Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: In this paper I test whether political institutions of checks and balances can restore investor confidence in leftist governments’ perceived creditworthiness. Investors tend to be averse to left-wing governments because historically leftist governments have frequently relied on expansionary macroeconomic policies and infringed on the property rights of investors. However, governments may improve the negative perception of from investors by the help of institutional and policy arrangements that reduce political and policy uncertainty and promote investor confidence. I specifically test the effects of veto players on country creditworthiness. Theoretically, veto players may or may not improve country creditworthiness: a larger number of veto players make policy changes more difficult, thus may provide greater policy stability; on the other hand, veto players in leftist governments may be perceived as a policy gridlock that locks in policies that are unfavorable to investors. Using sovereign credit ratings data of more than 100 developed and developing countries, I find that there is an inverted-U shaped relationship between political constraints and sovereign credit ratings among the leftist governments in the developing world; that is, there is a positive relationship between veto players and credit ratings as one moves from very few to a moderate number of veto players, but after reaching a certain level of veto points the relationship turns negative. On the other hand, there seems to be no significant association between the number of veto players and sovereign credit ratings among leftist governments in the developed world.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper develops a computational model to expand the theory of veto players into the realm of presidential regimes. We bridge two strands in the study of comparative institutions: the work on veto players in parliamentary systems and the analysis of executive-legislative relations under presidentialism. In the first part of the paper we introduce the basic concepts and outline the setup for the analysis. Section two explores the relationship between the legislative powers of the president and the configuration of veto players in presidential regimes. Section three discusses how the number of legislative parties and their internal cohesion affect policy stability. In the fourth section, we develop a computational model to estimate the simultaneous impact of these factors in a conventional two-dimensional policy space. The results suggest that constitutional decree authority is a key factor explaining policy stability in presidential regimes, and that the impact of most institutional variables is conditional on the policy position of the key players.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: What makes unions veto players in the process of welfare reform? Although organizationally weak, French and Japanese unions are able to block certain welfare reforms, thereby affecting negotiating patterns and policy outcomes. Comparing the veto power of French and Japanese unions, we argue that the way in which welfare programs are organized affects the veto power of unions more than the unions’ organizational strength, political institutions, state structure, or the political (ideological) orientation of the incumbent government. Our case studies also show that Japanese unions have more institutional veto power than their French counterparts, albeit in more limited policy domains. In contrast, the veto power of the French unions mainly derives from political resources.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Lijphart’s (1977, 1984, 1999) conceptualization of the distinction between consensual and majoritarian democracy has been one of the most important developments in the study of comparative political systems in the last thirty years, and has indeed served as an antidote to the anglocentrism that previously existed in the study of democratic institutions. However, the concept of consensual democracy is problematic from the point of view of social choice theory. Theorists of consensual democracy have emphasized consensus as an alternative to majority rule. I will argue, however, that many of the countries most often cited as “consensual” are actually amongst the world’s purest examples of government by majority rule, having virtually no constitutional checks and balances (examples include the Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and to a lesser extent Austria and Belgium). Furthermore, I will argue that the institutions of consensual democracy follow axiomatically from the requirement of political equality. Far from being a new form of democracy, consensual democracy might better be described as “simple democracy”.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Civil wars show a remarkable variation in how long they last. Some end within days; others continue for decades. What explains the extreme intractability of some wars while others are resolved quickly? This paper argues that conflicts with multiple actors who must approve a settlement (veto players) are longer because there are fewer acceptable agreements, information asymmetries are more acute and shifting alliances and incentives to hold out make negotiation more difficult. This veto player approach to explaining variation in civil war duration is tested using a new dataset containing yearly data on all parties to each civil war begun since World War II. The statistical analysis shows a strong correlation between the number of veto players and the duration of civil war.