Publication Type: Multiple Paper Format
Abstract: This session will examine how teacher candidates use electronic portfolios for collecting and analyzing multiple perspectives, and discuss how principals consider these portfolios during the interview process.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Building on longitudinal research begun in 2002, this paper shares data from a program’s portfolio assessment system that captured teachers’ dispositions and growth of reflective practice to provide evidence of teachers’ growth and change, input for program decision-making, and data to measure program effectiveness.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Discussion of a collaboratively developed digital portfolio assessment initiative and the new dimension this process has brought to our teaching as a result of in-depth student work sample evaluation.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Illinois principals’ reported use of candidate portfolios in the hiring process and importance of factors that they consider when making clinical placements, analyzed by school type, location and size.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: To what extent does clientelism respond to monopolistic control of political power, or is clientelism rather the product of underdevelopment and poverty? Are hegemonic parties more likely to establish clientelistic links? We answer these questions stressing the role clientelism plays as a risk mitigating device for incumbents facing increased electoral threats. We argue that ?clientelism?, where politicians deliver goods to their core constituency in the form of private divisible transfers, is a strategy that usually does not ensure permanence in power. Only under exceptional conditions of extreme poverty and very low political competition are votes bought through clientelism cheap enough to ensure electoral victory. In order to win elections, politicians are compelled to reduce transfers to their core supporters and increase instead universalistic allocations. However, since politicians are risk-adverse, they do not abandon clientelism altogether. Politicians hedge electoral risk by retaining a portion of their diversified electoral investment portfolio in clientelistic exchanges. Our theoretical assertions are derived from a portfolio diversification model of policy investment. The model is tested with municipal level data from Mexico?s PRONASOL, a poverty alleviation program implemented by the PRI between 1989 and 1994.