1900 preparations for the German fleet were well underway and German foreign policy was squarely focused on challenging British naval hegemony.Germany’s decision to pursue a navy has long puzzled theorists of international relations. From a security perspective, the decision makes little to no sense. First, British intentions during the period were fairly transparent and there was little reason to suspect Britain of harboring revisionist intentions toward Germany. Second, it was clear from the beginning of German naval planning that if Germany became engaged in an arms race with Britain, Germany would surely lose. The German economy never possessed the strength to sustain a naval program capable of challenging British naval hegemony while maintaining its continental commitments. By simple virtue of its geography as a European continental power, Germany was certain to lose in a naval arms race with Britain. Moreover, Germany’s security situation on the continent was much more pressing and Germany could meet its security needs more efficiently by directing resources towards continental defense. If, then, from a security perspective Germany’s decision to pursue Weltpolitik makes little sense, how can we explain German naval ambition before the First World War?In this paper I argue that Germany’s bid for naval hegemony was a symptom of a larger social process constitutive of international politics: the struggle for recognition. Recognition refers to a social act in which another actor is constituted as a subject with legitimate social standing; the struggle for recognition refers to the process through which states attempt to become this subject of a certain kind. In pursing a powerful navy, Germany sought to establish its identity as a world power. From its inception, the German navy had one clear aim: a powerful fleet in the North Sea would alter the power relationship with Britain and create a display of military force that Britain simply could not ignore. The fleet would force Britain to accept Germany’s world power status; a German fleet stationed in the North Sea would be both a political lever and a deterrent. Using discourse analysis, I show how a naval discourse emerged within Germany that conflated the survival of the German nation with Germany’s power projection capabilities, and made German naval expansion both imperative and inevitable, in spite of its dire security consequences. The paper concludes that the power maximizing practices of states should be seen as an important component of identity construction and an understudied dimension of security practice.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: In the decades which have followed the end of the Cold War, the US military has hesitantly explored the transformation of its forces. Uncertain as to what it should transform into, it is equally unsure as to how it should go about the process of transformation, let alone why it should transform in the first place. Fiscal constraints have driven some transformation, a commonsensical realization that the perceived enemy has changed has introduced more, and technological discoveries have prompted still more transformation; yet the military of the 21st century is set to be only incrementally evolved from its late 20th century parent. In no other service is this d??but-de-si??cle structural uncertainty as apparent as in the US Navy- lashed as it is to the concept of the super-carrier until well into the mid-21st century. This paper explores the transformation of a segment of the US Navy not purely as a reaction to newly available technology and the like, but as a response to a new appreciation of the maritime battlespace: an appreciation driven by the still-unfolding theoretical fruits of the Revolution in Military Affairs. This transformed force, a naval swarm, will not only be a viable option for both ??blue?? and ??green/brown?? water battlespace dominance, but will also be a first step in learning how to operate within a chaotic battlespace rich in what Carl von Clausewitz termed ??friction.??