Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Recent attention to graduate curricula (Schwartz-Shea, 2003) reveals that less than half of the 57 programs studied require some coverage of issues in philosophy of social science of doctoral students. Moreover, only about 44% offer a stand-alone course as an option for students in their programs. (In contrast, a course in quantitative methods is required by 66% of programs and is universally offered as an option.) Schwartz-Shea has argued (2002) that philosophy of social science is a course critical to legitimizing the variety of methodological approaches in the discipline, but is that what happens? Are students exposed to the range of positions on issues of epistemology or are particular positions privileged? In this paper, we begin to address this issue by examining a selection of fifteen syllabi for graduate-level "inquiry" courses. We look for commonalities across the syllabi in terms of texts, topics, themes, and course titles. After describing the patterns (e.g., core topics, texts), we assess the extent to which such patterns serve the purposes of: (a) exposing students to the range of debates in philosophy of social science; (b) connecting issues of philosophy of science to practices in research methodology; and (c) promoting understanding and communication across epistemic divides.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Burns, Deneen, Deutsch, Easton, Festinger, Frankl, Lasswell, Maslow, Rawls, Skinner, Tillich, and Wiener have each made significant contributions to democratic theory that seem to slip through our fingers. This essay analyzes portions of their contributions towards a theory of political leadership, employing components of systems dynamics theory, humanistic psychology, cybernetics, value theory and democratic philosophy. The theory, tentatively labeled “integrated dissonance theory” (IDT) is then used to interpret some of the multiple meanings of religion in politics, including democratic faith. Illustrative applications include current foreign policy concerns with religious belief systems such as the “clash of civilizations” problem that pits the interpretive frameworks of the current “great religions” against each other and against democratic faith. Further illustrations examine American domestic problems filtered through ideologies that pit racial and ethnic beliefs against each other, and issues such as size of government, whether budgets should be balanced, and so on. It concludes with an agenda for further research employing three distinct paradigms: science, philosophy, and historical practice.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Abstract:
Although technical terms often represent unambiguous meanings, the crucial expression �emptiness� in Mahāyāna Buddhist traditions is likely to serve a soteriological function. The doctrine of emptiness seems to be intended to detach our linguistic expression from the unwholesome influence of illusory assumptions; assumptions of which we are not aware in our referential acts. Buddhist texts often reveal our linguistic habits as the very root of inverse views inflicting unwholesome results on our existence.
On the other hand, Buddhists also believe that there is a mode of expression which initiates the transformation from the unwholesome into the wholesome. It is a mode of expression which causes us to become aware of the falseness inherent to linguistic expression. Consequently, Mahāyāna traditions treat and utilize linguistic expression in an ambiguous way; that is not only as the source of the unwholesome but also as the very impulse initiating its transformation into the opposite. Since the teaching about �emptiness� is self-referential, the functioning of emptiness must shape the linguistic expression in those Buddhist texts expanding on this doctrine. The compositional pattern of these texts frequently displays an ambiguous feature.
In some Chinese traditions, the ambiguous mode of linguistic expression received new inspirations from the very mark of the Chinese classical language itself � its mark of ambiguity. In my paper, I attempt to outline both the Mahāyāna Buddhist concern with language and the extent to which ambiguity in Chinese language may have inspired Chinese Buddhist thinkers in designing the compositional pattern of their texts. Since the doctrine of emptiness is a common foundation for all Mahayana teachings in China, my investigation intends to expose the Buddhist inclination to ambiguity as a major tendency in the traditions of various Chinese Buddhist schools.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The link between Locke�s natural and moral philosophy and his political theory has been explored by many scholars with varying degrees of success over the last twenty-five years. Some (Neal Wood, for example) argue that Locke constructed his philosophy in order to support his political program; Wood�s Locke was first a gentleman, and only a philosopher in support of that political priority. Others, like Paul Rahe, argue that Locke�s political theory arose from his natural and moral philosophy, that Locke pursued his philosophic interests to their political implications. This latter reading, which in my view is correct, raises the possibility that Locke developed a politics � a liberal regime � that would tolerate and perhaps even serve the ends of his modern natural philosophy. It accomplishes this in several ways: in its epistemology; through its doctrine of toleration and its emphasis on individual liberty; in its cosmopolitanism. This is to say that in addition to its civic goods, Locke�s politics serves his philosophy.
The difficulty has less to do with the particulars of Lockean liberalism, and more to do with the nature of political life as Locke sees it. Simply put, though Locke seems to hope that a liberal politics will make the philosopher safer, he does not seem to believe that political liberalism � or any regime � can embrace and promote the philosophic life. Philosophy may be made political, but politics cannot be wholly philosophic. The life of philosophy cannot be public life; it is essentially private. Liberalism offers greater defense of the private (for example, by making affairs of the soul private matters), but the regime itself cannot be philosophic; rather, it tolerates philosophy. Further, Locke suggests that for the philosopher to make his way in the modern liberal regime he must not only display the fruits of his work, he must also disguise that work under a mask of liberalism. In other words, Locke�s polite modern philosopher will not be vicious. This implies that Locke�s egalitarian philosophy and his egalitarian politics do not presume that all are philosophers; even under liberalism, philosophy is the realm of a few, and perhaps even a natural few. Locke understands the limits of the liberal regime or the so-called free society.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The study of crime has been a highly contentious and problematic issue. Now, with an overabundance of "crime," an overcrowding of criminal justice correctional institutions, and an intolerant and uninformed public, criminologists have been pressured to develop pragmatic theories of crime as underpinnings for practical application against a "war of crime." As a result, a plethora of criminological theories have emerged. However, these pragmatic theories have lacked the efficacy to advance criminology; although these theories are aggregating, the discipline of criminology has failed to progress. Criminologist Bernard offers a suggestion to this problem: accumulating a scientific knowledge base by falsifying theories of crime with the intent to perpetuate criminology as an academic discipline. One criterion he offers is that theories must be value-free if they are to be falsified. Granted, Bernard's contention is validated in so far as criminology is heading in the wrong direction, but his argument of a value-free criminology is unsubstantiated. In retrospect, if criminology is to progress, criminologists must think and come to some agreement about the fundamental nature of crime itself.