Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Effective negotiation strategies have long been a focus for scholars and practitioners alike. A negotiator can be assertive or passive, argumentative or collaborative, or employ other strategies in an attempt to secure their desired outcome. Some studies have suggested that the most effective techniques in negotiation include viewing the issue from the adversary's perspective, focusing on the problem versus personalities, seeking collaborative solutions versus compromise, and basing the discussions on objective criteria. In the real world of negotiation, however, individuals have limited information regarding effective negotiation styles, and thus it would rationally follow that their perceptions of what works - most often based on personal experience and assumptions - would determine the strategies they utilize. This raises the question of whether or not rational, self-interested individuals or negotiating teams employ what they perceive to be the most effective techniques to resolve a conflict. In other words, do their perceptions of effective negotiating match their actions? Furthermore, is such rationality, which is stereotypically more commonly associated with masculinity, more prevalent in male negotiators rather than female negotiators? Using data from the GlobalEd project at the University of Connecticut, this study investigates the link between perceptions and action in simulated international negotiations. This paper analyzes that data (coded from the content of their simulation messages) and matches that content with the negotiators' perceptions of what are effective negotiations strategies.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Specifically, this study will reveal the negotiating modes of North Korea(Bargaining, Blocking, Breakthrough mode) and analyze the intentions of North Korea focusing on the experiences of Six-party talks. Recent studies on the issue of the negotiating patterns pay insufficient attention to this gap. As a criticism of such an approach, this study will show that each mode has its own peculiarities and that we can make an estimate the purposes of North Korea's negotiating strategy at the Six-party talks through the application of each mode.(from First Six-party talks(August 27-29, 2003) to Fifth Six-party talks( November 9-11, 2005)) This study can help the preparation the upcoming Six-party talks toward denuclearization.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This article evaluates the February 13th Agreement in the fifth Six-Party Talk, officially known as “Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement,” in light of several negotiating strategies. Evaluation of the agreement’s effectiveness is considered not only based on general negotiating strategy, but also on North Korea’s negotiating style. Although a forecast of the result of the agreement is beyond the scope of this paper, this analysis may help lead to an understanding of North Korea’s behavior in the negotiations that will ultimately affect the building a peaceful Korean Peninsula. The February 13th Agreement has not yet been fully implemented, but it has successfully applied important strategies in the pre-negotiation and the negotiation processes. It should be complemented by continuous strategies in the post-negotiation process for the ultimate peace of Korean Peninsula.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: In this paper we draw together insights from bargaining theory, institutional analysis, and studies of the EU in multilevel games to shed light on the EU’s role in negotiating the 2000 Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. This multilateral environmental agreement represents one of the most “successful” EU negotiations to date. Not only did EU negotiators overcome stubborn opposition from GMO-exporting countries and secure most of their policy objectives, but the Commission played a leading role in relation to EU member states during the negotiation. All of this occurred under a “mixed” negotiation mandate for the EU, which, in contrast to conventional trade issues, means that member states and the Community must share, coordinate, and negotiate competences within an international setting. We determine that the institutionalist models of multilevel EU decisionmaking examined here perform adequately in yielding insights for our case. However, we encourage the inclusion of preference-based variables to analytical models in order to avoid institutional determinism and to understand more fully the role of the EU in “mixed” negotiation settings.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Analyses of the decision-making procedures in the European Union are often based on the positions of the central actors: the EU member states, the European Commission, the European Parliament. Quantitative and qualitative studies of EU negotiations need the opinions of the EU member states in order to model and investigate negotiation processes and the individual success or failure of the negotiators. Most models have so far used data generated by documentary analysis (Bueno de Mesquita & Stokman, 1994, 1997) or interview data such as the recently concluded research project “Decision Making in the European Union” (DEU) (2004). It is not clear, however, whether the preferences used in these analyses are an expression of interest or strategic positions assumed as a reaction to the position of other negotiators.
In the following paper I will show which elements determine the preferences of the EU member states in Council of Ministers negotiations. The calculations are based on the DEU data set which offers information on bargaining positions and saliencies of the EU member states in negotiations about 60 EU legislative proposals in the period 2000- 2002.
The results of my analyses will show that the negotiation positions of the EU delegations are to a large extent determined by their structural, often economic interests such as the amount which they contribute to the EU budget. Furthermore, the principal-agent relationship between the domestic constituency and the government can explain a government’s interest in some specific issues such as consumer protection. Missing positions are an expression of a lack of interest in a negotiation topic. However, I will also demonstrate that certain characteristics of the negotiation situation, such as the degree of contestation of a proposal or the institutional procedure trigger the choice of a strategy such as an extreme position.