Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The goal of this paper is to draw a parallel between the rise of Marxism as a militant, anti-Western ideology in the first half of the 20th century and the present state of North-South relations with an emphasis on Islamic fundamentalism. Three historical events will be used as examples for the possible course of anti-Western actions in the South and their consequences for the West.During the first half of the 20th century Marxism was the most aggressive anti-Western ideology. Promoted by both internal and external forces, it tried to destroy not only the capitalist and democratic internal structure of Western countries but also their world hegemony. Despite obvious differences, we witness today the emergence of a similar challenge: the rise of global, if still unarticulated anti-Western movements, out of which Islamic fundamentalism seems to be the most active. It is true that, unlike Marxism, they are less capable of contaminating the West itself. Bu the reactions they can generate within the West and among West?s allies are no less dangerous.I will start with the analysis of three interesting cases of Marxist rebellions. All took place aboard navies of Western or Western-oriented states cruising the Black Sea or the Eastern Mediterranean. All were parts of wider Marxist movements. And all failed. Nevertheless, I consider their study most helpful for the present evolution of North-South (or, rather, West-South) divide.The three examples are the 1905 rebellion of the Potemkine battleship crew, immortalized by the famous Eisenstein movie; the Black Sea rebellion of the French navy servicemen sent to support the anti-Bolshevik forces in the Russian Civil War; and the rebellion of Greek seamen whose ships had taken refuge in British-controlled Alexandria during the Nazi occupation of Greece.Of course, I do not suggest American forces in Iraq or Afghanistan will follow the example of French crews and rebel in sympathy of Islamic fundamentalism. Nevertheless, the three examples might be echoed by evolutions different in details but similar in essence. Despite the uprising of her seamen, France did not become Marxist in 1919. But Russia and Greece did have Marxist civil wars were announced if not ignited by their respective rebellions. Some of today expeditionary forces in Middle East are very similar to navies cruising Levantine seas a century ago. They might ignite the same kind of political unrest and, under the flag of Islam, their home countries might follow the anti-Western way of Russian or Greek Marxists. Of course, Marxism didn?t succeed in destroying the West. But it created a challenger it took half a century to defeat.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Insights from Disruptive Innovation theory (DI) are often used in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of national security policy. DI explains why successful companies are sometimes defeated by new competitors with relatively unsophisticated products. Although DI is highly influential in the business literature, its applicability to military doctrine has not been persuasively shown. A more abstract and general version of DI is proposed here which improves its foundations, adapts it to militaries, and suggests a framework for the reliable identification of disruptive innovations. This new theory is tested by examining the Royal Navy before and during World War I and evaluating how well it explains the Royal Navy�s success at developing ASW to protect the battlefleet from submarine attacks and its near-failure at implementing convoy tactics to protect merchant shipping. This generalized version of DI successfully explains several key features of the case.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: International political and demographic trends point to a time when the United States Navy, arguably a hegemonic military organization, will be unable to count on shore-based facilities in the regions of the world in which it is most likely to operate. This paper examines the Navy's response to these trends and seeks to determine whether that response will enable the Navy to continue its dominance of the blue water environment and the foreign policy ramifications of that response.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The US Navy operates with its sisters services thought jointness across the range of American military operations. Through 2005 and 2006, however, there has been increasing interest evident within the US Navy about developing new concepts and capabilities to contribute to America?s ?long war?. Suggested changes range from improving the Navy?s capability to protect its ships and personnel from maritime terrorism attacks to taking a greater role in combating maritime piracy to developing a capacity for ?brown water? riverine operations. Yet an inherent limitation faced by the US Navy is that much of the ?long war? occurs inland from the beach. This paper considers ways and means by which the US Navy can support the US Marine Corps, historically inseparable partners across the spectrum of military operations, when the Corps is tasked with stability operations. It starts with an examination of the Marine Corps concepts and doctrine for stability operations and then examining the range of capabilities that US Navy has that can contribute to Marine stability operations.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper studies the causes and consequences of the diffusion of military power in the international system, focusing specifically on the spread of new forms of naval power in the late 19th and early 20th century. The paper applies a framework called “adoption capacity theory” as a lens to understand the spread of new shifts in the basis of naval power, looking at how actions like the changes from sail to steam and wood to iron to steel, as well as the invention of weapons like the torpedo and submarine, influenced naval power. The results show that the relatively low organizational change requirements for adopting these inventions, with the exception of the submarine, meant these inventions tended to benefit pre-existing rich and powerful naval powers like Great Britain. The submarine, on the other hand, as an organizationally disruptive change, placed Great Britain on the defensive and tended to benefit newer and more nimble naval powers.