Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper tests David Laitin's competitive assimilation hypothesis with the aid of Latvian school attendance records. Aggregate data appear to confirm a moderate rise in the number of Russian-speakers sending their children to Latvian schools. Disaggregate data, however, paint a more complicated picture, one which questions a main assumption of the Laitin model. Minority parents do not send their children to Latvian schools in Latvia's economically vibrant cities and continue to opt for education in Russian, despite the apparent economic rewards for knowing Latvian in these cities. I explain this paradoxical outcome by operationalizing and measuring the three variables that Laitin cites as affecting rates of assimilation: economic rewards, in-group status, and out-group acceptance. I then propose an alternative game theoretic framework for analyzing school choice.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The winner-take-all system of the American Electoral Colllege has resulted in some states being considered "safe" or non-competitive and others being considered "battlegrounds." The consequence of this is that presidential campaigns spend less time and money in safe states. This paper examines the degree to which the level of competitiveness affects political knowlege and argues that residents in competitive states have higher degrees of political knowledge and trust-in-government. Discussions about the Electoral College should take into account the discrepant impact of this system on the citizens of the states.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper explores the critical roles played by the
party leadership and standing committees in the state legislative
process. Specifically, it examines the role that each plays in
non-competitive, Democratically-dominant, competitive,
Democratic-advantage, and competitive, Republican-advantage political
settings. Does movement from a non-competitive to a competitive
environment result in a more centralized decision making arena?
Futhermore, does a shift from Democratic to Republican control in the
state legislature result in further centralization of the
decisionmaking process or does it result in a tendency to decentralize?
These two principal research questions will be investigated with the
aid of data drawn from one state (Florida) that has experienced a shift
from a one-party, Democratic-dominant legislature to a two-party
competitive legislature with a Democratic edge, and more recently, to a
competitive but Republican advantage. The results of this study could
have significant policy implications for not only legislative decision
making in Florida but also for policy making in legislatures in other
southern states that have been undergoing similar political changes as
tradional Democratic rule has given way to new Republican majorities.
In addition, this study could have relevance for legislative decision
making in other formerly one-party legislatures outside of the South as
well as ones that have shifted from traditional Republican control to
new Democratic majorities.
Data on committee and chairperson assignments will be drawn from the
The Clerk's Manual of the Florida Legislature and survey data
collected from Florida legislators in 1997 and 2003 by the
author.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper seeks to determine the scope and nature of competitive pressures which compel non-profit agencies to compete with one another for volunteers. This paper uses survey, interview, and GPS data from local non-profit directors.