Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Given the close relationship between polarization and social conflict, I calculate the index of polarization proposed by Joan Esteban and Debraj Ray (Esteban and Debraj Ray, 1994), and some of its extensions as the extended polarization index (Esteban, Gradín and Ray, 1999), and the group and explained polarization indexes proposed by Carlos Gradín (Gradín, 2000), for Bogotá between the first semester of 2000 and the second semester of 2003._x000d_The Extended Polarization index was reduced by 10 % in the case of bipolar representation of the original distribution and by 8% in the case of multipolar representation. The reduction, in the bipolar case, is mainly explained by a reduction in the income distance between the two groups. In fact, there is an increase in the average income of the lower income group and a decrease in the average income of the high income group. In the case of multipolar representation the reduction is explained by a reduction in simple polarization due to the reduction in the income distance between the groups, and the fact that they become more uneven. Additionally, when looking at Group and Explained Polarization education seems to be the most relevant socioeconomic feature affecting income polarization.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The two political parties in Congress are as ideologically divergent as they have been at any point in the last three decades. Scholars, analyzing the factors that have propelled this polarization, have come to different conclusions. Several recent studies finds that fundamental shifts in party strategies inside Congress has polarized the parties (Collie and Mason 2000 and Roberts and Smith 2003), while others claims that the shift in the electorate has driven party divergence (Fleisher and Bond 2003 and Stonecash et al. 2003). This article takes a necessary step back to analyze the congress-to-congress micro-level changes leading to these enormous macro trends. By analyzing the individual ideological changes, I find evidence for both the institutional and electoral explanations for party polarization. A more complete picture of how Congress has polarized helps explain why Congress has polarized.

Publication Type: Proceeding

Publication Type: Proceeding

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The causes and consequences of public support, or the lack thereof, for the overseas application of military force is a subject of longstanding scholarly debate. The most widely accepted explanations emphasize rational public responses to events as they unfold. Such “event-based” explanations hold that a president’s ability to sustain public support for a U.S. military engagement depends primarily on its degree of success, the number of or trend in U.S. casualties, or the U.S. goals in a given conflict. Yet, recent research into the framing of foreign policy has shown that public perceptions concerning, success or failure, the implications of casualties, and the offensive or defensive nature of U.S. military engagements are often endogenous to the domestic political circumstances surrounding them, including the efforts of political and media elites to frame events to their own advantage.
In this study, we develop and test a series of hypotheses concerning media coverage of, and public opinion regarding, the war in Iraq. In the former case, in prior research (Baum and Groeling 2004, 2005) we report evidence that journalists’ preferences lead traditional news programs to disproportionately feature instances of members of the presidential party criticizing their fellow partisan president and, albeit to a somewhat lesser extent, of the opposition party praising him. Moreover, because they represent costly speech, presidential party attacks are highly credible to consumers, as is opposition party praise. In contrast, in more ideologically narrow “new media” outlets, we anticipate that the balance will likely differ substantially.
We test our hypotheses concerning media coverage through a comprehensive content analysis of all coverage of the war from September 2004 through February 2007 appearing on the CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News and FOX’s Special Report with Brit Hume. We test our public opinion hypotheses using that same dataset, as well as an expert survey on conditions in Iraq and national opinion toward the Iraq War broken down by party. We find significant differences in both the composition and impact of partisan messages on public opinion across outlets.