Showing 1 through 5 of 20 records. | 1. Rosen, Brian. "The ICC: Will It Prevent Preemption?" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, Mar 17, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-11-22 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p73790_index.html>Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: International law has traditionally if controversially acknowledged preemptive attack as a legitimate act if self defense, although only under very constrained conditions, while consistently holding preventive attacks against less-than-imminent threats to be beyond the pale of the legitimate use of force. This paper re-examines the legal standing and definitions of anticipatory self-defense, particularly considering how these might change or be required to change in the context of terrorism and WMD proliferation. It will also consider the implications of the recent establishment of the International Criminal Court for the future consideration and use of anticipatory strategies. |
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| 2. Kessler-Mata, Kouslaa. "Federal Preemption in Indian Law: The Role of Courts and Congress in Shaping Tribal-State Relations" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Marriott, Loews Philadelphia, and the Pennsylvania Convention Center, Philadelphia, PA, <Not Available>. 2009-11-22 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p152174_index.html>Publication Type: Proceeding |
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| | Pages: 24 pages | || | Words: 11577 words | || | |
| 3. Chen, Frederick. "The Iraqi War and International Law: A Case of Hegemonic Preemption" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, Mar 17, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-11-22 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p73110_index.html>Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed |
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| | Pages: 24 pages | || | Words: 7389 words | || | |
| 4. Zimmerman, Joseph. "Congressional Preemption During the George W. Bush Administration, 2001-2007" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Hyatt Regency Chicago and the Sheraton Chicago Hotel and Towers, Chicago, IL, Aug 30, 2007 <Not Available>. 2009-11-22 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p210888_index.html>Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: The paper (1) assesses the adequacy of the theories of dual federalism, cooperative federalism, and coercive federalism in explaining the continuing metamorphous of national-state relations caused by preemption statutes, (2) calls for a broader theory of national-state relations in the dynamic United States federal system by emphasizing the failure of the existing theories to explain the unplanned, kaleidoscopic transformation of such relations by congressional preemption statutes since 1965, and (3) contains recommendations addressed to Congress, the President, Governors, and State Legislatures to improve the regulatory processes of the economic union and the political union. |
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| | Pages: 1 pages | || | Words: 174 words | || | |
| 5. Sandler, Todd. and Siqueira, Kevin. "Global Terrorism: Deterrence Versus Preemption" Paper presented at the annual meeting of the International Studies Association, Le Centre Sheraton Hotel, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, Mar 17, 2004 <Not Available>. 2009-11-22 <http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p74325_index.html>Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: This paper analyzes two anti-terrorism policies deterrence and preemption in an environment where a targeted nation's people and property are in jeopardy at home and abroad. A country's deterrence decision involves both external benefits and costs, while its preemption decision only gives external benefits. With damages limited to home interests, a country will overdeter, while, for globlized terror, a country will underdeter. Preemption is always undersupplied. Leader-follower behavior is apt to lessen inefficiency for deterrence, but worsens inefficiency for preemption as compared with Nash behavior. Policy conclusions are drawn. |
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