Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: Theorists have long grappled with the concept of power in international relations. It is widely recognized that a simplistic aggregation of capabilities fails to capture the full meaning of power in international affairs, and is even less effective in capturing the elusive process in which power is translated into influence. However, international relations theory has yet to fully articulate a set of alternative tangible concepts that can help us gain a better grasp of the many faces of power. In this paper I focus on prestige as such an alternative concept. Prestige is a social reflection of capabilities and as such it is especially useful in untangling the capabilities/influence conundrum. While international relations theory offers very little insight into the nature and mechanics of prestige, works by prominent social theorists such as Veblen, Gramsci, Bourdieu, Parsons and Mills offer theoretical conceptualizations of prestige as well as observations on prestige-driven behavioral regularities that are applicable to international relations. In this paper I use these works in order to develop a comprehensive analysis of the role, nature, and mechanics of prestige in international affairs. I offer the theory of conspicuous waste in international relations as one testable derivative of this theoretical analysis.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Can prestige be an end of foreign policy? This paper addresses the role of prestige in international relations. Most approaches to the study of International Relations recognize that prestige exists in the realm of global politics. However, scholarship does not address the full significance of prestige. For example, Realists focus on the use of prestige by great powers to demonstrate the state’s military power and do not believe that prestige could be an end of foreign policy. This paper argues prestige is not just important as a reflection of power but can be an important foreign policy consideration for states that lack power. In addition, prestige is not limited to traditional conceptions of power but can reflect non-military characteristics. Lastly, prestige can be an end of state behavior independent of power considerations and material interest motivations. Some states place a premium on international prestige and will engage in potentially costly international action in order to bolster their reputation and increase their prestige. This paper examines two cases where prestige is employed in unconventional ways in order to demonstrate that prestige can play an important role in foreign policy calculations.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper uses social network analysis to generate and test hypotheses on the effects of a state's social environment on its propensity to seek and acquire nuclear weapons.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: We test Mackinnon and Langford’s (1994) identity theory of the meaning of occupational prestige rankings among Americans and Canadians with Japanese data. Stratification researchers normally assume that societal prerequisites of education and the rewards of income give cognitive meaning to occupational prestige scores. The Mackinnon and Langford path analytic model demonstrates how North American affective meaning in the form of the moral worthiness of occupations directly and indirectly influence occupational prestige scores. Because many scholars regard Japan as exceptionalist, our analyses shed light on whether the affective and cognitive mechanisms underlying occupational prestige rankings are universalistic or particularistic. Japanese occupational prestige appears to be a function of an individual’s educational attainment and the authority bestowed by his or her occupation. We propose McPherson’s model of Blau-space for explaining significant dissimilarities with the North American model.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: How does corruption become prevalent in an organization? How do organizational socialization processes affect the learning of corrupt behavior, and what can organizations do to control corruption through social learning? We develop a theoretical model that draws on literature in criminology and corruption to explore these questions. Our analysis suggests that, because corrupt behavior results in enhanced status, and there is some probability that corrupt acts can be carried out covertly and therefore never punished, corruption will evolve in organizations when corrupt actors serve as role models to others. In order to eradicate corruption within organizations, we posit that rather than punishing the behavior of corrupt actors (as suggested by behaviorists and rational choice theorists), organizations must instead ensure through culture and socialization that corrupt actors cannot achieve high status and therefore cannot serve as role models to others or must minimize the observation of high-status corrupt actors.