Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Under what conditions would a political party choose to articulate an interest group’s position in its campaign platform? Conventional models of party alignment illustrate that in a two-party system, both parties should try to capture the median voter (Downs 1957). If voters are aligned in interest groups, however, and those groups can credibly promise votes, can they pull party platforms away from the median? We construct a model of interaction between interest groups and political parties in a sequential game wherein groups align with parties in order to receive formal inclusion in parties’ campaign platforms. The payoffs of the game account for group attributes of mobilization potential, threat of exit, and ideology, and for party attributes of party electoral potential and ideology. We find that parties will position themselves closer to interest groups, possibly even diverging from the median, when groups pose a credible voter mobilization effort and represent a point distant from the median voter. To empirically test the formal model, we collect the party platforms for the Democratic and Republican parties from 2004. We estimate the spatial position of parties by using content analysis software on the transcripts of interest group testimony from party platform hearings in 2004. Results in this paper are highly preliminary, yet initial analysis shows support for our primary hypothesis.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Based on the Diffusion of Innovation theory and the Uses & Gratification theory, this paper investigates the predictors in audience’s adoption of online video platforms—webcasting and video download provided by the broadcast networks. Based on a survey of college students, gender, age, and personal innovativeness are not unique predictors of people’s adoption of online platforms, while perceived utility of online platforms is a significant indicator. The most popular programs people watch online are comedies and dramas. Online video platforms don’t seem to be a threat to the following media platforms—newspapers, magazines, music, or radio. However, they have a significant influence on people’s TV viewing habits. More than half of the respondents said online video platforms are substitute to television to some extent. Results from this study shows that a sizable group of audience is migrating to the Internet. This may a warning sign for broadcast networks whose main profit comes from television advertising revenues. Broadcasters need to incorporate alternative platforms into their programming distribution and find innovative ways to monetize these online platforms.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The national party platforms are often denigrated as meaningless with planks allotted to party activists as a means to quell internal dissent and diffuse intra-party fractionalization. However, we suggest that platforms do, in fact, matter precisely because they serve as a justification for ideational change and redirection of the governing party. We test this claim by examining three mechanisms of how platforms affect politics: they (1) signal faction strength, (2) create expectations of accountability among relevant issue publicans and thus serve as instruments to shift existing policy, and (3) function as linguistic and communications resources for politicians and candidates to reframe their rhetoric. We build this theory by examining the ideological disjunction apparent in the 1976 and 1980 Republican party platforms, focusing particularly on that party’s shifting on abortion, women’s rights, and family values. Evidence confirming two of these mechanisms suggests that platforms may have some effect on altering the terms of the political universe following an election.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: We study electoral competition when parties first choose platforms, and then compete to produce valance. Even though parties are office-seeking, platforms can be divergent. We discuss several applications to campaign spending and party discipline.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: A two dimensional model of political competition where two candidates compete for the votes of four group of voters is developed in this paper. Candidates' positions are fixed, and their most preferred policies will be implemented after the candidate is elected. Each candidate has a unit of time to declare his position on both policies. The time spent by candidate discussing the issues will affect the level of ambiguity observed by the voters._x000d_I find that both, voter distribution and issue importance affect the outcome of the election. Voter distribution determines which candidate will have an advantage in the election and issue importance determines the minimum amount of time that a candidate with advantage has to devote to the most important issue in order to win the election._x000d_In most cases, candidates are willing to discuss both issues to a certain level, and dialogue between candidates is possible. Only when candidates disagree on both issues, which are equally important to the voters, each candidate will discuss the issue upon which he agrees with deciding group of voters.