Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Peg solitaire on a triangular board of side 5 is a popular puzzle found in Cracker Barrel restaurants. We'll consider this game on a triangular board of arbitrary size. The basic game begins from a full board with one peg missing and finishes with one peg at a specified board location. We develop necessary and sufficient conditions for this game to be solvable. For all solvable problems, we give an explicit solution algorithm. On the Cracker Barrel board, we compare three simple solution strategies. We then consider the problem of finding solutions that minimize the number of moves (where a move is one or more jumps by the same peg), and (using computational search) find the shortest solution to the basic game on all triangular boards with up to 55 holes (10 holes on a side).

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: In this talk, I focus on the attempted use of intellectual property to regulate areas historically falling outside the traditional intellectual property realm. Intellectual property protection of data, such as remote sensing, is an example of how existing intellectual property frameworks may be forced to encompass such areas, with questionable success. Other examples, such as the law of prediction, may have no justification to use intellectual property, although intuitively covered by the subject matter. I conclude by discussing the probable success of using non-traditional frameworks to inform the intellectual property regime, as opposed to forcing new legal problems into the existing intellectual property framework.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Soaring imprisonment rates and longer sentences have generated a remarkable number of habeas cases that allege not constitutional flaws in the underlying conviction or sentence but instead constitutional errors in actions taken by prison administrators or parole boards. A recent empirical study (King, Cheeseman & Ostrom, Habeas Litigation in U.S. District Courts) found that approximately 18% of habeas cases nationwide involve these claims, and a much greater percentage in some federal districts. Drawing upon the study, this paper addresses two problems this development poses for federal courts. First is the unclear and ill-fitting distinction between which of these challenges may be pursued using § 1983 under PLRA, and which must be pursued as habeas petitions under AEDPA. The second problem is that when these administrative challenges are brought as habeas petitions, the provisions of AEDPA, designed to address challenges to the criminal judgments of state courts, are difficult to apply. The paper proposes legal reforms that respond to both problems.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: We study the electoral impact of exchange rate policies by examining how de facto and de jure exchange rate behavior influences changes in electoral support for incumbent parties in a panel of 74 countries from 1972-2002. Our findings indicate that politicians are punished not for choosing a fixed or a floating exchange rate, but rather for deviating from a promise that the exchange rate regime will remain fixed. This finding applies only to de jure fixed exchange rare regimes; politicians that maintain but to not publicly commit to a fixed exchange rate regime are not punished. The findings in this paper provide support for the notion that politicians in democratic countries have an electorally motivated “fear of floating.”

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Recent research has found that the decision to float or peg an exchange rate is contingent on a nation's desire for flexibility to respond to domestic political institutional constraints, sectoral interests, and international investment. However, considering the recent trend of many non-democratic and commodity exporting dependent nations aspiring to move toward a floating exchange rate, extant studies need to be reevaluated. Much of the literature fails to evaluate the influences of the pegged currency, trade and investment agreements beyond the European Union, and a single predominant export. The volatility of pegged currency can greatly impact the instability the domestic economy of local markets, thereby increasing the desire to float the exchange rate. In addition, states that create or join trade agreements are often required to coordinate their exchange rates in an effort to promote institutional unity. Lastly, the significant weight of a principal export compels nations to acquire more control over its trade value. Using a data set spanning the years from 1970-2003, we employ pooled data of approximately 100 under-developed, developing, and developed nations to test the affects of our primary explanatory variables and reconsider existing arguments in light of the many unanticipated recent national decisions to float exchange rates.