Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: A large literature documents to what extent a state will engage in free trade or protectionist policies. However, there is considerable variation in the specific policies governing protected commodities, and much less is known about how trade policy is developed for specific goods. Since different instruments generate different incentive structures _x000d_to “rent seek” and hence have differential implications for social costs, more theory is needed that explains the form of specific trade policy. Here we will argue that the specific form of these protections policy is due largely to the nature _x000d_of the enacting legislative coalition and its relationship with relevant interest groups. In contrast to existing theories of trade policy, we argue that the commitment problems that plague the interactions between legislators and interest groups are central to understanding why some _x000d_protections are more complex than others. After developing a theory of the specific form of protections policy, we test it using a simple multilevel model and TRAINS data for the U.S. _x000d_during the 1990s.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Abstract: Glassware and rubber footwear are both beneficiaries of special protections under U.S. trade
policy, yet the incidence of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on rubber footwear is considerably greater.
Theories explaining trade policy and domestic politics routinely emphasize interactions between political
actors including executives, legislators, voters and interest groups. The interactions between
varying combinations of such actors largely determine the extent to which a state will engage in
free trade or protectionist policies. However, there is considerable variation in the specific policies
governing protected commodities, and much less is known about how trade policy is developed for
specific goods. Since different instruments generate different incentive structures to �rent seek�
and hence have differential implications for social costs, more theory is needed that explains the
form of specific trade policy. Just as some states emphasize free trade over protectionism (and vice
versa), special protections policies can be more or less complex. Here we will argue that the specific
form of these protections policy is due largely to the nature of the enacting legislative coalition and
its relationship with relevant interest groups. Though tariffs are generally the easiest−and most
transparent−form of protection policy to implement, the level of complexity will increase as interest
groups wield greater power over the policy-making process. These more complex policies are
attractive to politicians because they are less likely to be implicated as sources of increased social
costs while appealing to commodity lobbies because it is more difficult to overturn complex policies
than simple policies. Legislators design more complex policy in order to �lock in� the protections
awarded to a particular commodity and secure the support of the relevant interest group. Consequently,
more complex protections policies are a testament to the strength of interest groups. On
the other hand, imposing tariffs is simpler, more transparent, and from a transaction costs perspective,
less costly than non-tariff barriers such as subsidies and quotas. The task of this paper is to
understand what conditions influence the level of policy complexity.

Publication Type: Abstract
Abstract: Freshwater Myristica swamps are special type of wetlands that harbors a number of unique taxa. They usually occur at lower altitudes in evergreen forests of Western Ghats, India and form an ideal habitat for the cultivation of several commercial crops. Hence, in last few decades these swamps have been extensively encroached and destroyed. Consequently, many species obligatory to these habitats show reduced genetic diversity and fitness. In this study an attempt was made to assess the genetic status of an obligate swampy species in protected (n=3) and non-protected areas (n=5).

The results indicated that disturbance indices (number of cut and broken stems per quadrat) was significantly higher in non-protected areas (NPAs) (3.21�3.10) compared to protected areas (PAs) (1.67�2.60). Genetic data revealed from 10 Inter-Simple-Sequence-Repeat (ISSR) markers indicated that swamps in PAs maintain significantly higher (0.12�0.03) genetic diversity (Dice�s Index) than NPAs (0.10�0.04). Further, frequency distribution of Dice�s dissimilarity index was negatively skewed for PAs whereas it was skewed positively for NPAs. In summary, it appears that PAs with low disturbance facilitates random mating thereby increasing the population genetic diversity. Our study plays an important role in developing conservation strategies for the swamps as well as their obligatory species.

Publication Type: Oral Presentation
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: The establishment of marine protected areas is often viewed as a conflict between conservation and fishing interests. We considered multiple commercial and recreational fisheries in the systematic design of a network of marine protected areas along California�s coast in the context of The Marine Life Protection Act Initiative. Three types of marine protected areas are under consideration, each with different levels of protection that allow varying degrees of extractive and non-extractive activities, ranging from no-take marine reserves (high protection) to conservation parks (low protection). With advice from managers, administrators, and scientists, a representative group of stakeholders defined biodiversity conservation and socioeconomic goals that accommodated social needs and conserved marine ecosystems, consistent with legal requirements.

Using a simulated annealing algorithm, we produce several possible zoning configurations that satisfied both biodiversity and socioeconomic goals and objectives. The zone assignments are driven by the fishing restrictions in each zone and are informed by fine-scale spatially explicit data on multiple commercial and recreational fisheries. Previous methods for systematically designing marine protected areas could not simultaneously consider multiple types of conservation zones and activities; they were limited to including or excluding a planning unit from a single type of zone (e.g. reserved or not reserved). We compare the effectiveness of marine protected area networks designed using our approach with these previous methods and conclude that design methods with the ability to consider multiple zones reduce the potential impact to the fisheries substantially more than design methods without consideration of multiple zones.

Publication Type: Conference Paper/Unpublished Manuscript
Review Method: Peer Reviewed
Abstract: In this paper, I discuss the international regulation of databases. Compilations of data have become the subject of a contentious intellectual property debate between the EU and U.S. over the past decade, particularly with the emergence of on-line technologies for the collection, dissemination, organization, and use of data. Although both sides initially held convergent views on the international regulation of database rights, to the point of jointly proposing an international treaty in 1996, their approaches have since diverged dramatically, generating an uncertain legal environment for database producers, users, and regulators. Given the transnational nature of the market for many types of databases and the extensive international regime for copyright and other intellectual property rights, database regulation should be an easy case for institutionalist theories. There are many ex ante reasons to believe that the EU and U.S. would cooperate to build a regime for databases, yet no international regulatory regime has thus far been established. Database protection therefore constitutes an international non-regime. After defining databases and describing the market for them, I review the status quo for intellectual property regulation on this issue in Europe, the U.S., and internationally. In the final section of the chapter, I offer competing explanations of the divergent outcomes based on my theory of private sector preferences and the statist-realist alternative.