Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: What explains variations in state compliance with the 1997 OECD "Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions."? In an initial phase of follow-up monitoring to evaluate each country's implementing legislation, this Convention's peer-review monitoring group found a surprising variation in the compliance records of the OECD's four largest members. While Germany and the United States 'satisfactorily' complied with the Convention, France only 'sufficiently' complied and the United Kingdom did not comply. Why did some states comply and others not? Given the Convention's optimal design, function, and normative basis from the point of view of compliance theory, this outcome is particularly surprising. Employing evidence from research in the fours countries, and focusing on the U.K. case in particular, the paper assesses three alternative explanations for the observed variations in compliance: unintentional non-compliance; strategic trade; and norms related to transnational bribery. The analysis finds that none of the explanations initially suggested by the evidence is complete, but that a combination of strategic trade interests and normative factors is at play. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of this study for compliance theory in IR, and theories of international politics in general.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Separate studies in comparative political economy explain that distinctive economic performances of industrialized economies are produced by interactions between government partisanship and labor institutions, partisanship and the central bank, and labor and the central bank, respectively. There is thus reason to expect that all three factors of partisanship, the central bank, and labor jointly influence economic performance. This paper investigates their interactive effects on economic growth, inflation, and unemployment among OECD countries. The data show patterns distinct from those expected by any conventional explanations. There is little support for social democratic neocorporatism. But partisan differences do exist—just not in the way presumed by existing theories. Contrary to existing explanations, central bank independence enhances left governments’ growth. It also enhanced their employment performance in the 1990s, while it fueled their unemployment in the 1970s if labor is decentralized. It appears that the left’s policy preferences became more consistent with central bank monetary policy toward the 1990s.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Rogowski and Kayser (2002) posited that electoral systems, because they modify the balance of consumer-producer power, also modify price levels. Cross-sectional analysis of OECD countries in 1990 demonstrated that majoritarian electoral systems lower real price levels by approximately 10 percent. This paper now extends that empirical analysis to panel data for twenty-three OECD countries over the period 1970-2000, taking advantage of the numerous changes in electoral systems during that period (France, Italy, Japan, New Zealand). The finding that majoritarian electoral systems lead to lower real prices is shown to be remarkably resilient, surviving demanding robustness tests. The short-run effect of switching to an SMD from a PR system in a given country is a reduction of about 1.2 index points; the long-run effect of having an SMD electoral system, in the average OECD country, is a reduction in real prices of at least 10 per cent.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The literature on economic voting has long debated the issue of whether voters in democracies make voting decisions based on past economic performance, rewarding and punishing incumbents, or if voters select representatives based on their prospective evaluations of future economic performance. We argue that the existing theories on economic voting can draw on the finance literature on how stock market data reflect expectations of future economic performance. We empirically test the impact of stock market performance on incumbent party vote shares in a cross-national study of eight countries from 1980-2001, and the impact of stock market performance on US presidential approval rating from 1980 to 2002. We find that voters consistently use stock market performance when voters have more difficulty in attributing past economic performance to incumbent politicians.