Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: This paper examines efforts by the New York Times to critique its prewar intelligence reporting in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq War. The newspaper featured several stories on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction using anonymous sources. In turn, these stories helped set the U.S. news agenda in the months before the start of the Iraq War. In the wake of revelations of faulty intelligence regarding Iraq’s weapons, the Times received criticism over its reporting. In particular, the overuse of anonymous sourcing by reporter Judith Miller was blamed for relaying misleading information to readers. News sourcing raises tensions between journalism’s claims to being independent and, in practice, its entrenched reliance on official sources. This contrast is made more complicated by anonymous sourcing and the removal of attribution from public view. As a result, the controversial use of anonymous sources strikes at the core of the credibility of the news. The paper traces the criticisms of the New York Times’s prewar coverage as well as the response to its editor’s note a year into the war. The newspaper apologized for its prewar coverage and blamed both misinformation from Iraqi exiles as well as a newsroom culture driven by scoops. The Times attempted to repair damage to its credibility through restating the importance of skepticism as a norm of journalism. In doing so, the newspaper attempts to align the problematic practice of anonymous sourcing with the normative role of journalism in a democracy.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: "I was shocked to the point that I was blinded by sheer disbelief ? In the end, [the U.S.] completely disregarded the years of sacrifice made by Japan, forcing us to forgo the great nation status that we had striven so hard to establish in the Far East. But to do so for Japan was none other than committing suicide. We now had no choice but to rise." (Jidai no Ichimen [An Aspect of Time], 2 vols, Tokyo: Hara Shobo, 1985.) According to the memoirs of Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, these were his immediate reactions upon reading the cable that had just arrived from the Japanese Ambassador to the United States, Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura. Included in the cable was a note from Secretary of State Cordell Hull that contained an explicit rejection of Japan's proposal to resolve the current U.S.-Japan crisis. The message of the so-called "Hull Note" was clear: Japan needed to first withdraw from China before the U.S. would consider any Japanese demands. It was the same unequivocal position that the U.S. had maintained since early 1941. Unquestionably, Washington was unwilling to make even the slightest compromise towards Tokyo; appeasement was clearly out of the question.If there ever did exist a point-of-no-return on the road to Pearl Harbor, it was certainly on this day of November 26, 1941, when Togo - the leading advocate for peace in the cabinet - gave away all hope. Of course, Togo was no pacifist. However, he also was cognizant of the fact that war with the U.S. was futile and would only spell disaster for Japan. If so, then what pushed Togo to the brink that he felt Japan had "no choice but to rise"? Was it, as most Japanese historians claim, because the "Hull Note" was so uncompromising in its stance that it basically amounted to an ultimatum? Moreover, why was Togo so utterly dismayed? His emotionally charged words reveal that the foreign minister was so taken aback by the note that he felt a overpowering sense of betrayal. Could it be that Togo had been expecting an altogether different reply from the U.S.? Was he privy to any intelligence that would suggest otherwise? In light of the new evidence on prewar Japanese sigint recently discovered at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, and the Diplomatic Record Office (DRO) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, Japan, the purpose of this paper will be the following: First, to illuminate the history of the hitherto highly obscure Japanese Black Chamber (Section 18),and two, to set forth a more logical and coherent explanation to Togo's volte-face in his policy towards the United States that ruptured all hope for peace. In conclusion, the paper will incorporate the new knowledge gained concerning Japanese prewar sigint and reveal how intelligence analysis had a detrimental impact on policy decisions a critical juncture. Through this undertaking, this paper will refute the longstanding understanding that the so-called "Hull Note" was the final straw that led to Pearl Harbor.