Publication Type: Proceeding
Abstract: Theoretical and empirical work has offered compelling evidence that informational problems increase the odds of international conflict. Conversely, solutions to informational problems decrease these odds. Indeed, some explanations for the Democratic Peace draw extensively from this approach. Because democratic leaders can stake their threat to use force on the fact that they may lose office if they back down after issuing a threat, they are able to send more credible signals of resolve than autocrats. Moreover, to avoid these ‘audience costs,’ democrats only select themselves into conflicts when they are convinced that their adversaries will acquiesce to their demands. Both of these phenomena reduce the informational problems that lead to conflict. Most simply, democracies are bad bluffers. And, if rational, their adversaries know better than to resist their demands.

Applying these insights to intra-state conflict presents an empirical puzzle, however. Why does the Democratic Peace sometimes fail within states? That is, if democracies do not go to war with one another, why do groups within democracies sometimes come to blows with the central government? These questions raise a related theoretical puzzle: if national democratic leaders can generate audience costs in interstate disputes, why are regional leaders in democracies sometimes unable to gain concessions from the center through coercive diplomacy – without having to escalate to violent conflict? In other words, why would there be more uncertainty about the resolve of subnational actors within a democracy than between democratic states?

In this paper we offer both empirical and theoretical responses to these questions. We identify the microfoundations of credible signaling by subnational actors within democracies. Voters must control systematic and reliable mechanisms to punish regional leaders if they back down from demands. If they do not, because their regional executives are appointed by the central government, informational problems and thus bargaining failure and violent escalation ensue.

Empirically, we focus on the form of civil conflict most analogous to interstate conflict: violent secessionism. We find that the interaction between federalism and population size -- which we argue proxies for preference heterogeneity -- explains a lower probability of secessionist war. We attribute this finding to the ability of regional leaders under electoral federalism, a democracy in which regional governors are elected, not appointed, to generate audience costs. Indeed, we offer some "stylized facts" about the politics of decentralization that adduce regional political elites’ ability to extract concessions from central governments without needing to resort to violent escalation. Even as the magnitude of preference divergence increases and thus the incentives for regional leaders to seek changes in the policy status quo. This result does not hold so "structural federations," in which regional executives are appointed by the central government and not elected, however. We also find evidence for the fact that commitment problems and indivisibilities, the other culprits of bargaining failure that have been identified in the formal literature applied to international relations, explain a higher susceptibility to secessionist war within states.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The Vermont Progressive Party is unique among third parties for its growth and stability. This paper seeks to examine the factors that help this party survive, its ideological effect on the two major parties, and the role of partisan coordination.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This presentation will address a problem-based learning exercise in which students assume the role of campaign staff for a house incumbent running for re-election. The campaign staff is representing an individual whose district has voted for the opposing party’s presidential candidate in the two most recent presidential elections. In addition to that challenge, the opponent of the student’s candidate in the general election is a potential political heavyweight, such as Oprah, Michael Moore, Colin Powell, or Lou Dobbs. Therefore, students are required to conduct opposition research, evaluate their opponent's strengths and weaknesses, as well as the strength and weaknesses of the incumbent, produce storyboards for three different types of political advertisements, and devise an overall campaign strategy.

Publication Type: Graduate Student Research Forum
Abstract: Commonalities among exemplary secondary language arts teachers of traditionally underserved students will be discussed along with implications for preparing teachers to successfully teach traditionally underserved students.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Euler's classic partition identity, which states that the number of partitions of the
positive integer $n$ into odd parts equals the number of partitions of $n$ into distinct
parts, has been generalized and extended by many. In this talk, we
will briefly consider the historical background behind Euler's identity and then discuss
two results proven in the last few years which generalize this identity. Some of these
results were developed in collaboration with Gary Mullen and Drew Sills.