Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: In organized hypocrisy � a concept from sociological organization theory � actors satisfy contradictory demands from their external environment through inconsistent rhetoric and behavior. This paper argues that the NPT exhibits organized hypocrisy � rhetorical commitment to nuclear disarmament inconsistent with actual nuclear strategies and force structures -- and explores the implications of such �nuclear organized hypocrisy� for the future of the nonproliferation regime. The nonproliferation regime�s legitimacy depends to a great extent on the maintenance of nuclear organized hypocrisy. NPT Review Conferences play an important role in perpetuating nuclear organized hypocrisy. The failure of the 2005 NPT Review Conference therefore raises important questions about the sustainability of nuclear organized hypocrisy, and its implications for the nonproliferation regime.

Publication Type: Proceeding
Abstract: What makes international institutions endure when they are challenged by noncompliance--especially in the field of arms control where the stakes and risks are so high? When noncompliance threatens an institution, actors can choose to abandon it, replace it, or rally in its defense. Realists and rationalists would expect an examination of materially defined interests to explain this variation. However, these approaches are not alone capable of describing how and why the strategic interests of states change in a way that accounts for the variance in outcomes. Consideration of the concept of legitimacy is necessary to complete the circle. Specifically, this paper disaggregates the concept of legitimacy in order to isolate its different operational dimensions. It then examines them in the case of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), which is widely considered to be experiencing a �crisis of compliance," and seeks to identify the conditions in which the NPT would, in fact, unravel.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This work examines the history of the Iranian nuclear program from the 1970s till the present. It also studies the economic, political, and potential strategic impact of a developing country acquiring nuclear capabilities, both civilian and military. In addition the paper examines the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the ramifications a potential Iranian nuclear program would have on the treaty. Finally the paper examines the ramifications an Iranian nuclear program has on Tehran's foreign policy regarding the United States, the Russian Federation, and the European Union, as well as with its neighbors in the region. This work also takes into account the implications of the upcoming Iranian election on this issue.

Publication Type: Poster
Abstract: At first glance, there appears a rather neat overlap between neoliberal institutional theory in the IR literature and the principles of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. After all, the text of the non-proliferation treaty specifies an emphasis on interstate cooperation, sharing information regarding nuclear technologies, and enforcing the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. Almost point for point, these principles echo the theoretical promise of institutions. The non-proliferation regime thus exists primarily because of the notion of mutual gains, because of a cost-benefit analysis made by individual states even in the backdrop of the self-help world. Yet, as Solingen (2007) notes, the rationalist perspective fails to explain the nuclear decisions of many states in recent history. In this paper, I pursue her critique further, examining the applicability of neoliberal institutionalism with regards to the non-proliferation regime. I begin by examining the general principles of the theory. What are the conditions under which cooperation occurs between states? How do relative gains, as well as power distribution, affect the nature of the particular institution? Solingen argues that “neorealist, constructivist, or domestic politics arguments” are better suited in explaining individual cases of compliance, and challenges the role credited to the NPT. Do institutions matter? The purpose of this paper is to flesh out the nuances of the neoliberal institutionalist perspective. Do the empirical shortcomings of the NPT and the non-proliferation regime reflect weaknesses in particular mechanisms, or are they indictments of the utility of institutional theory with the concept of nuclear weapons?

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Why did the NPT fail to prevent some of its own members from pursuing nuclear weapons? In this paper I argue that, to be effective in preventing proliferation, the NPT should have pursued one of two goals: force proliferators to reveal themselves by enacting an incentive structure that drove proliferators out of the NPT treaty, thereby denying them the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology transfers; or, encourage proliferators to remain within the NPT framework with a high likelihood of successfully uncovering violations. With a series of game theoretic models, I demonstrate that the incentive structure of the NPT failed to provide disincentives for proliferation and that the current structure of the Additional Protocol also fails to block proliferation. I suggest a revision of the current NPT treaty, incorporating the Additional Protocol: by forcing states to choose between signing an Additional Protocol and exiting the NPT, the nuclear nonproliferation regime will be better able to block the spread of nuclear weapons. Yet even this revised framework cannot target proliferation that occurs outside the reach of the treaty. Tackling the nuclear programs of states such as North Korea will require the international community to make a frank evaluation of the motivations driving states to acquire nuclear weapons.